From: "Mi, Dapeng" <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev
Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 14/15] perf/core: Add event_caps dependency flags
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2026 14:34:45 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b0d68c0e-3787-4a98-be13-408d84daafb7@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260928080537.5212D1F000FF@smtp.kernel.org>
On 9/28/2026 4:05 PM, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
> - [High] perf/core: Userspace-triggerable WARN_ON_ONCE via retained event_caps in promoted group leader
> --
>
> commit ee7032954fb61d16c3b9fceb7931ce04cf4b8852
> Author: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
>
> perf/core: Add event_caps dependency flags
>
> This commit adds two new event capability flags, PERF_EV_CAP_RELIED_ON and
> PERF_EV_CAP_RELIANT, to track dependencies between perf events in a group.
> When a relied-on event is detached, all reliant events are scheduled out
> and transitioned to an ERROR state.
>
>> diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
>> index de05df65ab3d0..55db0ad8b93a0 100644
>> --- a/kernel/events/core.c
>> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
>> @@ -2349,13 +2349,12 @@ static void perf_promote_sibling_to_leader(struct perf_event *sibling,
>> int group_caps)
>> {
>> /*
>> - * Events that have PERF_EV_CAP_SIBLING require being part of
>> - * a group and cannot exist on their own, schedule them out
>> - * and move them into the ERROR state. Also see
>> - * _perf_event_enable(), it will not be able to recover this
>> - * ERROR state.
>> + * Events with PERF_EV_CAP_SIBLING or PERF_EV_CAP_RELIANT
>> + * must stay in a group or depend on another event in the
>> + * group; otherwise schedule them out and move them to ERROR.
>> + * _perf_event_enable() cannot recover from this state.
>> */
>> - if (sibling->event_caps & PERF_EV_CAP_SIBLING)
>> + if (sibling->event_caps & (PERF_EV_CAP_SIBLING | PERF_EV_CAP_RELIANT))
>> __event_disable(sibling, ctx, PERF_EVENT_STATE_ERROR);
>>
>> sibling->group_leader = sibling;
>> sibling->group_caps = group_caps;
> [Severity: High]
> Does this code need to clear PERF_EV_CAP_RELIED_ON and PERF_EV_CAP_RELIANT
> from sibling->event_caps when promoting the sibling to a singleton group
> leader?
>
> Since the flags are retained, a newly promoted leader can still carry
> PERF_EV_CAP_RELIANT.
Per my understanding, the event->event_caps should only be initialized at
the event creation and can't be modified from then. The event->event_caps
carries the specific capabilities of the event, it should not be changed or
cleared.
Besides, if PERF_EV_CAP_RELIANT is cleared for the metric events, the
metric events could be incorrectly enabled in _perf_event_enable().
>
>> @@ -2371,6 +2370,43 @@ static void perf_promote_sibling_to_leader(struct perf_event *sibling,
>> perf_event__header_size(sibling);
>> }
>>
>> +static void perf_group_disable_reliants(struct perf_event *event)
>> +{
>> + struct perf_event *leader = event->group_leader;
>> + struct perf_event *sibling, *tmp;
>> + struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
>> + u32 mask = PERF_EV_CAP_RELIED_ON | PERF_EV_CAP_RELIANT;
>> +
>> + if (!(event->event_caps & PERF_EV_CAP_RELIED_ON))
>> + return;
>> +
>> + /* Group leader should not carry PERF_EV_CAP_RELIED_ON. */
>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(leader->event_caps & PERF_EV_CAP_RELIED_ON);
>> + /* Group leader should not carry PERF_EV_CAP_RELIANT. */
>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(leader->event_caps & PERF_EV_CAP_RELIANT);
> [Severity: High]
> Can userspace trigger this WARN_ON_ONCE because of the retained caps when
> siblings are promoted to leaders?
>
> If a user creates a perf event group with a non-slots leader, a slots
> sibling, and a metric sibling, the metric sibling can acquire
> PERF_EV_CAP_RELIANT.
>
> When the user closes the leader, the metric sibling is promoted to its
> own group leader, retaining PERF_EV_CAP_RELIANT and entering
> PERF_EVENT_STATE_ERROR.
>
> If the user then opens a new slots sibling and a new metric sibling under
> this promoted leader, and finally closes the new slots sibling, won't
> perf_group_disable_reliants() hit this WARN_ON_ONCE because the leader
> still holds the reliant flag? On systems with panic_on_warn enabled,
> this could cause a kernel panic.
It's a possible case, but won't it justify why the WARN_ON_ONCE() is
needed? Once such incorrect cases occur, users would be warned.
Thanks.
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-29 6:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-28 7:42 [PATCH 00/15] perf/x86: Fix sampling bugs and relax slots-event grouping Dapeng Mi
2026-09-28 7:42 ` [PATCH 01/15] perf/x86/intel: Guard leader sibling walk on nr_siblings Dapeng Mi
2026-09-28 8:00 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-28 7:42 ` [PATCH 02/15] perf/x86/intel: Reset active_fixed_ctrl_val on CPU teardown Dapeng Mi
2026-09-28 8:02 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-28 7:42 ` [PATCH 03/15] perf/x86/intel: Reset active_pebs_data_cfg " Dapeng Mi
2026-09-28 8:07 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-28 7:42 ` [PATCH 04/15] perf/x86/intel: Reset cached acr_cfg_b[] and cfg_c_val[] " Dapeng Mi
2026-09-28 8:01 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-28 7:42 ` [PATCH 05/15] perf/x86/intel: Pass correct PEBS counter mask to no-drain update path Dapeng Mi
2026-09-28 7:58 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-28 7:43 ` [PATCH 06/15] perf/x86/intel: Limit PEBS counter iteration to valid array bounds Dapeng Mi
2026-09-28 8:00 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-28 7:43 ` [PATCH 07/15] perf/x86/intel: Reject SAMPLE_READ for no-counter-snapshot ACR events Dapeng Mi
2026-09-28 8:04 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-29 6:08 ` Mi, Dapeng
2026-09-29 19:02 ` Falcon, Thomas
2026-09-30 1:12 ` Mi, Dapeng
2026-09-28 7:43 ` [PATCH 08/15] perf/x86/intel: Fix stale PEBS count without counter-group support Dapeng Mi
2026-09-28 8:02 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-28 7:43 ` [PATCH 09/15] perf/x86/intel: Refactor intel_pmu_drain_arch_pebs() Dapeng Mi
2026-09-28 7:57 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-28 7:43 ` [PATCH 10/15] perf/x86/intel: Refactor intel_pmu_drain_pebs_icl() Dapeng Mi
2026-09-28 7:59 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-28 7:43 ` [PATCH 11/15] perf/x86/intel: Fix invalid PEBS counts with counter-group support Dapeng Mi
2026-09-28 8:00 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-28 7:43 ` [PATCH 12/15] perf/x86/intel: Make ACR static_call update architectural Dapeng Mi
2026-09-28 8:02 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-28 7:43 ` [PATCH 13/15] perf/x86: Validate event type before topdown/mem-loads classification Dapeng Mi
2026-09-28 8:01 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-28 7:43 ` [PATCH 14/15] perf/core: Add event_caps dependency flags Dapeng Mi
2026-09-28 8:05 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-29 6:34 ` Mi, Dapeng [this message]
2026-09-28 7:43 ` [PATCH 15/15] perf/x86/intel: Allow Topdown metrics with a non-leader slots event Dapeng Mi
2026-09-28 8:12 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-29 7:04 ` Mi, Dapeng
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