[PATCH] s390: ensure that syscall arguments are properly masked on s390

[PATCH] s390: ensure that syscall arguments are properly masked on s390

[Paul Moore]

From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

When executing s390 code on s390x the syscall arguments are not
properly masked, leading to some malformed audit records.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c |   11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
index 49b1c13..ac1dc74 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -822,6 +822,7 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
 asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	long ret = 0;
+	unsigned long mask = -1UL;
 
 	/* Do the secure computing check first. */
 	if (secure_computing()) {
@@ -849,9 +850,13 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
 		trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->gprs[2]);
 
-	audit_syscall_entry(regs->gprs[2], regs->orig_gpr2,
-			    regs->gprs[3], regs->gprs[4],
-			    regs->gprs[5]);
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+        if (test_thread_flag(TIF_31BIT))
+                mask = 0xffffffff;
+#endif
+	audit_syscall_entry(regs->gprs[2], regs->orig_gpr2 & mask,
+			    regs->gprs[3] & mask, regs->gprs[4] & mask,
+			    regs->gprs[5] & mask);
 out:
 	return ret ?: regs->gprs[2];
 }

Re: [PATCH] s390: ensure that syscall arguments are properly masked on s390

[Paul Moore]

On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 4:42 PM, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> wrote:
> From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>
> When executing s390 code on s390x the syscall arguments are not
> properly masked, leading to some malformed audit records.
>
> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> ---
>  arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c |   11 ++++++++---
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

FWIW, I've applied this patch to the audit tree, in the next branch;
if anyone has any objections please let me know.

> diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
> index 49b1c13..ac1dc74 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -822,6 +822,7 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
>  asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
>  {
>         long ret = 0;
> +       unsigned long mask = -1UL;
>
>         /* Do the secure computing check first. */
>         if (secure_computing()) {
> @@ -849,9 +850,13 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
>         if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
>                 trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->gprs[2]);
>
> -       audit_syscall_entry(regs->gprs[2], regs->orig_gpr2,
> -                           regs->gprs[3], regs->gprs[4],
> -                           regs->gprs[5]);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
> +        if (test_thread_flag(TIF_31BIT))
> +                mask = 0xffffffff;
> +#endif
> +       audit_syscall_entry(regs->gprs[2], regs->orig_gpr2 & mask,
> +                           regs->gprs[3] & mask, regs->gprs[4] & mask,
> +                           regs->gprs[5] & mask);
>  out:
>         return ret ?: regs->gprs[2];
>  }
>

-- 
paul moore
security @ redhat