From: Linlin Zhang <linlin.zhang@oss.qualcomm.com>
To: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Cc: ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, mst@redhat.com,
jasowangio@gmail.com, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
martin.petersen@oracle.com, robh@kernel.org, krzk+dt@kernel.org,
conor+dt@kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org,
virtualization@lists.linux.dev, devicetree@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org, neeraj.soni@oss.qualcomm.com,
gaurav.kashyap@oss.qualcomm.com, mani@kernel.org,
andersson@kernel.org, konradybcio@kernel.org, bvanassche@acm.org,
alim.akhtar@samsung.com, avri.altman@sandisk.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com, eperezma@redhat.com,
xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 08/11] block: add /dev/blk-crypto-proxy for host-side virtio-blk inline encryption
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2026 21:14:41 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3fb17f29-6f74-4b7d-b776-8a95e597f8b9@oss.qualcomm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260901194316.GD729142@fedora>
On 9/2/2026 3:43 AM, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 27, 2026 at 09:07:17AM -0700, Linlin Zhang wrote:
>> From: linlzhan <linlin.zhang@oss.qualcomm.com>
>>
>> A userspace virtio-blk backend receives VIRTIO_BLK_T_CRYPTO_IN/OUT
>> requests from guests that carry a virtual ICE keyslot index and a data
>> unit number. The backend must submit the bio to the host storage
>> controller with the correct inline encryption context, but it has
>> no in-kernel interface to do so.
>>
>> Add /dev/blk-crypto-proxy, a misc character device that bridges a
>> userspace virtio-blk backend to the kernel blk-crypto layer. The
>
> Question for blk-crypto folks: should this new userspace blk-crypto
> interface be at the block device level or at the VFS level? If you
> envision that applications might want to manage their own keys and
> perform encrypted I/O on files, then maybe this should be at the VFS
> level. Block devices would of course be supported by a VFS interface
> too.
>
>> interface is three ioctls:
>>
>> BCP_BIND_CONTEXT — bind a host block device fd and a hypervisor
>> VM fd to this file descriptor; the kernel
>> resolves the VM fd to a guest id and holds
>> the bdev reference for the fd lifetime.
>
> Is there anything virtualization-specific in this interface? I think
> it's really a userspace interface for blk-crypto that can be used by any
> userspace application.
>
> It would be nice to name and document the interface without mentioning
> virtualization so that we can think about it from a more generic point
> of view that allows for new use cases in the future rather than
> focussing too much on just the virtualization use case.
ACK
I'll update it if it exists in the next patch.
>
>> BCP_GET_CRYPTO_CAPS — query the bound device's blk_crypto_profile
>> capabilities (supported modes, key types, max
>> DUN bytes) and the number of ICE keyslots
>> allocated to the bound VM, so the backend can
>> populate the virtio config space crypto fields.
>> BCP_SUBMIT_IO_BY_VSLOT — submit an inline-encrypted bio using the
>> virtual slot index supplied by the guest. The
>> kernel resolves virt_slot to a physical ICE
>> keyslot via bcp_slot_virt_ops, calls
>> bio_crypt_set_ctx_by_slot(), and submits the
>> bio synchronously. Large requests are split
>> at data-unit boundaries (BIO_MAX_VECS per bio)
>> to preserve DUN/IV correctness. The
>> implementation follows the block layer's
>> direct-I/O path, with two differences: each
>> bio carries an inline encryption context, and
>> multiple bios are submitted sequentially
>> rather than concurrently now.
>
> Linux already has multiple userspace interfaces for submitting I/O, like
> preadv(2), io_uring, Linux AIO, etc. I don't think a new ioctl-based
> interface just for submitting I/O with blk-crypto metadata makes sense
> because applications sometimes spend a lot of time optimizing for the
> I/O submission interface (e.g. io_uring) and integrating a new interface
> makes adoption hard.
>
> Did you look at how to extend preadv()-related interfaces and io_uring
> operations?
>
Thanks for the feedback!
I agree that introducing a new ioctl-based I/O submission path is not ideal,
especially for VMMs that are already optimized around existing interfaces
such as io_uring or preadv()-based workflows.
My reasoning was that I/O carrying blk-crypto metadata has several
constraints that must be validated before submission:
1. The starting logical offset must be aligned to the data unit size,
which is also the granularity at which the DUN increments.
2. The I/O length must be a multiple of the data unit size.
DUN + data_unit_count - 1 must not exceed the maximum representable
DUN value.
3. The bio construction and page-segment splitting must not break
data-unit boundaries.
My assumption was that handling these blk-crypto-specific requirements
inside generic I/O submission interfaces might not be desirable, since
those interfaces are primarily concerned with I/O submission semantics
rather than encryption metadata validation. As a result, I opted for a
separate ioctl-based path.
That said, I understand the concern about introducing a new I/O
interface solely for blk-crypto support. If reusing existing
infrastructure is preferred, io_uring seems like the most suitable
candidate to me. Linux AIO is largely legacy at this point, while
extending preadv()-style APIs would likely require ABI changes to pass
encryption metadata.
I'd appreciate guidance from you, the block and blk-crypto maintainers
on what direction would be considered more acceptable. In particular,
whether these blk-crypto-specific constraints should be handled by
extending an existing I/O submission interface such as io_uring, or
whether a dedicated interface is justified in this case.
>>
>> The driver is hypervisor-agnostic and storage-vendor-agnostic. Two
>> pluggable op-sets registered by platform drivers fill the gaps:
>>
>> bcp_hypervisor_ops — translate a hypervisor VM fd to an opaque
>> guest_id; implemented by the hypervisor driver.
>> bcp_slot_virt_ops — map (profile, guest_id, virt_slot) to a
>> physical ICE keyslot; implemented by the
>> platform storage virtualization layer.
>>
>> Both op-sets are RCU-protected singletons; the hot path reads them
>> lock-free.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: linlzhan <linlin.zhang@oss.qualcomm.com>
>> ---
>> drivers/block/Kconfig | 15 +
>> drivers/block/Makefile | 1 +
>> drivers/block/blk-crypto-proxy.c | 667 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> include/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h | 100 ++++
>> include/uapi/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h | 122 +++++
>> 5 files changed, 905 insertions(+)
>> create mode 100644 drivers/block/blk-crypto-proxy.c
>> create mode 100644 include/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h
>> create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/block/Kconfig b/drivers/block/Kconfig
>> index 7790ee2c700c..48ad79734c09 100644
>> --- a/drivers/block/Kconfig
>> +++ b/drivers/block/Kconfig
>> @@ -176,6 +176,21 @@ config BLK_DEV_LOOP
>>
>> Most users will answer N here.
>>
>> +config BLK_CRYPTO_PROXY
>> + tristate "Inline encryption proxy for virtio-blk guests"
>> + depends on BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION
>> + help
>> + Provides /dev/blk-crypto-proxy, a misc character device that allows a
>> + userspace virtio-blk backend to submit inline-encrypted block I/O
>> + on behalf of guest virtual machines.
>> +
>> + Guests supply a virtual keyslot index and data unit number with
>> + each encrypted request. The host kernel translates the virtual
>> + slot to a physical hardware keyslot and issues the bio to the
>> + storage controller with the correct inline encryption context.
>> +
>> + If unsure, say N.
>> +
>> config BLK_DEV_LOOP_MIN_COUNT
>> int "Number of loop devices to pre-create at init time"
>> depends on BLK_DEV_LOOP
>> diff --git a/drivers/block/Makefile b/drivers/block/Makefile
>> index 079c910d5fc9..636137248d0d 100644
>> --- a/drivers/block/Makefile
>> +++ b/drivers/block/Makefile
>> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP) += loop.o
>> obj-$(CONFIG_SUNVDC) += sunvdc.o
>>
>> obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NBD) += nbd.o
>> +obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_CRYPTO_PROXY) += blk-crypto-proxy.o
>> obj-$(CONFIG_VIRTIO_BLK) += virtio_blk.o
>>
>> obj-$(CONFIG_VIRTBLK_CRYPTO_VIRTUALIZATION) += virtio_blk_crypto_ext.o
>> diff --git a/drivers/block/blk-crypto-proxy.c b/drivers/block/blk-crypto-proxy.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..60722884dbcd
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/drivers/block/blk-crypto-proxy.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,667 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>> +
>> +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "blk-crypto-proxy: " fmt
>> +
>> +#include <linux/module.h>
>> +#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
>> +#include <linux/fs.h>
>> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
>> +#include <linux/slab.h>
>> +#include <linux/blkdev.h>
>> +#include <linux/bio.h>
>> +#include <linux/mutex.h>
>> +#include <linux/overflow.h>
>> +#include <linux/file.h>
>> +#include <linux/mm.h>
>> +#include <linux/pagemap.h>
>> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
>> +#include <linux/uio.h>
>> +#include <linux/blk-crypto.h>
>> +#include <linux/blk-crypto-profile.h>
>> +#include <linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h>
>> +#include <linux/virtio_blk.h>
>> +
>> +static const struct bcp_hypervisor_ops __rcu *g_hypervisor_ops;
>> +static DEFINE_MUTEX(g_hypervisor_ops_lock);
>> +
>> +static const struct bcp_slot_virt_ops __rcu *g_slot_virt_ops;
>> +static DEFINE_MUTEX(g_slot_virt_ops_lock);
>> +
>> +int bcp_register_hypervisor_ops(const struct bcp_hypervisor_ops *ops)
>> +{
>> + int ret = 0;
>> +
>> + mutex_lock(&g_hypervisor_ops_lock);
>> + if (rcu_access_pointer(g_hypervisor_ops))
>> + ret = -EBUSY;
>> + else
>> + rcu_assign_pointer(g_hypervisor_ops, ops);
>> + mutex_unlock(&g_hypervisor_ops_lock);
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bcp_register_hypervisor_ops);
>> +
>> +void bcp_unregister_hypervisor_ops(const struct bcp_hypervisor_ops *ops)
>> +{
>> + mutex_lock(&g_hypervisor_ops_lock);
>> + if (rcu_access_pointer(g_hypervisor_ops) == ops)
>> + rcu_assign_pointer(g_hypervisor_ops, NULL);
>> + mutex_unlock(&g_hypervisor_ops_lock);
>> + synchronize_rcu();
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bcp_unregister_hypervisor_ops);
>> +
>> +int bcp_register_slot_virt_ops(const struct bcp_slot_virt_ops *ops)
>> +{
>> + int ret = 0;
>> +
>> + mutex_lock(&g_slot_virt_ops_lock);
>> + if (rcu_access_pointer(g_slot_virt_ops))
>> + ret = -EBUSY;
>> + else
>> + rcu_assign_pointer(g_slot_virt_ops, ops);
>> + mutex_unlock(&g_slot_virt_ops_lock);
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bcp_register_slot_virt_ops);
>> +
>> +void bcp_unregister_slot_virt_ops(const struct bcp_slot_virt_ops *ops)
>> +{
>> + mutex_lock(&g_slot_virt_ops_lock);
>> + if (rcu_access_pointer(g_slot_virt_ops) == ops)
>> + rcu_assign_pointer(g_slot_virt_ops, NULL);
>> + mutex_unlock(&g_slot_virt_ops_lock);
>> + synchronize_rcu();
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bcp_unregister_slot_virt_ops);
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * struct bcp_ctx - per-fd state for /dev/blk-crypto-proxy
>> + * @bdev_file: file handle for the bound block device; NULL until BCP_BIND_CONTEXT.
>> + * Published with smp_store_release() so hot-path ioctls can read it
>> + * lock-free via smp_load_acquire() in bcp_ctx_bound().
>> + * @guest_id: guest identifier resolved from vm_fd at bind time.
>> + * @bdev_writable: block_dev_fd was opened with write access.
>> + * @bind_lock: serializes concurrent BCP_BIND_CONTEXT calls on this fd.
>> + */
>> +struct bcp_ctx {
>> + struct file *bdev_file;
>> + u32 guest_id;
>> + bool bdev_writable;
>> + struct mutex bind_lock;
>> +};
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * True once BCP_BIND_CONTEXT has published ctx->bdev_file. The acquire pairs
>> + * with smp_store_release() in bcp_ioctl_bind_context(), ensuring ctx->guest_id
>> + * and ctx->bdev_writable are visible to any caller that observes true.
>> + */
>> +static bool bcp_ctx_bound(struct bcp_ctx *ctx)
>> +{
>> + return smp_load_acquire(&ctx->bdev_file) != NULL;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int bcp_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
>> +{
>> + struct bcp_ctx *ctx;
>> +
>> + ctx = kzalloc_obj(*ctx, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!ctx)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> + mutex_init(&ctx->bind_lock);
>> + file->private_data = ctx;
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int bcp_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
>> +{
>> + struct bcp_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
>> +
>> + if (ctx) {
>> + if (ctx->bdev_file)
>> + bdev_fput(ctx->bdev_file);
>> + mutex_destroy(&ctx->bind_lock);
>> + kfree(ctx);
>> + file->private_data = NULL;
>> + }
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Resolve a userspace block device fd to a struct file holding a reference
>> + * to the block device, opened with the same access mode as @fd so that a
>> + * read-only fd cannot gain write access via BCP_SUBMIT_IO_BY_VSLOT.
>> + */
>> +static struct file *bcp_bdev_from_fd(int fd, bool *writable)
>> +{
>> + struct file *f;
>> + struct inode *inode;
>> + dev_t dev;
>> + blk_mode_t mode = 0;
>> +
>> + f = fget(fd);
>> + if (!f)
>> + return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
>> + inode = file_inode(f);
>> + if (!S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) {
>> + fput(f);
>> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOTBLK);
>> + }
>> + if (f->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
>> + mode |= BLK_OPEN_READ;
>> + if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
>> + mode |= BLK_OPEN_WRITE;
>> + if (!mode) {
>> + fput(f);
>> + return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
>> + }
>> + *writable = !!(mode & BLK_OPEN_WRITE);
>> + dev = inode->i_rdev;
>> + fput(f);
>> + return bdev_file_open_by_dev(dev, mode, NULL, NULL);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static long bcp_ioctl_bind_context(struct file *file,
>> + struct bcp_bind_context_arg __user *argp)
>> +{
>> + struct bcp_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
>> + struct bcp_bind_context_arg arg;
>> + const struct bcp_hypervisor_ops *hv_ops;
>> + struct file *bdev_file;
>> + u32 guest_id;
>> + bool writable = false;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + if (!ctx)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + if (copy_from_user(&arg, argp, sizeof(arg)))
>> + return -EFAULT;
>> + if (arg.reserved)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * get_guest_id() may sleep; call it before taking bind_lock.
>> + */
>> + rcu_read_lock();
>> + hv_ops = rcu_dereference(g_hypervisor_ops);
>> + if (!hv_ops) {
>> + rcu_read_unlock();
>> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> + }
>> + ret = hv_ops->get_guest_id(arg.vm_fd, &guest_id);
>> + rcu_read_unlock();
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Serialize against concurrent BCP_BIND_CONTEXT calls: two callers
>> + * could both pass the ctx->bdev_file == NULL check before either stores.
>> + */
>> + guard(mutex)(&ctx->bind_lock);
>> +
>> + if (ctx->bdev_file)
>> + return -EBUSY;
>> +
>> + bdev_file = bcp_bdev_from_fd(arg.block_dev_fd, &writable);
>> + if (IS_ERR(bdev_file))
>> + return PTR_ERR(bdev_file);
>> +
>> + ctx->guest_id = guest_id;
>> + ctx->bdev_writable = writable;
>> + /*
>> + * Publish ctx->bdev_file last with a release barrier; bcp_ctx_bound()
>> + * reads it with smp_load_acquire() without taking @bind_lock.
>> + */
>> + smp_store_release(&ctx->bdev_file, bdev_file);
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Maps VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_* to enum blk_crypto_mode_num. The two index
>> + * spaces do not coincide, so modes_supported[] must not be copied positionally.
>> + * Keep in sync with virtio_blk_crypto_mode_map[] in drivers/block/virtio_blk.c.
>> + */
>> +static const enum blk_crypto_mode_num
>> + bcp_virtio_crypto_mode_map[VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_MAX + 1] = {
>> + [VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_INVALID] = BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID,
>> + [VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_AES_256_XTS] = BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS,
>> +};
>> +
>> +static long bcp_ioctl_get_crypto_caps(struct file *file,
>> + struct bcp_get_crypto_caps_arg __user *argp)
>> +{
>> + struct bcp_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
>> + struct bcp_get_crypto_caps_arg arg;
>> + struct block_device *bdev;
>> + u32 modes[VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_MAX + 1] = {0};
>> + struct blk_crypto_profile *profile;
>> + unsigned int i, n;
>> + u32 cap, written;
>> +
>> + if (!ctx || !bcp_ctx_bound(ctx))
>> + return -ENXIO;
>> +
>> + if (copy_from_user(&arg, argp, sizeof(arg)))
>> + return -EFAULT;
>> + if (arg.num_modes && !arg.modes_ptr)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + bdev = file_bdev(ctx->bdev_file);
>> + profile = bdev_get_queue(bdev)->crypto_profile;
>> + if (!profile)
>> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> +
>> + arg.key_types_supported = profile->key_types_supported;
>> + /*
>> + * Clamp to 8: the @dun wire field is a single __aligned_u64 so nothing
>> + * upstream can deliver a wider DUN regardless of what the profile claims.
>> + */
>> + arg.max_dun_bytes = min_t(u32, profile->max_dun_bytes_supported, 8);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * arg.modes_supported[] is indexed by VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_* (index 0
>> + * is always 0 per the virtio spec). Translate via the map above; do not
>> + * copy profile->modes_supported[] positionally.
>> + */
>> + n = VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_MAX + 1;
>> + cap = arg.num_modes;
>> + written = min_t(u32, cap, n);
>> +
>> + for (i = 1; i < n; i++) {
>> + enum blk_crypto_mode_num kmode = bcp_virtio_crypto_mode_map[i];
>> +
>> + if (!kmode)
>> + continue;
>> + modes[i] = profile->modes_supported[kmode];
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (written &&
>> + copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(arg.modes_ptr), modes,
>> + written * sizeof(modes[0])))
>> + return -EFAULT;
>> + arg.num_modes = written;
>> +
>> + arg.max_slots = 0;
>> + rcu_read_lock();
>> + {
>> + const struct bcp_slot_virt_ops *sv_ops =
>> + rcu_dereference(g_slot_virt_ops);
>> + if (sv_ops) {
>> + int nslots = sv_ops->get_guest_slots(profile, ctx->guest_id);
>> +
>> + if (nslots > 0)
>> + arg.max_slots = nslots;
>> + }
>> + }
>> + rcu_read_unlock();
>> +
>> + if (copy_to_user(argp, &arg, sizeof(arg)))
>> + return -EFAULT;
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Compute the number of pages needed for up to @want_bytes of iovec data
>> + * starting at cursor (@start_idx, @start_off). The page count is capped at
>> + * @cap to bound the arithmetic; *bytes_out receives the actual byte count.
>> + */
>> +static unsigned int bcp_iov_pages_for_bytes(const struct iovec *iov, u32 iov_cnt,
>> + u32 start_idx, u64 start_off,
>> + u64 want_bytes, unsigned int cap,
>> + u64 *bytes_out)
>> +{
>> + u64 pages = 0, taken = 0;
>> + u32 i;
>> +
>> + for (i = start_idx; i < iov_cnt && taken < want_bytes; i++) {
>> + u64 base, len;
>> +
>> + if (i == start_idx) {
>> + base = (u64)(uintptr_t)iov[i].iov_base + start_off;
>> + len = iov[i].iov_len - start_off;
>> + } else {
>> + base = (u64)(uintptr_t)iov[i].iov_base;
>> + len = iov[i].iov_len;
>> + }
>> + if (len == 0)
>> + continue;
>> + if (len > want_bytes - taken)
>> + len = want_bytes - taken;
>> + pages += DIV_ROUND_UP(len + offset_in_page(base), PAGE_SIZE);
>> + taken += len;
>> + if (pages >= cap) {
>> + *bytes_out = taken;
>> + return cap;
>> + }
>> + }
>> + *bytes_out = taken;
>> + return (unsigned int)pages;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Advance cursor (*idx, *off) forward by @bytes within @iov[0..iov_cnt).
>> + */
>> +static void bcp_iov_advance_cursor(const struct iovec *iov, u32 iov_cnt,
>> + u32 *idx, u64 *off, u64 bytes)
>> +{
>> + while (bytes > 0 && *idx < iov_cnt) {
>> + u64 seg_remaining = iov[*idx].iov_len - *off;
>> + u64 take = min_t(u64, seg_remaining, bytes);
>> +
>> + *off += take;
>> + bytes -= take;
>> + if (*off == iov[*idx].iov_len) {
>> + (*idx)++;
>> + *off = 0;
>> + }
>> + }
>> +}
>> +
>> +static long bcp_ioctl_submit_io_by_vslot(struct file *file,
>> + struct bcp_submit_io_by_vslot_arg __user *argp)
>> +{
>> + struct bcp_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
>> + struct bcp_submit_io_by_vslot_arg arg;
>> + struct block_device *bdev;
>> + struct blk_crypto_profile *profile;
>> + struct iovec *iov = NULL;
>> + struct iov_iter iter;
>> + struct blk_crypto_slot slot;
>> + u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
>> + u64 bytes_done = 0;
>> + u64 align, stride;
>> + u64 total_bytes;
>> + u32 seg_idx = 0;
>> + u64 seg_off = 0;
>> + unsigned int phy_slot;
>> + int ret = -EFAULT;
>> +
>> + if (!ctx || !bcp_ctx_bound(ctx))
>> + return -ENXIO;
>> +
>> + if (copy_from_user(&arg, argp, sizeof(arg)))
>> + return -EFAULT;
>> + if (arg.reserved2)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + bdev = file_bdev(ctx->bdev_file);
>> +
>> + if (arg.direction != BCP_DIR_READ && arg.direction != BCP_DIR_WRITE)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + /*
>> + * blk_mode_t does not stop submit_bio() from writing; enforce the
>> + * caller's original fd permission explicitly.
>> + */
>> + if (arg.direction == BCP_DIR_WRITE && !ctx->bdev_writable)
>> + return -EACCES;
>> + /*
>> + * bdev_read_only() can change after bind time; submit_bio_noacct()'s
>> + * bio_check_ro() only warns rather than errors in this kernel.
>> + */
>> + if (arg.direction == BCP_DIR_WRITE && bdev_read_only(bdev))
>> + return -EROFS;
>> + if (arg.flags != BCP_SUBMIT_IO_F_IOV)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + if (arg.iov_cnt == 0 || arg.iov_cnt > BCP_MAX_IOV)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + /* A shift amount >= 64 would be undefined behavior. */
>> + if (arg.data_unit_size_bits >= 64)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + profile = bdev_get_queue(bdev)->crypto_profile;
>> + if (!profile)
>> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> +
>> + /* Resolve virt_slot → phy_slot. */
>> + rcu_read_lock();
>> + {
>> + const struct bcp_slot_virt_ops *sv_ops =
>> + rcu_dereference(g_slot_virt_ops);
>> + if (!sv_ops) {
>> + rcu_read_unlock();
>> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> + }
>> + ret = sv_ops->vslot_to_pslot(profile, ctx->guest_id,
>> + arg.virt_slot, &phy_slot);
>> + }
>> + rcu_read_unlock();
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> +
>> + memset(dun, 0, sizeof(dun));
>> + dun[0] = arg.dun;
>> +
>> + slot.phy_slot = phy_slot;
>> + slot.data_unit_size_bits = arg.data_unit_size_bits;
>> +
>> + align = 1ULL << arg.data_unit_size_bits;
>> + /*
>> + * Split bios at stride (smallest multiple of the data unit size >=
>> + * PAGE_SIZE) boundaries so each bio ends on a whole data unit.
>> + * bio_crypt_check_alignment() is skipped for slot-based bios (bc_key
>> + * == NULL), so a mid-unit split would silently mis-encrypt/mis-decrypt.
>> + */
>> + stride = DIV_ROUND_UP(PAGE_SIZE, align) * align;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Import the caller's iovec once. import_iovec() validates every
>> + * segment with access_ok(), returns the total byte count, and takes a
>> + * private kernel copy that eliminates TOCTOU from a guest mutating its
>> + * own iovec array mid-ioctl.
>> + */
>> + ret = import_iovec(arg.direction == BCP_DIR_READ ? ITER_DEST : ITER_SOURCE,
>> + (const struct iovec __user *)u64_to_user_ptr(arg.iov_ptr),
>> + arg.iov_cnt, 0, &iov, &iter);
>> + if (ret < 0)
>> + return ret;
>> + total_bytes = ret;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Reject a misaligned total length up front: bio_crypt_check_alignment()
>> + * is skipped for slot-based bios so nothing downstream will catch it.
>> + */
>> + if (total_bytes == 0 || (total_bytes & (align - 1)) ||
>> + (total_bytes & (SECTOR_SIZE - 1))) {
>> + ret = -EINVAL;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Fail fast if the request exceeds the device. bio_check_eod() would
>> + * also catch this, but only on the last bio after earlier bios have
>> + * already done real I/O.
>> + */
>> + {
>> + sector_t nr_sectors = total_bytes >> SECTOR_SHIFT;
>> + sector_t maxsector = bdev_nr_sectors(bdev);
>> +
>> + if (nr_sectors > maxsector || arg.sector > maxsector - nr_sectors) {
>> + ret = -EIO;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Reject an out-of-range DUN: slot-based bios skip
>> + * bio_crypt_check_alignment(), so an overflow would silently truncate
>> + * in the hardware DUN field rather than error out.
>> + */
>> + {
>> + u64 total_units = total_bytes >> arg.data_unit_size_bits;
>> + u64 max_dun_used, dun_limit;
>> +
>> + if (check_add_overflow(arg.dun, total_units - 1, &max_dun_used)) {
>> + ret = -EINVAL;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> + dun_limit = profile->max_dun_bytes_supported >= 8 ? U64_MAX :
>> + (1ULL << (8 * profile->max_dun_bytes_supported)) - 1;
>> + if (max_dun_used > dun_limit) {
>> + ret = -EINVAL;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Submit the request as a sequence of bios (submit_bio_wait() per
>> + * bio), each holding at most BIO_MAX_VECS pages. Sequential
>> + * submission avoids DUN/IV correctness concerns across concurrent
>> + * in-flight bios.
>> + */
>> + while (seg_idx < arg.iov_cnt) {
>> + unsigned int pages_used = 0;
>> + u64 bio_bytes = 0;
>> + u32 la_idx = seg_idx;
>> + u64 la_off = seg_off;
>> + u64 remaining_before;
>> + struct bio *bio;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Lookahead: count how many whole stride units fit within a
>> + * fresh bio's BIO_MAX_VECS page budget.
>> + */
>> + for (;;) {
>> + u64 unit_bytes;
>> + unsigned int unit_pages;
>> +
>> + unit_pages = bcp_iov_pages_for_bytes(iov, arg.iov_cnt,
>> + la_idx, la_off, stride,
>> + BIO_MAX_VECS + 1,
>> + &unit_bytes);
>> + if (unit_bytes == 0)
>> + break; /* only empty segments remain */
>> +
>> + if (pages_used + unit_pages > BIO_MAX_VECS) {
>> + if (pages_used == 0) {
>> + /* data_unit_size_bits too large to fit one unit. */
>> + ret = -EINVAL;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> + break; /* finalize this bio; unit deferred to next */
>> + }
>> +
>> + pages_used += unit_pages;
>> + bio_bytes += unit_bytes;
>> + bcp_iov_advance_cursor(iov, arg.iov_cnt, &la_idx, &la_off,
>> + unit_bytes);
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (bio_bytes == 0)
>> + break;
>> +
>> + bio = bio_alloc(bdev, pages_used,
>> + arg.direction == BCP_DIR_WRITE ?
>> + REQ_OP_WRITE : REQ_OP_READ,
>> + GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!bio) {
>> + ret = -ENOMEM;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> + bio->bi_iter.bi_sector = arg.sector + (bytes_done >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Use bio_iov_iter_get_pages() to pin pages into the bio,
>> + * the same as the O_DIRECT path. Truncate the iter to this
>> + * bio's byte budget, then reexpand for the next iteration.
>> + */
>> + remaining_before = iov_iter_count(&iter);
>> + iov_iter_truncate(&iter, bio_bytes);
>> + ret = bio_iov_iter_get_pages(bio, &iter, 0, 0);
>> + if (ret < 0) {
>> + bio_put(bio);
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> + if (iov_iter_count(&iter) != 0) {
>> + /*
>> + * The lookahead verified bio_bytes fits in BIO_MAX_VECS;
>> + * if bio_iov_iter_get_pages() stopped early, its page
>> + * accounting disagreed with bcp_iov_pages_for_bytes().
>> + */
>> + bio_put(bio);
>> + ret = -EIO;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> + iov_iter_reexpand(&iter, remaining_before - bio_bytes);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Match __blkdev_direct_IO(): mark pages dirty on reads into
>> + * user-backed memory.
>> + */
>> + if (arg.direction == BCP_DIR_READ && user_backed_iter(&iter))
>> + bio_set_pages_dirty(bio);
>> +
>> + bcp_iov_advance_cursor(iov, arg.iov_cnt, &seg_idx, &seg_off,
>> + bio_bytes);
>> +
>> + bio_crypt_set_ctx_by_slot(bio, &slot, dun, GFP_KERNEL);
>> +
>> + ret = submit_bio_wait(bio);
>> + bio_put(bio);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Advance dun by this bio's contribution only, not by
>> + * recomputing from arg.dun + bytes_done, to avoid silent
>> + * truncation when bytes_done grows past UINT_MAX data units.
>> + */
>> + bio_crypt_dun_increment(dun, (unsigned int)(bio_bytes >> arg.data_unit_size_bits));
>> + bytes_done += bio_bytes;
>> + }
>> + ret = 0;
>> +
>> +out:
>> + kfree(iov);
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static long bcp_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
>> +{
>> + void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
>> +
>> + switch (cmd) {
>> + case BCP_BIND_CONTEXT:
>> + return bcp_ioctl_bind_context(file, argp);
>> + case BCP_GET_CRYPTO_CAPS:
>> + return bcp_ioctl_get_crypto_caps(file, argp);
>> + case BCP_SUBMIT_IO_BY_VSLOT:
>> + return bcp_ioctl_submit_io_by_vslot(file, argp);
>> + default:
>> + return -ENOTTY;
>> + }
>> +}
>> +
>> +static const struct file_operations bcp_fops = {
>> + .owner = THIS_MODULE,
>> + .open = bcp_open,
>> + .release = bcp_release,
>> + .unlocked_ioctl = bcp_ioctl,
>> + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
>> +};
>> +
>> +static struct miscdevice bcp_misc = {
>> + .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
>> + .name = "blk-crypto-proxy",
>> + .fops = &bcp_fops,
>> +};
>> +
>> +static int __init blk_crypto_proxy_init(void)
>> +{
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + ret = misc_register(&bcp_misc);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void __exit blk_crypto_proxy_exit(void)
>> +{
>> + misc_deregister(&bcp_misc);
>> +}
>> +
>> +module_init(blk_crypto_proxy_init);
>> +module_exit(blk_crypto_proxy_exit);
>> +
>> +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
>> +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Host-side inline crypto proxy for virtio-blk guests");
>> diff --git a/include/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h b/include/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..6cf1ff0703e9
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/include/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h
>> @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
>> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
>> +
>> +#ifndef __LINUX_BLK_CRYPTO_PROXY_H
>> +#define __LINUX_BLK_CRYPTO_PROXY_H
>> +
>> +#include <uapi/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h>
>> +#include <linux/types.h>
>> +
>> +struct blk_crypto_profile;
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * struct bcp_hypervisor_ops - hypervisor VM identity operations
>> + *
>> + * Translates a hypervisor-specific VM fd to the opaque u32 vm_id used
>> + * throughout blk-crypto-proxy. Register once at module init time.
>> + */
>> +struct bcp_hypervisor_ops {
>> + /**
>> + * @get_guest_id: Resolve @vm_fd to an opaque guest identifier.
>> + *
>> + * Verify the caller is permitted to act on behalf of the VM and write
>> + * its u32 id to @guest_id_out. The value is passed verbatim to
>> + * bcp_slot_virt_ops callbacks.
>> + *
>> + * Returns 0 on success, -errno on failure.
>> + */
>> + int (*get_guest_id)(int vm_fd, u32 *guest_id_out);
>> +};
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * bcp_register_hypervisor_ops() - register the hypervisor op-set
>> + * @ops: op-set to register; must remain valid until unregistered.
>> + *
>> + * Returns 0 on success, -EBUSY if an op-set is already registered.
>> + */
>> +int bcp_register_hypervisor_ops(const struct bcp_hypervisor_ops *ops);
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * bcp_unregister_hypervisor_ops() - unregister the hypervisor op-set
>> + * @ops: must be the pointer that was passed to bcp_register_hypervisor_ops().
>> + *
>> + * Blocks until all in-flight callers have finished, then clears the
>> + * registration. Safe to call from module exit.
>> + */
>> +void bcp_unregister_hypervisor_ops(const struct bcp_hypervisor_ops *ops);
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * struct bcp_slot_virt_ops - ICE keyslot virtualization operations
>> + *
>> + * Per-VM ICE keyslot accounting and virtual-to-physical slot translation.
>> + * The implementation owns the slot allocation table and is registered once
>> + * at platform driver probe time.
>> + *
>> + * @profile is passed to every callback so an implementation supporting
>> + * multiple storage controllers can distinguish between them.
>> + *
>> + * All callbacks may be called concurrently and must not sleep (called
>> + * under RCU read lock).
>> + */
>> +struct bcp_slot_virt_ops {
>> + /**
>> + * @get_guest_slots: Return the number of ICE keyslots allocated to @guest_id.
>> + *
>> + * Returns the slot count (≥ 1) on success, -ENOKEY if @guest_id is
>> + * not in the allocation table.
>> + */
>> + int (*get_guest_slots)(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, u32 guest_id);
>> +
>> + /**
>> + * @vslot_to_pslot: Translate a VM-local virtual slot to a physical slot.
>> + * @guest_id: hypervisor-assigned VM identifier.
>> + * @virt_slot: 0-based slot index within @guest_id's allocation.
>> + * @phy_slot_out: receives the physical ICE keyslot index on success.
>> + *
>> + * Returns 0 on success, -ENOKEY if @guest_id is unknown, -EINVAL if
>> + * @virt_slot >= the VM's allocation.
>> + */
>> + int (*vslot_to_pslot)(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile,
>> + u32 guest_id, u32 virt_slot,
>> + unsigned int *phy_slot_out);
>> +};
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * bcp_register_slot_virt_ops() - register the slot-virt op-set
>> + * @ops: op-set to register; must remain valid until unregistered.
>> + *
>> + * Returns 0 on success, -EBUSY if an op-set is already registered.
>> + */
>> +int bcp_register_slot_virt_ops(const struct bcp_slot_virt_ops *ops);
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * bcp_unregister_slot_virt_ops() - unregister the slot-virt op-set
>> + * @ops: must be the pointer passed to bcp_register_slot_virt_ops().
>> + *
>> + * Blocks until all in-flight callers have finished, then clears the
>> + * registration. Safe to call from module exit.
>> + */
>> +void bcp_unregister_slot_virt_ops(const struct bcp_slot_virt_ops *ops);
>> +
>> +#endif /* __LINUX_BLK_CRYPTO_PROXY_H */
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h b/include/uapi/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..dc8adc8ef5ed
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h
>> @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
>> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
>> +
>> +#ifndef __UAPI_LINUX_BLK_CRYPTO_PROXY_H
>> +#define __UAPI_LINUX_BLK_CRYPTO_PROXY_H
>> +
>> +#include <linux/types.h>
>> +#include <linux/ioctl.h>
>> +
>> +#define BCP_DIR_READ 0
>> +#define BCP_DIR_WRITE 1
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * BCP_BIND_CONTEXT - bind a host block device and hypervisor VM fd.
>> + *
>> + * Must be called once after open(), before any other ioctl.
>> + * Returns -EBUSY if already bound, -EOPNOTSUPP if no hypervisor op-set
>> + * is registered.
>> + *
>> + * @block_dev_fd: fd of the host block device to bind.
>> + * @vm_fd: hypervisor VM fd identifying the guest.
>> + * @reserved: must be zero.
>> + */
>> +struct bcp_bind_context_arg {
>> + __s32 block_dev_fd;
>> + __s32 vm_fd;
>> + __u32 reserved;
>> +};
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * BCP_GET_CRYPTO_CAPS - query crypto capabilities of the bound block device.
>> + *
>> + * Requires BCP_BIND_CONTEXT; returns -ENXIO otherwise.
>> + *
>> + * @key_types_supported: [out] BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_* bitmask.
>> + * @max_dun_bytes: [out] maximum DUN bytes supported.
>> + * @max_slots: [out] maximum ICE keyslots available for the bound VM;
>> + * 0 if the VM is not found in the table.
>> + * @num_modes: [in] capacity of the buffer pointed to by @modes_ptr,
>> + * in entries. [out] number of entries actually
>> + * written to @modes_ptr (may be less than the
>> + * given capacity; the caller must use this
>> + * value, not its own capacity, to know how many
>> + * entries are valid).
>> + * @modes_ptr: [in] pointer to a caller-allocated __u32 array of
>> + * at least @num_modes (as given) entries. Must
>> + * be non-NULL if @num_modes (as given) is > 0.
>> + * On return, holds a per-mode data_unit_size
>> + * bitmask array indexed by VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_*
>> + * (virtio wire numbering, uapi/linux/virtio_blk.h)
>> + * -- NOT by enum blk_crypto_mode_num. Index 0 is
>> + * reserved and always 0, matching struct
>> + * virtio_blk_crypto_modes.modes[].
>> + *
>> + * @modes_ptr is a pointer + count rather than a fixed-size array embedded in
>> + * this struct so that sizeof(struct bcp_get_crypto_caps_arg) -- and hence the
>> + * _IOWR-encoded ioctl number -- does not depend on VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_MAX.
>> + * The caller and this kernel may be built against different virtio_blk.h
>> + * versions (and thus different values of that constant); embedding a
>> + * VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_MAX-sized array directly in this struct would make
>> + * the ioctl fail to even dispatch (-ENOTTY) whenever the two disagree.
>> + */
>> +
>> +struct bcp_get_crypto_caps_arg {
>> + __u32 key_types_supported;
>> + __u32 max_dun_bytes;
>> + __u32 max_slots;
>> + __u32 num_modes;
>> + __aligned_u64 modes_ptr;
>> +};
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * BCP_SUBMIT_IO_BY_VSLOT - submit an encrypted bio using a virtual slot.
>> + *
>> + * The kernel resolves virt_slot to a physical ICE keyslot and submits the
>> + * I/O synchronously. Large requests are split at data-unit boundaries
>> + * (BIO_MAX_VECS pages per bio). Requires BCP_BIND_CONTEXT; returns -ENXIO
>> + * otherwise.
>> + *
>> + * @virt_slot: guest-visible slot index (0-based within the VM's range).
>> + * @direction: BCP_DIR_READ or BCP_DIR_WRITE.
>> + * @flags: must be BCP_SUBMIT_IO_F_IOV.
>> + * @data_unit_size_bits: log2 of the encryption data unit size in bytes.
>> + * @sector: start sector (512-byte units).
>> + * @dun: data unit number (single 64-bit limb, little-endian).
>> + * @iov_ptr: pointer to scatter-gather array of struct bcp_iovec.
>> + * @iov_cnt: number of entries in @iov_ptr[].
>> + * @reserved2: must be zero.
>> + *
>> + * @sector, @dun and @iov_ptr use __aligned_u64 to guarantee identical struct
>> + * layout between 32-bit and 64-bit callers, as required by
>> + * .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl.
>> + */
>> +
>> +/* Maximum iovec segments per BCP_SUBMIT_IO_BY_VSLOT call (matches UIO_MAXIOV). */
>> +#define BCP_MAX_IOV 1024
>> +
>> +#define BCP_SUBMIT_IO_F_IOV (1U << 0) /* scatter-gather mode; must always be set */
>> +
>> +struct bcp_iovec {
>> + __u64 iov_base;
>> + __u64 iov_len;
>> +};
>> +
>> +struct bcp_submit_io_by_vslot_arg {
>> + __u32 virt_slot;
>> + __u32 direction;
>> + __u32 flags;
>> + __u32 data_unit_size_bits;
>> + __aligned_u64 sector;
>> + __aligned_u64 dun;
>> + __aligned_u64 iov_ptr;
>> + __u32 iov_cnt;
>> + __u32 reserved2;
>> +};
>> +
>> +#define BCP_IOC_MAGIC 0xC7
>> +
>> +#define BCP_BIND_CONTEXT _IOW(BCP_IOC_MAGIC, 1, struct bcp_bind_context_arg)
>> +#define BCP_GET_CRYPTO_CAPS _IOWR(BCP_IOC_MAGIC, 2, struct bcp_get_crypto_caps_arg)
>> +#define BCP_SUBMIT_IO_BY_VSLOT _IOW(BCP_IOC_MAGIC, 3, struct bcp_submit_io_by_vslot_arg)
>> +
>> +#endif /* __UAPI_LINUX_BLK_CRYPTO_PROXY_H */
>> --
>> 2.34.1
>>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-02 13:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-27 16:07 [PATCH v1 00/11] FBE virtualization: inline encryption for virtio-blk guests Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 01/11] virtio_blk: add inline encryption support Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:23 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 19:48 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-09-02 5:58 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 02/11] soc: qcom: add crypto_virt backend for virtio-blk inline crypto Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:24 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 6:56 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2026-09-01 9:39 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-09-01 13:58 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2026-09-02 15:01 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 03/11] soc: qcom: crypto_virt: add support for create, prepare and import keys Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 6:58 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2026-09-01 10:31 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-09-01 14:01 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2026-09-02 15:33 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 04/11] dt-bindings: soc: qcom: add binding for qcom,crypto-virt Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:14 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 7:01 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2026-09-01 10:40 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 05/11] blk-crypto: add slot-based inline encryption path Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 19:06 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 06/11] scsi: ufs: core: add slot path to ufshcd_prepare_lrbp_crypto Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:20 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 19:08 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 07/11] blk-crypto: move bio_crypt_dun_increment() to the public header Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:18 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 19:13 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-09-02 6:02 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 08/11] block: add /dev/blk-crypto-proxy for host-side virtio-blk inline encryption Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:24 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 19:43 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-09-02 13:14 ` Linlin Zhang [this message]
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 09/11] soc: qcom: add ICE keyslot partitioning driver for guest VMs Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 7:02 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2026-09-01 10:48 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 10/11] blk-crypto: add slot_offset to blk_crypto_profile Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:23 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 11/11] scsi: ufs: ufs-qcom: support ICE keyslot partitioning for guest VMs Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 7:03 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2026-09-01 10:54 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-09-01 14:02 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2026-09-02 15:03 ` Linlin Zhang
[not found] ` <20260827184219.GB2137493@google.com>
2026-08-28 15:37 ` [PATCH v1 00/11] FBE virtualization: inline encryption for virtio-blk guests Linlin Zhang
2026-08-28 15:56 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-08-31 6:21 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-08-31 20:41 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-09-01 9:21 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-09-01 18:47 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-08-31 21:07 ` Eric Biggers
2026-09-01 8:22 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-09-01 8:45 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-09-01 19:44 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-09-02 8:15 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-09-01 21:28 ` Eric Biggers
2026-09-02 14:33 ` Linlin Zhang
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