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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, sergeh@kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, baijiaju1990@gmail.com,
	jjzuming@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] keys: Avoid the owner account dereference in named keyring lookup
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2026 20:51:56 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261017035156.GA29318@sol> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <pm-key-management-objects-candidate-0002-v3-2baa8cad2bb554364e10@gmail.com>

On Fri, Oct 09, 2026 at 01:11:59PM +0800, Cen Zhang wrote:
> Named keyring lookup must keep the storage containing the owner UID
> alive through the namespace mapping check.  find_keyring_by_name()
> reads keyring->user->uid under keyring_name_lock, but that lock protects
> the keyring's name entry and allocation, not its separate key_user.
> 
> A named session-keyring join can overlap a privileged KEYCTL_CHOWN on
> another CPU.  If the keyring holds the last reference to its old dynamic
> key_user and the ownership transfer succeeds, the following ordering is
> possible:
> 
>     Named join                         Chown
>     find_keyring_by_name()              keyctl_chown_key()
>       read_lock(keyring_name_lock)       down_write(key->sem)
>       load old keyring->user
>                                          replace key->user and key->uid
>                                          up_write(key->sem)
>                                          key_put(key)
>                                          key_user_put(old user): free
>       read old user->uid
>       read_unlock(keyring_name_lock)
> 
> Chown neither takes keyring_name_lock nor key_session_mutex, so it can
> free the old account between the pointer load and the UID read.  The
> lookup then reads freed memory even though the keyring itself is alive.
> 
> Use keyring->uid for the mapping check.  key_alloc() initializes this
> inline owner UID and keyctl_chown_key() updates it on chown.
> The existing name lock keeps its containing keyring allocated throughout
> the check, so lookup no longer depends on the account's lifetime.  This
> also matches the owner UID used by the permission check.
> 
> KASAN report as below:
> 
>     BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in find_keyring_by_name+0x577/0x5d0
>     Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881128ae2ec by task keycase/500
> 
> Fixes: 2ea190d0a006 ("keys: skip keys from another user namespace")
> Assisted-by: LLM
> Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>

Don't key_serial_next() and find_ge_key() (used when reading from
/proc/keys) have the same bug?

- Eric

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-10-17  3:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-09  5:11 [PATCH v2] keys: Avoid the owner account dereference in named keyring lookup Cen Zhang
2026-10-09  5:22 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-10 20:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-17  3:51 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2026-10-17  7:47   ` Cen Zhang

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