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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>,
	dhowells@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	serge@hallyn.com, sergeh@kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, baijiaju1990@gmail.com,
	jjzuming@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] keys: Avoid the owner account dereference in named keyring lookup
Date: Sat, 17 Oct 2026 19:19:52 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <atOgKLjra7xg19HL@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261017035156.GA29318@sol>

On Fri, Oct 16, 2026 at 08:51:56PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 09, 2026 at 01:11:59PM +0800, Cen Zhang wrote:
> > Named keyring lookup must keep the storage containing the owner UID
> > alive through the namespace mapping check.  find_keyring_by_name()
> > reads keyring->user->uid under keyring_name_lock, but that lock protects
> > the keyring's name entry and allocation, not its separate key_user.
> > 
> > A named session-keyring join can overlap a privileged KEYCTL_CHOWN on
> > another CPU.  If the keyring holds the last reference to its old dynamic
> > key_user and the ownership transfer succeeds, the following ordering is
> > possible:
> > 
> >     Named join                         Chown
> >     find_keyring_by_name()              keyctl_chown_key()
> >       read_lock(keyring_name_lock)       down_write(key->sem)
> >       load old keyring->user
> >                                          replace key->user and key->uid
> >                                          up_write(key->sem)
> >                                          key_put(key)
> >                                          key_user_put(old user): free
> >       read old user->uid
> >       read_unlock(keyring_name_lock)
> > 
> > Chown neither takes keyring_name_lock nor key_session_mutex, so it can
> > free the old account between the pointer load and the UID read.  The
> > lookup then reads freed memory even though the keyring itself is alive.
> > 
> > Use keyring->uid for the mapping check.  key_alloc() initializes this
> > inline owner UID and keyctl_chown_key() updates it on chown.
> > The existing name lock keeps its containing keyring allocated throughout
> > the check, so lookup no longer depends on the account's lifetime.  This
> > also matches the owner UID used by the permission check.
> > 
> > KASAN report as below:
> > 
> >     BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in find_keyring_by_name+0x577/0x5d0
> >     Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881128ae2ec by task keycase/500
> > 
> > Fixes: 2ea190d0a006 ("keys: skip keys from another user namespace")
> > Assisted-by: LLM
> > Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
> 
> Don't key_serial_next() and find_ge_key() (used when reading from
> /proc/keys) have the same bug?

With just a quick Saturday skim, yep, I think so.

> 
> - Eric

Br, Jarkko

      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-10-17 16:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-09  5:11 [PATCH v2] keys: Avoid the owner account dereference in named keyring lookup Cen Zhang
2026-10-09  5:22 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-10 20:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-17  3:51 ` Eric Biggers
2026-10-17  7:47   ` Cen Zhang
2026-10-17 16:28     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-17 16:31       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-17 16:19   ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]

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