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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>,
	"Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
	Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@gmail.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Jonathan McDowell <noodles@meta.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 3/5] KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 02:51:02 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261116005105.1573016-4-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261116005105.1573016-1-jarkko@kernel.org>

TPM2_Unseal requires TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, and tpm2_unseal_cmd() always does
set up either password or HMAC session.

Remove the branch in tpm2_unseal_cmd() conditionally setting
TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS. It is faulty but luckily it is never exercised at
run-time, and thus does not cause regressions.

Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 10 +---------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 563997600636..22d27e2512db 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -467,10 +467,8 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 			   u32 blob_handle)
 {
 	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
-	struct tpm_header *head;
 	struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
 	u16 data_len;
-	int offset;
 	u8 *data;
 	int rc;
 
@@ -514,15 +512,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 		tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, private->blobauth_len);
 		tpm_buf_append(buf, private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
 
-		if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
+		if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip))
 			tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
 						    NULL, 0);
-		} else  {
-			offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
-			head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
-			if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
-				head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
-		}
 	}
 
 	rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, buf);
-- 
2.47.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-16  0:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-16  0:50 [PATCH v3 0/5] Unsorted tpm2-sessions improvements Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-16  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] tpm2-sessions: Drop TPM2_NAME_SIZE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-16  0:55   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 2/5] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append_auth() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-16  0:56   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16  0:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-11-16  0:56   ` [PATCH v3 3/5] KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd sashiko-bot
2026-11-16  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] tpm2-sessions: Re-orchestrate tpm2_read_public() use Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-16  0:58   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 5/5] tpm-buf: Make tpm_buf_read*() fallible Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-16  1:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16  1:29     ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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