From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>,
"Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@gmail.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 4/5] tpm2-sessions: Re-orchestrate tpm2_read_public() use
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 02:51:03 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261116005105.1573016-5-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261116005105.1573016-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
Move TPM handle name resolution out of tpm_buf_append_name(), so that
callers resolve object names explicitly before constructing HMAC-protected
commands:
1. Export tpm2_read_public(), so that trusted_tpm2 can resolve handle
names, and store non-object handles in big-endian byte order matching
the TPM 2.0 handle Name definition.
2. Call tpm2_read_public() explicitly in tpm2_seal_trusted(),
tpm2_load_cmd(), and tpm2_unseal_cmd() before starting the auth
session, and pass the pre-resolved name and size to
tpm_buf_append_name().
3. Rework tpm_buf_append_name() and tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() to use
the caller-supplied name and size directly.
This reduces fallible exits from tpm2_buf_append_name().
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 9 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 122 +++++++---------------
include/linux/tpm.h | 10 +-
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 33 +++++-
4 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 4b2bb2ddc321..9c7e8b9aff4d 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -194,11 +194,12 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND);
if (!disable_pcr_integrity) {
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, pcr_idx, NULL);
- if (rc) {
- tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+ __be32 pcr_idx_be = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
+
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, pcr_idx,
+ (u8 *)&pcr_idx_be, sizeof(pcr_idx_be));
+ if (rc)
return rc;
- }
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, NULL, 0);
} else {
tpm_buf_append_handle(buf, pcr_idx);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index 94c11135beb3..fa107719b4f9 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -136,8 +136,8 @@ struct tpm2_auth {
* handle, but they are part of the session by name, which
* we must compute and remember
*/
- u32 name_h[AUTH_MAX_NAMES];
u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
+ u16 name_size_tbl[AUTH_MAX_NAMES];
};
#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
@@ -163,7 +163,17 @@ static int name_size(const u8 *name)
}
}
-static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
+/**
+ * tpm2_read_public() - Resolve TPM name for a handle
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use.
+ * @handle: TPM handle.
+ * @name: Buffer for returning the name blob. Must have a capacity of at
+ * least %TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE bytes.
+ *
+ * Return: Size of the TPM handle name on success, or a negative errno when
+ * TPM2_ReadPublic fails.
+ */
+int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
{
u32 mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
@@ -172,7 +182,7 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
if (mso != TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT && mso != TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE &&
mso != TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
- memcpy(name, &handle, sizeof(u32));
+ put_unaligned_be32(handle, name);
return sizeof(u32);
}
@@ -189,7 +199,8 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
/* Skip TPMT_PUBLIC: */
- offset += tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
+ rc = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
+ offset += rc;
/*
* Ensure space for the length field of TPM2B_NAME and hashAlg field of
@@ -212,39 +223,34 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], rc);
return name_size_alg;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_read_public);
#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
/**
- * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer
- * @chip: the TPM chip structure
- * @buf: The buffer to be appended
- * @handle: The handle to be appended
- * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL)
+ * tpm_buf_append_name() - Append a handle and store TPM name
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use.
+ * @buf: TPM buffer containing the TPM command in-transit.
+ * @handle: TPM handle to be appended.
+ * @name: TPM name of the handle.
+ * @name_size: Size of the TPM name.
*
* In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the
- * objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply
- * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name
- * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV
- * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name
- * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to
- * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended. For these
- * objects, the @name pointer should point to this. If a name is
- * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called
- * on the handle to obtain the name.
+ * objects pointed to by the handles. For permanent and PCR handles this is
+ * the 4-byte big-endian handle; for volatile objects, persistent objects
+ * and NV areas this is the name resolved with tpm2_read_public().
*
* As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure
* will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a
* kernel message.
*
- * Ends the authorization session on failure.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or -EIO when the authorization area state is
+ * malformed.
*/
int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
- u32 handle, u8 *name)
+ u32 handle, u8 *name, u16 name_size)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
- enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
struct tpm2_auth *auth;
- u16 name_size_alg;
int slot;
int ret;
#endif
@@ -263,45 +269,26 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
}
auth = chip->auth;
if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
- dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed");
+ dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed\n");
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (name_size > TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE) {
+ dev_err(&chip->dev, "name too long: %u\n", name_size);
ret = -EIO;
goto err;
}
tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
auth->session += 4;
-
- if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT ||
- mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE ||
- mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
- if (!name) {
- ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]);
- } else {
- ret = name_size(name);
- }
-
- if (ret < 0)
- goto err;
-
- name_size_alg = ret;
- } else {
- if (name) {
- dev_err(&chip->dev, "handle 0x%08x does not use a name\n",
- handle);
- ret = -EIO;
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- auth->name_h[slot] = handle;
- if (name)
- memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size_alg);
+ memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size);
+ auth->name_size_tbl[slot] = name_size;
#endif
return 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
err:
tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
- return tpm_ret_to_err(ret);
+ return ret;
#endif
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name);
@@ -629,22 +616,8 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i];
handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0);
+ offset_s += handles * sizeof(u32);
- /*
- * just check the names, it's easy to make mistakes. This
- * would happen if someone added a handle via
- * tpm_buf_append_u32() instead of tpm_buf_append_name()
- */
- for (i = 0; i < handles; i++) {
- u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s);
-
- if (auth->name_h[i] != handle) {
- dev_err(&chip->dev, "invalid handle 0x%08x\n", handle);
- ret = -EIO;
- goto err;
- }
- }
- /* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */
val = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s);
/* point offset_p to the start of the parameters */
offset_p = offset_s + val;
@@ -705,23 +678,8 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
/* ordinal is already BE */
sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&head->ordinal, sizeof(head->ordinal));
/* add the handle names */
- for (i = 0; i < handles; i++) {
- enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(auth->name_h[i]);
-
- if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT ||
- mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE ||
- mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
- ret = name_size(auth->name[i]);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto err;
-
- sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], ret);
- } else {
- __be32 h = cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]);
-
- sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&h, 4);
- }
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < handles; i++)
+ sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], auth->name_size_tbl[i]);
if (offset_s != tpm_buf_length(buf))
sha256_update(&sctx, &buf->data[offset_s],
tpm_buf_length(buf) - offset_s);
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index 84c8fe226235..a9fd53363dc4 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static inline struct tpm2_auth *tpm2_chip_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip)
}
int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
- u32 handle, u8 *name);
+ u32 handle, u8 *name, u16 name_size);
void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase,
int passphraselen);
@@ -314,6 +314,7 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf);
int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
int rc);
void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name);
#else
#include <linux/unaligned.h>
@@ -337,6 +338,13 @@ static inline int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip,
{
return rc;
}
+
+static inline int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle,
+ void *name)
+{
+ put_unaligned_be32(handle, name);
+ return sizeof(u32);
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
#endif
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 22d27e2512db..f7a0a312a652 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -211,9 +211,11 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_options *options)
{
struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
+ u8 parent_name[TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
struct tpm_buf *sized __free(kfree) = NULL;
+ u16 parent_name_size;
int blob_len = 0;
int hash;
u32 flags;
@@ -230,6 +232,12 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (rc)
return rc;
+ rc = tpm2_read_public(chip, private->keyhandle, parent_name);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out_put;
+
+ parent_name_size = rc;
+
rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
if (rc)
goto out_put;
@@ -253,7 +261,8 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_init_sized(sized, TPM_BUFSIZE);
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, parent_name,
+ parent_name_size);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -358,7 +367,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
{
u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
+ u8 parent_name[TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
+ u16 parent_name_size;
unsigned int private_len;
unsigned int public_len;
unsigned int blob_len;
@@ -409,6 +420,12 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (blob_len > payload->blob_len)
return -E2BIG;
+ rc = tpm2_read_public(chip, private->keyhandle, parent_name);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ parent_name_size = rc;
+
rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -422,7 +439,8 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, parent_name,
+ parent_name_size);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -467,11 +485,19 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
u32 blob_handle)
{
struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
+ u8 blob_name[TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
+ u16 blob_name_size;
u16 data_len;
u8 *data;
int rc;
+ rc = tpm2_read_public(chip, blob_handle, blob_name);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ blob_name_size = rc;
+
rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -485,7 +511,8 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL);
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, blob_handle, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, blob_handle, blob_name,
+ blob_name_size);
if (rc)
return rc;
--
2.47.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-16 0:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-16 0:50 [PATCH v3 0/5] Unsorted tpm2-sessions improvements Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-16 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] tpm2-sessions: Drop TPM2_NAME_SIZE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-16 0:55 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 2/5] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append_auth() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-16 0:56 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-16 0:56 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 0:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-11-16 0:58 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] tpm2-sessions: Re-orchestrate tpm2_read_public() use sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 5/5] tpm-buf: Make tpm_buf_read*() fallible Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-16 1:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 1:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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