* [PATCH v3 1/2] capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable()
2026-11-18 14:54 [PATCH v3 0/2] Fix LSM mediation of PR_SET_SECUREBITS Mickaël Salaün
@ 2026-11-18 14:54 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-18 15:00 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:54 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation Mickaël Salaün
1 sibling, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2026-11-18 14:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, Ada Smith, Christian Brauner,
Günther Noack, John Johansen, KP Singh, Matt Bobrowski,
Stephen Smalley, apparmor, bpf, kernel-team, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, selinux, James Morris, Serge Hallyn,
stable
PR_SET_SECUREBITS checks CAP_SETPCAP with cap_capable(), which skips the
LSM capable hooks, so a task can change privileged securebits despite an
LSM denial.
Use ns_capable() instead, as PR_CAPBSET_DROP already does. Move the
check to a helper that only requires CAP_SETPCAP when needed, so that
changes limited to the unprivileged securebits still do not reach the
LSMs or set PF_SUPERPRIV.
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Matt Bobrowski <matt@bobrowski.net>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@kernel.org>
Fixes: 3898b1b4ebff ("capabilities: implement per-process securebits")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
Changes since v1:
https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202811.2409395-2-mic@digikod.net
- Check the non-change case separately, with its own comment (suggested
by Serge Hallyn).
- Shorten the commit message (suggested by Serge Hallyn).
- Add Serge Hallyn's Reviewed-by.
---
security/commoncap.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index d47ab3022343..9794a594bdd9 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1283,6 +1283,26 @@ static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
return commit_creds(new);
}
+/*
+ * Doing anything with securebits requires privilege (go read about the
+ * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits. Indeed, the
+ * SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not restrictions enforced by the kernel but
+ * by user space on itself. Only checking CAP_SETPCAP when it is needed keeps
+ * LSMs from seeing (and logging) a capability check for unprivileged changes.
+ */
+static bool securebits_need_setpcap(unsigned long old, unsigned long new)
+{
+ const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks = SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED |
+ SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1;
+ const unsigned long changed = old ^ new;
+
+ /* For legacy reasons, a non-change requires privilege. */
+ if (!changed)
+ return true;
+
+ return changed & ~unpriv_and_locks;
+}
+
/**
* cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
* @option: The process control function requested
@@ -1346,28 +1366,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
/* cannot change a locked bit */
return -EPERM;
- /*
- * Doing anything requires privilege (go read about the
- * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits.
- * Indeed, the SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not
- * restrictions enforced by the kernel but by user space on
- * itself.
- */
- if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
- CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0) {
- const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks =
- SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED |
- SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1;
- const unsigned long changed = old->securebits ^ arg2;
-
- /* For legacy reason, denies non-change. */
- if (!changed)
- return -EPERM;
-
- /* Denies privileged changes. */
- if (changed & ~unpriv_and_locks)
- return -EPERM;
- }
+ if (securebits_need_setpcap(old->securebits, arg2) &&
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
+ return -EPERM;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
--
2.56.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* [PATCH v3 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation
2026-11-18 14:54 [PATCH v3 0/2] Fix LSM mediation of PR_SET_SECUREBITS Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-18 14:54 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable() Mickaël Salaün
@ 2026-11-18 14:54 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-18 14:59 ` sashiko-bot
1 sibling, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2026-11-18 14:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, Ada Smith, Christian Brauner,
Günther Noack, John Johansen, KP Singh, Matt Bobrowski,
Stephen Smalley, apparmor, bpf, kernel-team, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, selinux, Serge Hallyn
Test that Landlock denies and logs a privileged PR_SET_SECUREBITS
change, now that the previous commit routes its CAP_SETPCAP check
through the capable hooks, and that an unprivileged change still
succeeds. The domain deallocation record must then report exactly one
denial, which proves that the unprivileged change was not denied,
without relying on a no-record timeout.
The check-exec selftests already cover commoncap's securebits semantics.
Without the previous commit, this test fails.
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
Changes since v2:
https://patch.msgid.link/20261117101738.2523492-3-mic@digikod.net
- Use ASSERT_EQ() before checking errno (suggested by Günther Noack).
- Shorten the commit message.
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 69 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
index 7c58ece1c6f0..35a419c46764 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
@@ -1071,6 +1071,75 @@ TEST_F(cap_audit, denied)
EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
}
+/*
+ * A privileged denial allocates the domain ID. The following unprivileged-only
+ * change must not create a hidden Landlock denial, so the domain's deallocation
+ * record must report exactly one denial.
+ */
+TEST_F(cap_audit, securebits)
+{
+ const unsigned long unpriv = SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE |
+ SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED;
+ __u64 *domain_id, deallocated_dom = 0;
+ unsigned long bits;
+ int err, ruleset_fd, status;
+ pid_t child;
+
+ domain_id = mmap(NULL, sizeof(*domain_id), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+ ASSERT_NE(MAP_FAILED, domain_id);
+ *domain_id = 0;
+
+ ruleset_fd = create_cap_ruleset();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ /* Allow the child to replace the audit filter before exiting. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, add_cap_rule(ruleset_fd, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL));
+
+ child = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+ if (child == 0) {
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP);
+ bits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,
+ bits | SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_cap(self->audit_fd, CAP_SETPCAP));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_domain_allocated(self->audit_fd,
+ getpid(), domain_id));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, bits | unpriv));
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP);
+
+ /* Receive the asynchronous domain deallocation record. */
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_filter_drop(self->audit_fd, AUDIT_ADD_RULE));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0,
+ audit_filter_exe(self->audit_fd, &self->audit_filter,
+ AUDIT_DEL_RULE));
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
+
+ _exit(_metadata->exit_code);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+ if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || !WIFEXITED(status) ||
+ WEXITSTATUS(status) != EXIT_SUCCESS)
+ _metadata->exit_code = KSFT_FAIL;
+
+ EXPECT_NE(0, *domain_id);
+ err = matches_log_domain_deallocated(self->audit_fd, 1, *domain_id,
+ &deallocated_dom);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, err);
+ EXPECT_EQ(*domain_id, deallocated_dom);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, munmap(domain_id, sizeof(*domain_id)));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+}
+
/*
* Denials in the capset and mmap_addr paths are audited like capable hook
* denials. The vm_enough_memory hook only withholds the admin reserve, with
--
2.56.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread