* [PATCH v3 0/2] Fix LSM mediation of PR_SET_SECUREBITS
@ 2026-11-18 14:54 Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-18 14:54 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable() Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-18 14:54 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation Mickaël Salaün
0 siblings, 2 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2026-11-18 14:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, Ada Smith, Christian Brauner,
Günther Noack, John Johansen, KP Singh, Matt Bobrowski,
Stephen Smalley, apparmor, bpf, kernel-team, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, selinux
Hi,
This is series 2 of 3:
1. fix Landlock mediation of commoncap's capability checks;
* 2. fix PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation and add focused Landlock tests;
3. fix Landlock mediation of capabilities guarding LSM policies.
This series applies on top of series 1:
https://patch.msgid.link/20261118145217.2551053-1-mic@digikod.net
Since per-process securebits were introduced, PR_SET_SECUREBITS checks
CAP_SETPCAP with cap_capable() instead of ns_capable(), so LSMs
restricting capabilities through the capable hook (SELinux, AppArmor,
Landlock and BPF LSM programs) cannot deny it. A task with CAP_SETPCAP
can therefore change privileged securebits, and thus how its
capabilities evolve across UID changes and execve(), without the
expected denial or audit record.
Patch 1 uses ns_capable(), as PR_CAPBSET_DROP already does, for the
changes that require CAP_SETPCAP; changes limited to the unprivileged
securebits still do not check a capability. It applies cleanly to the
6.18 and 7.2 stable branches; older ones need a simpler adapted
backport. Patch 2 adds a Landlock audit test that fails without patch
1. It shares cap_test.c with series 1, which is the only reason for the
ordering.
Paul, John, Stephen, KP and Matt, please check the AppArmor, SELinux and
BPF LSM implications of exposing this CAP_SETPCAP check to the capable
hook.
Changes since v2:
https://patch.msgid.link/20261117101738.2523492-1-mic@digikod.net
- Apply on top of series 1 v3.
- Use ASSERT_EQ() in the test before checking errno (suggested by
Günther Noack).
- Shorten the commit message of patch 2.
Changes since v1:
https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202811.2409395-1-mic@digikod.net
- Shorten the commit message of patch 1 and check the non-change case
separately (suggested by Serge Hallyn).
- Add Serge Hallyn's Reviewed-by.
Regards,
Mickaël Salaün (2):
capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable()
selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation
security/commoncap.c | 45 +++++++-------
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
base-commit: 7475ea8b58616b33c04afb976cf0fbaad9dd63fb
prerequisite-patch-id: 365071039dd2be439f67707944d12edbe1422d60
prerequisite-patch-id: 021705fb5147cdc8edcac9dbe53c06b854cf976a
prerequisite-patch-id: ddc6687ae87f8f782ed8ad5b005834f242aec2fb
prerequisite-patch-id: 0bf745b08b99168d266461ef5b0b943a2b71eceb
prerequisite-patch-id: 03ec09be2416d4cc932b07dfb0e7450f15c22804
prerequisite-patch-id: 383fa2ce8a4ed44e4b5c828c99c5be5ee75048af
--
2.56.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 1/2] capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable()
2026-11-18 14:54 [PATCH v3 0/2] Fix LSM mediation of PR_SET_SECUREBITS Mickaël Salaün
@ 2026-11-18 14:54 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-18 15:00 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:54 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation Mickaël Salaün
1 sibling, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2026-11-18 14:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, Ada Smith, Christian Brauner,
Günther Noack, John Johansen, KP Singh, Matt Bobrowski,
Stephen Smalley, apparmor, bpf, kernel-team, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, selinux, James Morris, Serge Hallyn,
stable
PR_SET_SECUREBITS checks CAP_SETPCAP with cap_capable(), which skips the
LSM capable hooks, so a task can change privileged securebits despite an
LSM denial.
Use ns_capable() instead, as PR_CAPBSET_DROP already does. Move the
check to a helper that only requires CAP_SETPCAP when needed, so that
changes limited to the unprivileged securebits still do not reach the
LSMs or set PF_SUPERPRIV.
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Matt Bobrowski <matt@bobrowski.net>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@kernel.org>
Fixes: 3898b1b4ebff ("capabilities: implement per-process securebits")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
Changes since v1:
https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202811.2409395-2-mic@digikod.net
- Check the non-change case separately, with its own comment (suggested
by Serge Hallyn).
- Shorten the commit message (suggested by Serge Hallyn).
- Add Serge Hallyn's Reviewed-by.
---
security/commoncap.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index d47ab3022343..9794a594bdd9 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1283,6 +1283,26 @@ static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
return commit_creds(new);
}
+/*
+ * Doing anything with securebits requires privilege (go read about the
+ * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits. Indeed, the
+ * SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not restrictions enforced by the kernel but
+ * by user space on itself. Only checking CAP_SETPCAP when it is needed keeps
+ * LSMs from seeing (and logging) a capability check for unprivileged changes.
+ */
+static bool securebits_need_setpcap(unsigned long old, unsigned long new)
+{
+ const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks = SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED |
+ SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1;
+ const unsigned long changed = old ^ new;
+
+ /* For legacy reasons, a non-change requires privilege. */
+ if (!changed)
+ return true;
+
+ return changed & ~unpriv_and_locks;
+}
+
/**
* cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
* @option: The process control function requested
@@ -1346,28 +1366,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
/* cannot change a locked bit */
return -EPERM;
- /*
- * Doing anything requires privilege (go read about the
- * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits.
- * Indeed, the SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not
- * restrictions enforced by the kernel but by user space on
- * itself.
- */
- if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
- CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0) {
- const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks =
- SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED |
- SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1;
- const unsigned long changed = old->securebits ^ arg2;
-
- /* For legacy reason, denies non-change. */
- if (!changed)
- return -EPERM;
-
- /* Denies privileged changes. */
- if (changed & ~unpriv_and_locks)
- return -EPERM;
- }
+ if (securebits_need_setpcap(old->securebits, arg2) &&
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
+ return -EPERM;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
--
2.56.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation
2026-11-18 14:54 [PATCH v3 0/2] Fix LSM mediation of PR_SET_SECUREBITS Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-18 14:54 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable() Mickaël Salaün
@ 2026-11-18 14:54 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-18 14:59 ` sashiko-bot
1 sibling, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2026-11-18 14:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, Ada Smith, Christian Brauner,
Günther Noack, John Johansen, KP Singh, Matt Bobrowski,
Stephen Smalley, apparmor, bpf, kernel-team, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, selinux, Serge Hallyn
Test that Landlock denies and logs a privileged PR_SET_SECUREBITS
change, now that the previous commit routes its CAP_SETPCAP check
through the capable hooks, and that an unprivileged change still
succeeds. The domain deallocation record must then report exactly one
denial, which proves that the unprivileged change was not denied,
without relying on a no-record timeout.
The check-exec selftests already cover commoncap's securebits semantics.
Without the previous commit, this test fails.
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
Changes since v2:
https://patch.msgid.link/20261117101738.2523492-3-mic@digikod.net
- Use ASSERT_EQ() before checking errno (suggested by Günther Noack).
- Shorten the commit message.
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 69 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
index 7c58ece1c6f0..35a419c46764 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
@@ -1071,6 +1071,75 @@ TEST_F(cap_audit, denied)
EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
}
+/*
+ * A privileged denial allocates the domain ID. The following unprivileged-only
+ * change must not create a hidden Landlock denial, so the domain's deallocation
+ * record must report exactly one denial.
+ */
+TEST_F(cap_audit, securebits)
+{
+ const unsigned long unpriv = SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE |
+ SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED;
+ __u64 *domain_id, deallocated_dom = 0;
+ unsigned long bits;
+ int err, ruleset_fd, status;
+ pid_t child;
+
+ domain_id = mmap(NULL, sizeof(*domain_id), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+ ASSERT_NE(MAP_FAILED, domain_id);
+ *domain_id = 0;
+
+ ruleset_fd = create_cap_ruleset();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ /* Allow the child to replace the audit filter before exiting. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, add_cap_rule(ruleset_fd, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL));
+
+ child = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+ if (child == 0) {
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP);
+ bits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,
+ bits | SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_cap(self->audit_fd, CAP_SETPCAP));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_domain_allocated(self->audit_fd,
+ getpid(), domain_id));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, bits | unpriv));
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP);
+
+ /* Receive the asynchronous domain deallocation record. */
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_filter_drop(self->audit_fd, AUDIT_ADD_RULE));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0,
+ audit_filter_exe(self->audit_fd, &self->audit_filter,
+ AUDIT_DEL_RULE));
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
+
+ _exit(_metadata->exit_code);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+ if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || !WIFEXITED(status) ||
+ WEXITSTATUS(status) != EXIT_SUCCESS)
+ _metadata->exit_code = KSFT_FAIL;
+
+ EXPECT_NE(0, *domain_id);
+ err = matches_log_domain_deallocated(self->audit_fd, 1, *domain_id,
+ &deallocated_dom);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, err);
+ EXPECT_EQ(*domain_id, deallocated_dom);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, munmap(domain_id, sizeof(*domain_id)));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+}
+
/*
* Denials in the capset and mmap_addr paths are audited like capable hook
* denials. The vm_enough_memory hook only withholds the admin reserve, with
--
2.56.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation
2026-11-18 14:54 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation Mickaël Salaün
@ 2026-11-18 14:59 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-11-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
Cc: linux-security-module, selinux
> Test that Landlock denies and logs a privileged PR_SET_SECUREBITS
> change, now that the previous commit routes its CAP_SETPCAP check
> through the capable hooks, and that an unprivileged change still
> succeeds. The domain deallocation record must then report exactly one
> denial, which proves that the unprivileged change was not denied,
> without relying on a no-record timeout.
>
> The check-exec selftests already cover commoncap's securebits semantics.
> Without the previous commit, this test fails.
>
> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261118145431.2551578-1-mic@digikod.net?part=2
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable()
2026-11-18 14:54 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable() Mickaël Salaün
@ 2026-11-18 15:00 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-11-18 15:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
Cc: linux-security-module, selinux
> PR_SET_SECUREBITS checks CAP_SETPCAP with cap_capable(), which skips the
> LSM capable hooks, so a task can change privileged securebits despite an
> LSM denial.
>
> Use ns_capable() instead, as PR_CAPBSET_DROP already does. Move the
> check to a helper that only requires CAP_SETPCAP when needed, so that
> changes limited to the unprivileged securebits still do not reach the
> LSMs or set PF_SUPERPRIV.
>
> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
> Cc: Matt Bobrowski <matt@bobrowski.net>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@kernel.org>
> Fixes: 3898b1b4ebff ("capabilities: implement per-process securebits")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261118145431.2551578-1-mic@digikod.net?part=1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
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2026-11-18 14:54 [PATCH v3 0/2] Fix LSM mediation of PR_SET_SECUREBITS Mickaël Salaün
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