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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
Cc: "Rodolfo Giometti" <giometti@enneenne.com>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	"Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Jens Wiklander" <jenswi@kernel.org>,
	"Sumit Garg" <sumit.garg@kernel.org>,
	op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org,
	"Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@nxp.com>,
	"Pankaj Gupta" <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>,
	"Sahil Malhotra" <sahil.malhotra@nxp.com>,
	"Ahmad Fatoum" <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>,
	"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
	"Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" <chleroy@kernel.org>,
	"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 07:01:20 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <av6CoKFTzLN5Ftbq@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <01692969-8e92-4a08-bde9-aad86674504f@gmail.com>

On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 11:35:40PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> On 11/18/26 7:43 PM, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> > On 11/18/26 7:37 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> >> On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 06:42:15PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> >>> On 11/18/26 9:04 AM, Rodolfo Giometti wrote:
> >>>> This RFC proposes a key type, "keycrypt", whose material user space can
> >>>> use for symmetric operations but never read: AES-256-CBC, HMAC-SHA256
> >>>> and an authenticated AES-256-GCM stream, through a file descriptor that
> >>>> KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN returns for one key and one operation.
> >>>
> >>> I haven't looked at the API, but from a cryptographic perspective,
> >>> this encourages very poor practices.  AES-GCM even allows userspace
> >>> to extract the secret authentication key.
> >>>
> >>> AES-256-CBC isn't a suitable mode on its own, unless it's combined
> >>> with a MAC in encrypt-then-MAC.  Even then, it has a 2^64 birthday
> >>> bound, so it should only be used 2^48 times with a single key unless
> >>> the key is ephemeral.
> >>>
> >>> AES-GCM is not a suitable algorithm either.  If you allow encrypting
> >>> with a key loaded from persistent storage, there is no way for the API
> >>> to ensure it is only used with a unique nonce.  Nonce reuse leaks the
> >>> authentication key and allows forgeries.  Using random nonces isn't
> >>> good enough either: NIST only allows 2^32 encryptions in this case,
> >>> and the API can't enforce that limit.
> >>>
> >>> For long-term keys, all of the following are much safer choices.
> >>> They have 192-bit nonces, which means that one can generate them
> >>> at random for each encryption without any problems.
> >>>
> >>> - XAES-256-GCM
> >>> - XChaCha20-Poly1305
> >>> - AEGIS-256
> >>>
> >>> AES-GCM-SIV is also okay, provided that you are fine with occasionally
> >>> leaking if two plaintexts are equal.  This happens whenever there is
> >>> a nonce collision, so with probability 2^-32 after 2^32 encryptions.
> >>
> >> The exitential problem here is that KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN creates a circular
> >> relationship between the keyrings API and a specific key type.
> >>
> >> At hardware level I did not see any support for TPM, which narrows down
> >> the potential user base.
> >>
> >> The remaining potential user base is further reduced by those that use
> >> trusted keys; leaving out those who need to solve the assumed problem
> >> that only this patch set can presumebly sort out.
> >>
> >> And we don't really know at this point that cut. This is pretty much
> >> the break down of what is wrong here.
> >>
> >> If there is/was a problem to sort out, it should be so constrained that
> >> it should be as quick to describe as stepping over a nail really.
> >>
> >> These are the main topics what I would focus on.
> > 
> > This whole patchset looks like a solution looking for a problem.
> > 
> > The usual solution to something like this is a userspace service
> > like ssh-agent.  Then you can do whatever key management you want.
> > That doesn't protect against root, but if someone can get root you
> > have bigger problems.
> 
> Also, if you need keys stored in hardware for some reason (compliance,
> time-limited exfiltration), you can use a userspace library or
> daemon that abstracts over whatever the hardware-specific API is.

Pro-bab-ly but I'm not a huge fan of generalization ;-) 

But when looking only at HSMs that is at least 99,999% true as they
appear as PKCS#11 providing smart cards with a possible prorietary API.
Other than generic smart card driver they ought not to require any
special kernel support.


> -- 
> Sincerely,
> Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)

Br, Jarkko



      reply	other threads:[~2026-11-19  5:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-18 14:04 [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add a key type for keys user space never reads Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:33   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the sw backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:21   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the OP-TEE backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:33   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:07 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] docs: keycrypt: document keycrypt keys Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:19   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:08 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-KEYCRYPT Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the engine tier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:17   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:10 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] crypto: caam - add an internal cbc(paes) taking the blob's key modifier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:24   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:11 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the CAAM backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:36   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:12 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the aes256-gcm-stream algorithm Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:30   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19  0:25   ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19  0:55     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:31 ` [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:39   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:57 ` Marco Felsch
2026-11-18 15:07   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:42 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19  0:37   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19  0:43     ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19  1:01       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19  4:35       ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19  5:01         ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]

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