From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 9/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the aes256-gcm-stream algorithm
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:30:45 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-221210@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118141257.627441-1-giometti@enneenne.com>
> This patch is a proposal on its own: nothing before it needs it, so it
> can be discussed, or left out, apart from the rest.
>
> aes256-cbc does not authenticate what it decrypts, and a file or a
> transfer longer than one call cannot be sealed with a single AES-GCM
> invocation without buffering all of it, nor decrypted without
> releasing plaintext before its tag is checked.
>
> Add aes256-gcm-stream: the STREAM construction (Hoang, Reyhanitabar,
> Rogaway, Vizar) over AES-256-GCM. A message is split into segments
> of up to 64 KiB, each sealed with its own tag under a subkey derived
> with HKDF-SHA256 from the key and a 16-byte salt drawn at
> KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN; the nonce carries the segment's position and a
> last-segment flag, and the counter lives in the kernel, so segments
> can be neither reordered nor dropped from the end unnoticed. The
> segments go through a new ioctl, KEYCRYPT_IOC_SEGMENT, and
> KEYCRYPT_IOC_FINAL reports a stream whose last segment never came.
> A tee or hsm backend draws the salt and keeps the counter in its
> secure side; the sw and optee backends implement it.
>
> With it comes its section of the documentation, with a file format
> built on it.
>
> No user-space consumer uses it yet.
>
> Signed-off-by: Rodolfo Giometti <giometti@enneenne.com>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261118140421.584086-1-giometti@enneenne.com?part=9
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-18 14:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-18 14:04 [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add a key type for keys user space never reads Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:33 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the sw backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:21 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the OP-TEE backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:33 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:07 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] docs: keycrypt: document keycrypt keys Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:08 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-KEYCRYPT Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the engine tier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:10 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] crypto: caam - add an internal cbc(paes) taking the blob's key modifier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:24 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:11 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the CAAM backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:36 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:12 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the aes256-gcm-stream algorithm Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:30 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-18 14:31 ` [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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