From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] crypto: caam - add an internal cbc(paes) taking the blob's key modifier
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:24:48 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-221196@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118141047.616989-1-giometti@enneenne.com>
> cbc(paes) decapsulates every blob with the fixed key modifier
> "SECURE_KEY", the one trusted keys use for their "pk" keys, and is
> reachable from AF_ALG: a blob made for either can be used through the
> other by whoever holds CAP_NET_ADMIN or CAP_SYS_ADMIN (with AF_ALG's
> default restriction), for whatever operation they choose. A kernel
> user that wants its blobs bound to something of its own, such as the
> metadata of the key they protect, has no way to say so.
>
> Add a second cbc(paes), cbc-paes-km-caam, flagged CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL
> so that only kernel code asking for that flag can allocate it, as the
> DCP's paes is, which trusted keys allocate by driver name with that
> flag; its key names the key modifier to decapsulate with.
> caam_encap_blob() already takes a caller's key modifier, so a kernel
> user can now bind its blobs to a value of its own.
>
> Its only user is the keycrypt CAAM backend, which is a proposal, and
> so is this.
>
> Signed-off-by: Rodolfo Giometti <giometti@enneenne.com>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261118140421.584086-1-giometti@enneenne.com?part=7
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-18 14:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-18 14:04 [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add a key type for keys user space never reads Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:33 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the sw backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:21 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the OP-TEE backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:33 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:07 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] docs: keycrypt: document keycrypt keys Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:08 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-KEYCRYPT Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the engine tier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:10 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] crypto: caam - add an internal cbc(paes) taking the blob's key modifier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:24 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-18 14:11 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the CAAM backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:36 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:12 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the aes256-gcm-stream algorithm Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:30 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:31 ` [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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