From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keescook@chromium.org, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 18/25] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2019 11:01:25 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d2b3065d-c8b7-4d77-c447-5ae81ba9b27c@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191113182506.2580-2-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On 11/13/19 10:24 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change netlink netfilter interfaces to use lsmcontext
> pointers, and remove scaffolding.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 32 +++++++++++++-------------------
> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> index 2d6668fd026c..a1296453d8f2 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> @@ -301,12 +301,10 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
> return -1;
> }
>
> -static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
> +static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
> {
> - u32 seclen = 0;
> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
> struct lsmblob blob;
> - struct lsmcontext context = { };
>
> if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
> return 0;
> @@ -314,15 +312,16 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
> read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
>
> if (skb->secmark) {
> + /* Any LSM might be looking for the secmark */
> lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> - *secdata = context.context;
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
> }
>
> read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
> - seclen = context.len;
> + return context->len;
> +#else
> + return 0;
> #endif
> - return seclen;
> }
>
> static u32 nfqnl_get_bridge_size(struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
> @@ -398,8 +397,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
> enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var(ctinfo);
> struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
> bool csum_verify;
> - struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> - char *secdata = NULL;
> + struct lsmcontext context = { };
> u32 seclen = 0;
>
> size = nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(struct nfgenmsg))
> @@ -466,7 +464,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
> }
>
> if ((queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX) && entskb->sk) {
> - seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &secdata);
> + seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &context);
> if (seclen)
> size += nla_total_size(seclen);
> }
> @@ -601,7 +599,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
> nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(skb, entskb->sk) < 0)
> goto nla_put_failure;
>
> - if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, seclen, secdata))
> + if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, context.len, context.context))
> goto nla_put_failure;
>
> if (ct && nfnl_ct->build(skb, ct, ctinfo, NFQA_CT, NFQA_CT_INFO) < 0)
> @@ -629,10 +627,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
> }
>
> nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
> - if (seclen) {
> - lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
> - security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> - }
> + if (seclen)
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> return skb;
>
> nla_put_failure:
> @@ -640,10 +636,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
> kfree_skb(skb);
> net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
> nlmsg_failure:
> - if (seclen) {
> - lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
> - security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> - }
> + if (seclen)
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> return NULL;
> }
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-11-21 19:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20191113182506.2580-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-11-13 18:24 ` [PATCH v11 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-11-13 18:24 ` [PATCH v11 18/25] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2019-11-21 19:01 ` John Johansen [this message]
2019-11-21 20:36 ` James Morris
2019-11-13 18:25 ` [PATCH v11 19/25] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2019-11-21 19:02 ` John Johansen
2019-11-13 18:25 ` [PATCH v11 20/25] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler
2019-11-13 18:25 ` [PATCH v11 21/25] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary Casey Schaufler
2019-11-13 18:25 ` [PATCH v11 22/25] Audit: Include object data for all security modules Casey Schaufler
2019-11-13 18:25 ` [PATCH v11 23/25] NET: Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for multiple LSMs Casey Schaufler
2019-11-13 18:25 ` [PATCH v11 24/25] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2019-11-13 18:25 ` [PATCH v11 25/25] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2019-11-21 19:03 ` John Johansen
2019-11-13 17:56 [PATCH v11 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-11-13 17:57 ` [PATCH v11 18/25] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
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