From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/6] landlock: Restrict capabilities guarding other LSMs' policies
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 20:38:08 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-207719@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261110203042.2410140-3-mic@digikod.net>
> A process in a domain that denies CAP_MAC_ADMIN or CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE
> could still use them for AppArmor, Smack or SELinux policy, and
> CAP_SYS_PTRACE for Smack's ptrace rule, because these LSMs check them
> with cap_capable() instead of capable().
>
> Implement the capable_lsm hook with the same check as the capable hook,
> so that such capability uses are restricted like any other. The
> following commits switch these LSMs to security_capable_lsm().
>
> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261110203042.2410140-1-mic@digikod.net?part=2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-10 20:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-10 20:30 [PATCH 0/6] Fix Landlock mediation of capabilities guarding LSM policies Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:30 ` [PATCH 1/6] lsm: Add a capable_lsm hook for capabilities guarding an LSM's policy Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:36 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-10 20:30 ` [PATCH 2/6] landlock: Restrict capabilities guarding other LSMs' policies Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:38 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-10 20:30 ` [PATCH 3/6] apparmor: Use security_capable_lsm() for policy capabilities Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:42 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-10 20:30 ` [PATCH 4/6] smack: Use security_capable_lsm() for privilege checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:45 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-10 20:30 ` [PATCH 5/6] selinux: Use security_capable_lsm() for CAP_MAC_ADMIN checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:47 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-10 20:30 ` [PATCH 6/6] selftests/landlock: Test capabilities guarding other LSMs' policies Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 21:02 ` sashiko-bot
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