* [PATCH v3 0/2] wifi: libertas: firmware trust boundary hardening
@ 2026-04-21 13:50 Tristan Madani
2026-04-21 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] wifi: libertas: fix OOB read from firmware pkt_ptr offset in RX path Tristan Madani
2026-04-21 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] wifi: libertas: fix OOB read from firmware bssdescriptsize in scan response Tristan Madani
0 siblings, 2 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Tristan Madani @ 2026-04-21 13:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Johannes Berg; +Cc: libertas-dev, linux-wireless, Tristan Madani
From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
This series adds missing bounds checks for firmware-controlled fields
in the Marvell libertas driver.
Patch 1 validates pkt_ptr offset in the RX path. Patch 2 checks
bssdescriptsize in scan responses.
Changes in v3:
- Regenerated from wireless-next with proper git format-patch.
Changes in v2:
- No code changes from v1.
Tristan Madani (2):
wifi: libertas: fix OOB read from firmware pkt_ptr offset in RX path
wifi: libertas: fix OOB read from firmware bssdescriptsize in scan
response
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/cfg.c | 8 ++++++++
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/rx.c | 9 +++++++++
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread* [PATCH v3 1/2] wifi: libertas: fix OOB read from firmware pkt_ptr offset in RX path
2026-04-21 13:50 [PATCH v3 0/2] wifi: libertas: firmware trust boundary hardening Tristan Madani
@ 2026-04-21 13:50 ` Tristan Madani
2026-04-22 21:23 ` Johannes Berg
2026-04-21 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] wifi: libertas: fix OOB read from firmware bssdescriptsize in scan response Tristan Madani
1 sibling, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Tristan Madani @ 2026-04-21 13:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Johannes Berg; +Cc: libertas-dev, linux-wireless, Tristan Madani
From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
lbs_process_rxed_packet() uses the firmware-supplied pkt_ptr as an
offset into the skb data without validating that it falls within the
skb buffer bounds. A malicious pkt_ptr value causes out-of-bounds
memory access when the function subsequently reads ethernet header
fields from p_rx_pkt.
Add a bounds check to ensure pkt_ptr plus the minimum packet header
size does not exceed skb->len.
Fixes: e45d8e534b67 ("libertas: add support for Marvell SD8688 chip")
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
---
Changes in v3:
- Regenerated from wireless-next with proper git format-patch to
produce valid index hashes (v2 had post-processed index lines).
Changes in v2:
- No code changes from v1.
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/rx.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/rx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/rx.c
index c34d30f7cbe03..3497595a67595 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/rx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/rx.c
@@ -73,6 +73,15 @@ int lbs_process_rxed_packet(struct lbs_private *priv, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
p_rx_pd = (struct rxpd *) skb->data;
+
+ if (le32_to_cpu(p_rx_pd->pkt_ptr) + sizeof(struct rxpackethdr) >
+ skb->len) {
+ lbs_deb_rx("rx err: pkt_ptr %u beyond skb len %u\n",
+ le32_to_cpu(p_rx_pd->pkt_ptr), skb->len);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ dev_kfree_skb(skb);
+ goto done;
+ }
p_rx_pkt = (struct rxpackethdr *) ((u8 *)p_rx_pd +
le32_to_cpu(p_rx_pd->pkt_ptr));
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] wifi: libertas: fix OOB read from firmware pkt_ptr offset in RX path
2026-04-21 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] wifi: libertas: fix OOB read from firmware pkt_ptr offset in RX path Tristan Madani
@ 2026-04-22 21:23 ` Johannes Berg
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Johannes Berg @ 2026-04-22 21:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tristan Madani; +Cc: libertas-dev, linux-wireless, Tristan Madani
On Tue, 2026-04-21 at 13:50 +0000, Tristan Madani wrote:
> From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
>
> lbs_process_rxed_packet() uses the firmware-supplied pkt_ptr as an
> offset into the skb data without validating that it falls within the
> skb buffer bounds. A malicious pkt_ptr value causes out-of-bounds
> memory access when the function subsequently reads ethernet header
> fields from p_rx_pkt.
>
> Add a bounds check to ensure pkt_ptr plus the minimum packet header
> size does not exceed skb->len.
Please generally put a bit more thought into your patches.
> Fixes: e45d8e534b67 ("libertas: add support for Marvell SD8688 chip")
> Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
I'll also note again that I don't find any tool/LLM disclosure
improbably, nobody really cares about these rivers any more?
> p_rx_pd = (struct rxpd *) skb->data;
> +
> + if (le32_to_cpu(p_rx_pd->pkt_ptr) + sizeof(struct rxpackethdr) >
> + skb->len) {
>
At this point you don't even know yet that the skb is long enough to
access p_r x_pd->pkt_ptr *itself*, so this can't be right.
There's a length check later that checks for
if (skb->len < (ETH_HLEN + 8 + sizeof(struct rxpd))) {
which probably needs to be moved up _and_ improved, but you're not
actually checking things correctly.
How is it that whatever tool you're using to find these isn't
complaining about the fix??
johannes
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 2/2] wifi: libertas: fix OOB read from firmware bssdescriptsize in scan response
2026-04-21 13:50 [PATCH v3 0/2] wifi: libertas: firmware trust boundary hardening Tristan Madani
2026-04-21 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] wifi: libertas: fix OOB read from firmware pkt_ptr offset in RX path Tristan Madani
@ 2026-04-21 13:50 ` Tristan Madani
1 sibling, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Tristan Madani @ 2026-04-21 13:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Johannes Berg; +Cc: libertas-dev, linux-wireless, Tristan Madani
From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
The firmware-controlled bssdescriptsize field in lbs_ret_scan() is used
to compute the TSF descriptor position without validation against the
response buffer size. An inflated value causes out-of-bounds reads from
the 2312-byte response buffer into adjacent struct lbs_private members.
Add a check that bssdescriptsize fits within the response data.
Fixes: ff9fc791940f ("libertas: first stab at cfg80211 support")
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
---
Changes in v3:
- Regenerated from wireless-next with proper git format-patch to
produce valid index hashes (v2 had post-processed index lines).
Changes in v2:
- No code changes from v1.
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/cfg.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/cfg.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/cfg.c
index 72c92f72469de..41dee6e0ca9fa 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/cfg.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/cfg.c
@@ -554,6 +554,14 @@ static int lbs_ret_scan(struct lbs_private *priv, unsigned long dummy,
bsssize = get_unaligned_le16(&scanresp->bssdescriptsize);
+ if (bsssize > le16_to_cpu(resp->size) -
+ sizeof(struct cmd_ds_802_11_scan_rsp)) {
+ lbs_deb_scan(
+ "scan response: bssdescriptsize %d exceeds response\n",
+ bsssize);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
lbs_deb_scan("scan response: %d BSSs (%d bytes); resp size %d bytes\n",
scanresp->nr_sets, bsssize, le16_to_cpu(resp->size));
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-04-22 21:23 UTC | newest]
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2026-04-21 13:50 [PATCH v3 0/2] wifi: libertas: firmware trust boundary hardening Tristan Madani
2026-04-21 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] wifi: libertas: fix OOB read from firmware pkt_ptr offset in RX path Tristan Madani
2026-04-22 21:23 ` Johannes Berg
2026-04-21 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] wifi: libertas: fix OOB read from firmware bssdescriptsize in scan response Tristan Madani
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