From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pjt@google.com, evn@google.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
peterz@infradead.org, pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com,
kim.phillips@amd.com, alexandre.chartre@oracle.com,
daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com,
"José Oliveira" <joseloliveira11@gmail.com>,
"Rodrigo Branco" <rodrigo@kernelhacking.com>,
"Alexandra Sandulescu" <aesa@google.com>,
"Jim Mattson" <jmattson@google.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 08:34:42 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230220163442.7fmaeef3oqci4ee3@treble> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACYkzJ6n=-tobhX0ONQhjHSgmnNjWnNe_dZnEOGtD8Y6S3RHbA@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Feb 20, 2023 at 04:34:02AM -0800, KP Singh wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 20, 2023 at 4:20 AM KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Feb 20, 2023 at 4:13 AM Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Mon, Feb 20, 2023 at 01:01:27PM +0100, KP Singh wrote:
> > > > +static inline bool spectre_v2_user_no_stibp(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
> > > > +{
> > > > + /* When IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, STIBP is not needed.
> > > > + *
> > > > + * However, With KERNEL_IBRS, the IBRS bit is cleared on return
> > > > + * to user and the user-mode code needs to be able to enable protection
> > > > + * from cross-thread training, either by always enabling STIBP or
> > > > + * by enabling it via prctl.
> > > > + */
> > > > + return (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode) &&
> > > > + !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS));
> > > > +}
> > >
> > > The comments and code confused me, they both seem to imply some
> > > distinction between IBRS and KERNEL_IBRS, but in the kernel those are
> > > functionally the same thing. e.g., the kernel doesn't have a user IBRS
> > > mode.
> > >
> > > And, unless I'm missing some subtlety here, it seems to be a convoluted
> > > way of saying that eIBRS doesn't need STIBP in user space.
>
> Actually, there is a subtlety, STIBP is not needed in IBRS and eIBRS
> however, with KERNEL_IBRS we only enable IBRS (by setting and
> unsetting the IBRS bit of SPEC_CTL) in the kernel context and this is
> why we need to allow STIBP in userspace. If it were for pure IBRS, we
> would not need it either (based on my reading). Now, with
> spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode, as per the current implementation implies
> that KERNEL_IBRS is chosen, but this may change. Also, I would also
> prefer to have it more readable in the sense that:
>
> "If the kernel decides to write 0 to the IBRS bit on returning to the
> user, STIBP needs to to be allowed in user space"
We will never enable IBRS in user space. We tried that years ago and it
was very slow.
--
Josh
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-20 16:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-20 12:01 [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS KP Singh
2023-02-20 12:13 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-02-20 12:20 ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 12:34 ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 14:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 15:38 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-20 19:57 ` Andrew Cooper
2023-02-20 21:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 23:01 ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 23:30 ` Andrew Cooper
2023-02-20 23:45 ` KP Singh
2023-02-21 18:52 ` KP Singh
2023-02-21 10:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 16:34 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2023-02-20 17:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 17:59 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-02-20 18:01 ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 18:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 18:44 ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 18:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 18:56 ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 19:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 19:10 ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 18:27 ` [PATCH] x86/bugs: Allow STIBP with IBRS Josh Poimboeuf
2023-02-20 18:33 ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 18:59 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-02-20 19:04 ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 19:19 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-02-20 18:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 19:09 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-02-20 19:16 ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 19:35 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-02-20 19:38 ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 19:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-22 1:20 ` Pawan Gupta
2023-02-22 1:26 ` KP Singh
2023-02-22 1:38 ` Pawan Gupta
2023-02-27 19:59 ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS tip-bot2 for KP Singh
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