Re: [PATCH] x86/bugs: Allow STIBP with IBRS

[Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>]

On Mon, Feb 20, 2023 at 07:34:59PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> Drop stable@ again.
> 
> On Mon, Feb 20, 2023 at 10:27:17AM -0800, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > IBRS is only enabled in kernel space.  Since it's not enabled in user
> > space, user space isn't protected from indirect branch prediction
> > attacks from a sibling CPU thread.
> > 
> > Allow STIBP to be enabled to protect against such attacks.
> > 
> > Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS")
> 
> Yah, look at that one:
> 
> commit 7c693f54c873691a4b7da05c7e0f74e67745d144
> Author: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
> Date:   Tue Jun 14 23:15:55 2022 +0200
> 
>     x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS
> 
>     Extend spectre_v2= boot option with Kernel IBRS.
> 
>     [jpoimboe: no STIBP with IBRS]
>     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> 
> I'm assuming this was supposed to mean no STIBP in *kernel mode* when
> IBRS is selected?

No it was supposed to be "no STIBP with *eIBRS*".

> In user mode, STIBP should be selectable as we disable IBRS there.
> 
> Close?
> 
> If so, pls document it too while at it:
> 
> Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
> 
> because we will be wondering next time again.
> 
> Like we wonder each time this madness is being touched. ;-(

As far as I can tell, that document was never updated to describe
spectre_v2=ibrs in the first place.  That would be a whole 'nother patch
which I'm not volunteering for.  Nice try ;-)

-- 
Josh