* [PATCH v4 1/3] KVM: SEV-ES: Prevent MSR access post VMSA encryption
2024-05-31 4:46 [PATCH v4 0/3] KVM: SEV-ES: Fix KVM_{GET|SET}_MSRS and LBRV handling Ravi Bangoria
@ 2024-05-31 4:46 ` Ravi Bangoria
2024-05-31 4:46 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] KVM: SEV-ES: Disallow SEV-ES guests when X86_FEATURE_LBRV is absent Ravi Bangoria
` (2 subsequent siblings)
3 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Ravi Bangoria @ 2024-05-31 4:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: seanjc, pbonzini, nikunj.dadhania
Cc: ravi.bangoria, thomas.lendacky, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, x86,
hpa, michael.roth, pankaj.gupta, kvm, linux-kernel,
santosh.shukla
From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
KVM currently allows userspace to read/write MSRs even after the VMSA is
encrypted. This can cause unintentional issues if MSR access has side-
effects. For ex, while migrating a guest, userspace could attempt to
migrate MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR and end up unintentionally disabling LBRV on
the target. Fix this by preventing access to those MSRs which are context
switched via the VMSA, once the VMSA is encrypted.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 3d0549ca246f..1a01293f6909 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -2834,10 +2834,24 @@ static int svm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
return 0;
}
+static bool
+sev_es_prevent_msr_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+ return sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm) &&
+ vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected &&
+ svm_msrpm_offset(msr_info->index) != MSR_INVALID &&
+ !msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, msr_info->index);
+}
+
static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ if (sev_es_prevent_msr_access(vcpu, msr_info)) {
+ msr_info->data = 0;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
switch (msr_info->index) {
case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
@@ -2988,6 +3002,10 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
u32 ecx = msr->index;
u64 data = msr->data;
+
+ if (sev_es_prevent_msr_access(vcpu, msr))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
switch (ecx) {
case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
--
2.45.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 2/3] KVM: SEV-ES: Disallow SEV-ES guests when X86_FEATURE_LBRV is absent
2024-05-31 4:46 [PATCH v4 0/3] KVM: SEV-ES: Fix KVM_{GET|SET}_MSRS and LBRV handling Ravi Bangoria
2024-05-31 4:46 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] KVM: SEV-ES: Prevent MSR access post VMSA encryption Ravi Bangoria
@ 2024-05-31 4:46 ` Ravi Bangoria
2024-05-31 4:46 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] KVM: SEV-ES: Fix LBRV code Ravi Bangoria
2024-06-03 17:05 ` [PATCH v4 0/3] KVM: SEV-ES: Fix KVM_{GET|SET}_MSRS and LBRV handling Paolo Bonzini
3 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Ravi Bangoria @ 2024-05-31 4:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: seanjc, pbonzini, nikunj.dadhania
Cc: ravi.bangoria, thomas.lendacky, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, x86,
hpa, michael.roth, pankaj.gupta, kvm, linux-kernel,
santosh.shukla
As documented in APM[1], LBR Virtualization must be enabled for SEV-ES
guests. So, prevent SEV-ES guests when LBRV support is missing.
[1]: AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Pub. 40332, Rev. 4.07 - June
2023, Vol 2, 15.35.2 Enabling SEV-ES.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=304653
Fixes: 376c6d285017 ("KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU creation/loading")
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 ++++++
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 16 +++++++---------
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 176ba117413a..8345a5098ab7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -2933,6 +2933,12 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES))
goto out;
+ if (!lbrv) {
+ WARN_ONCE(!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LBRV),
+ "LBRV must be present for SEV-ES support");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/* Has the system been allocated ASIDs for SEV-ES? */
if (min_sev_asid == 1)
goto out;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 1a01293f6909..cadf3085f183 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ int vgif = true;
module_param(vgif, int, 0444);
/* enable/disable LBR virtualization */
-static int lbrv = true;
+int lbrv = true;
module_param(lbrv, int, 0444);
static int tsc_scaling = true;
@@ -5308,6 +5308,12 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
nrips = nrips && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
+ if (lbrv) {
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LBRV))
+ lbrv = false;
+ else
+ pr_info("LBR virtualization supported\n");
+ }
/*
* Note, SEV setup consumes npt_enabled and enable_mmio_caching (which
* may be modified by svm_adjust_mmio_mask()), as well as nrips.
@@ -5361,14 +5367,6 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
svm_x86_ops.set_vnmi_pending = NULL;
}
-
- if (lbrv) {
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LBRV))
- lbrv = false;
- else
- pr_info("LBR virtualization supported\n");
- }
-
if (!enable_pmu)
pr_info("PMU virtualization is disabled\n");
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 555c55f50298..2d6c19c55b1a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ extern int vgif;
extern bool intercept_smi;
extern bool x2avic_enabled;
extern bool vnmi;
+extern int lbrv;
/*
* Clean bits in VMCB.
--
2.45.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 3/3] KVM: SEV-ES: Fix LBRV code
2024-05-31 4:46 [PATCH v4 0/3] KVM: SEV-ES: Fix KVM_{GET|SET}_MSRS and LBRV handling Ravi Bangoria
2024-05-31 4:46 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] KVM: SEV-ES: Prevent MSR access post VMSA encryption Ravi Bangoria
2024-05-31 4:46 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] KVM: SEV-ES: Disallow SEV-ES guests when X86_FEATURE_LBRV is absent Ravi Bangoria
@ 2024-05-31 4:46 ` Ravi Bangoria
2024-06-05 11:48 ` [PATCH] KVM: SNP: Fix LBR Virtualization for SNP guest Ravi Bangoria
2024-06-03 17:05 ` [PATCH v4 0/3] KVM: SEV-ES: Fix KVM_{GET|SET}_MSRS and LBRV handling Paolo Bonzini
3 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Ravi Bangoria @ 2024-05-31 4:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: seanjc, pbonzini, nikunj.dadhania
Cc: ravi.bangoria, thomas.lendacky, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, x86,
hpa, michael.roth, pankaj.gupta, kvm, linux-kernel,
santosh.shukla
As documented in APM[1], LBR Virtualization must be enabled for SEV-ES
guests. Although KVM currently enforces LBRV for SEV-ES guests, there
are multiple issues with it:
o MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is still intercepted. Since MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR
interception is used to dynamically toggle LBRV for performance reasons,
this can be fatal for SEV-ES guests. For ex SEV-ES guest on Zen3:
[guest ~]# wrmsr 0x1d9 0x4
KVM: entry failed, hardware error 0xffffffff
EAX=00000004 EBX=00000000 ECX=000001d9 EDX=00000000
Fix this by never intercepting MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR for SEV-ES guests.
No additional save/restore logic is required since MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR
is of swap type A.
o KVM will disable LBRV if userspace sets MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR before the
VMSA is encrypted. Fix this by moving LBRV enablement code post VMSA
encryption.
[1]: AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Pub. 40332, Rev. 4.07 - June
2023, Vol 2, 15.35.2 Enabling SEV-ES.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=304653
Fixes: 376c6d285017 ("KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU creation/loading")
Co-developed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 ++++++++-----
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 8 +++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 3 ++-
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 8345a5098ab7..7d401f8a3001 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -851,6 +851,14 @@ static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
*/
fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = true;
+
+ /*
+ * SEV-ES guest mandates LBR Virtualization to be _always_ ON. Enable it
+ * only after setting guest_state_protected because KVM_SET_MSRS allows
+ * dynamic toggling of LBRV (for performance reason) on write access to
+ * MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR when guest_state_protected is not set.
+ */
+ svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu);
return 0;
}
@@ -4279,7 +4287,6 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ES_ENABLE;
- svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
/*
* An SEV-ES guest requires a VMSA area that is a separate from the
@@ -4331,10 +4338,6 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
/* Clear intercepts on selected MSRs */
set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_EFER, 1, 1);
set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, 1, 1);
- set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 1, 1);
- set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 1, 1);
- set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1);
- set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 1, 1);
}
void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index cadf3085f183..bff08729c0e9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs {
{ .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, .always = false },
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, .always = false },
@@ -990,7 +991,7 @@ void svm_copy_lbrs(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb)
vmcb_mark_dirty(to_vmcb, VMCB_LBR);
}
-static void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
@@ -1000,6 +1001,9 @@ static void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1);
set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 1, 1);
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, 1, 1);
+
/* Move the LBR msrs to the vmcb02 so that the guest can see them. */
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb, svm->vmcb01.ptr);
@@ -1009,6 +1013,8 @@ static void svm_disable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ KVM_BUG_ON(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm), vcpu->kvm);
+
svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 0, 0);
set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 0, 0);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 2d6c19c55b1a..3424a9577872 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
#define IOPM_SIZE PAGE_SIZE * 3
#define MSRPM_SIZE PAGE_SIZE * 2
-#define MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS 47
+#define MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS 48
#define MSRPM_OFFSETS 32
extern u32 msrpm_offsets[MSRPM_OFFSETS] __read_mostly;
extern bool npt_enabled;
@@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ u32 *svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm(void);
void svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm);
void svm_vcpu_free_msrpm(u32 *msrpm);
void svm_copy_lbrs(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb);
+void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void svm_update_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer);
--
2.45.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread