[PATCH v3 20/35] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors

[David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>]

Define 5 new attack vectors that are used for controlling CPU
speculation mitigations and associated command line options.  Each
attack vector may be enabled or disabled, which affects the CPU
mitigations enabled.

The default settings for these attack vectors are consistent with
existing kernel defaults, other than the automatic disabling of VM-based
attack vectors if KVM support is not present.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h | 11 +++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c  | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h
index f25ca2d709d4..354d04a964f0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h
@@ -12,4 +12,15 @@ static inline int ppro_with_ram_bug(void) { return 0; }
 
 extern void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void);
 
+enum cpu_attack_vectors {
+	CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL,
+	CPU_MITIGATE_USER_USER,
+	CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST,
+	CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_GUEST,
+	CPU_MITIGATE_CROSS_THREAD,
+	NR_CPU_ATTACK_VECTORS,
+};
+
+bool cpu_mitigate_attack_vector(enum cpu_attack_vectors v);
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_BUGS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index aee2945bdef9..88eba8e4c7fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -169,6 +169,66 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmio_stale_data_clear);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS
+/*
+ * All except the cross-thread attack vector are mitigated by default.
+ * Cross-thread mitigation often requires disabling SMT which is too expensive
+ * to be enabled by default.
+ *
+ * Guest-to-Host and Guest-to-Guest vectors are only needed if KVM support is
+ * present.
+ */
+static bool cpu_mitigate_attack_vectors[NR_CPU_ATTACK_VECTORS] __ro_after_init = {
+	[CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL] = true,
+	[CPU_MITIGATE_USER_USER] = true,
+	[CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST] = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM),
+	[CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_GUEST] = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM),
+	[CPU_MITIGATE_CROSS_THREAD] = false
+};
+
+#define DEFINE_ATTACK_VECTOR(opt, v) \
+	static int __init v##_parse_cmdline(char *arg) \
+{ \
+	if (!strcmp(arg, "off")) \
+		cpu_mitigate_attack_vectors[v] = false; \
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "on")) \
+		cpu_mitigate_attack_vectors[v] = true; \
+	else \
+		pr_warn("Unsupported " opt "=%s\n", arg); \
+	return 0; \
+} \
+early_param(opt, v##_parse_cmdline)
+
+bool cpu_mitigate_attack_vector(enum cpu_attack_vectors v)
+{
+	if (v < NR_CPU_ATTACK_VECTORS)
+		return cpu_mitigate_attack_vectors[v];
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(v >= NR_CPU_ATTACK_VECTORS);
+	return false;
+}
+
+#else
+#define DEFINE_ATTACK_VECTOR(opt, v) \
+static int __init v##_parse_cmdline(char *arg) \
+{ \
+	pr_crit("Kernel compiled without mitigations, ignoring %s; system may still be vulnerable\n", opt); \
+	return 0; \
+} \
+early_param(opt, v##_parse_cmdline)
+
+bool cpu_mitigate_attack_vector(enum cpu_attack_vectors v)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
+
+DEFINE_ATTACK_VECTOR("mitigate_user_kernel", CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL);
+DEFINE_ATTACK_VECTOR("mitigate_user_user", CPU_MITIGATE_USER_USER);
+DEFINE_ATTACK_VECTOR("mitigate_guest_host", CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST);
+DEFINE_ATTACK_VECTOR("mitigate_guest_guest", CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_GUEST);
+DEFINE_ATTACK_VECTOR("mitigate_cross_thread", CPU_MITIGATE_CROSS_THREAD);
+
 void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
 {
 	/*
-- 
2.34.1