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From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 04/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2025 14:24:44 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250108202515.385902-5-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250108202515.385902-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>

Restructure mds mitigation selection to use select/update/apply
functions to create consistent vulnerability handling.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 592d40551432..ff2d6f2e01f4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -34,6 +34,25 @@
 
 #include "cpu.h"
 
+/*
+ * Speculation Vulnerability Handling
+ *
+ * Each vulnerability is handled with the following functions:
+ *   <vuln>_select_mitigation() -- Selects a mitigation to use.  This should
+ *				   take into account all relevant command line
+ *				   options.
+ *   <vuln>_update_mitigation() -- This is called after all vulnerabilities have
+ *				   selected a mitigation, in case the selection
+ *				   may want to change based on other choices
+ *				   made.  This function is optional.
+ *   <vuln>_apply_mitigation() -- Enable the selected mitigation.
+ *
+ * The compile-time mitigation in all cases should be AUTO.  An explicit
+ * command-line option can override AUTO.  If no such option is
+ * provided, <vuln>_select_mitigation() will override AUTO to the best
+ * mitigation option.
+ */
+
 static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -41,6 +60,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mds_update_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void);
 static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void);
 static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -165,6 +186,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
 	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();
 	ssb_select_mitigation();
 	l1tf_select_mitigation();
+	mds_select_mitigation();
 	md_clear_select_mitigation();
 	srbds_select_mitigation();
 	l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
@@ -175,6 +197,14 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
 	 */
 	srso_select_mitigation();
 	gds_select_mitigation();
+
+	/*
+	 * After mitigations are selected, some may need to update their
+	 * choices.
+	 */
+	mds_update_mitigation();
+
+	mds_apply_mitigation();
 }
 
 /*
@@ -229,9 +259,6 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
 }
 
-#undef pr_fmt
-#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"MDS: " fmt
-
 /* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
 static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
 	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MDS) ? MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
@@ -277,12 +304,20 @@ enum rfds_mitigations {
 static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
 	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 
+/* Return TRUE if any VERW-based mitigation is enabled. */
+static bool __init verw_mitigation_enabled(void)
+{
+	return (mds_mitigation != MDS_MITIGATION_OFF ||
+		(taa_mitigation != TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+		 taa_mitigation != TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED) ||
+		mmio_mitigation != MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
+		rfds_mitigation != RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF);
+}
+
 static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
 {
-	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off())
 		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
-		return;
-	}
 
 	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO)
 		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
@@ -290,9 +325,29 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
 			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
+	}
+}
 
-		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+static void __init mds_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off())
+		return;
+
+	/* If TAA, MMIO, or RFDS are being mitigated, MDS gets mitigated too. */
+	if (verw_mitigation_enabled()) {
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+		else
+			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
+	}
+
+	pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+}
 
+static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
 		    (mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
 			cpu_smt_disable(false);
@@ -595,7 +650,6 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
 
 static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
 {
-	mds_select_mitigation();
 	taa_select_mitigation();
 	mmio_select_mitigation();
 	rfds_select_mitigation();
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-01-08 20:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 138+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-01-08 20:24 [PATCH v3 00/35] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 01/35] x86/bugs: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER David Kaplan
2025-02-28 11:53   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 02/35] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines David Kaplan
2025-02-28 11:53   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 03/35] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds David Kaplan
2025-02-28 11:53   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2025-02-10 16:13   ` [PATCH v3 04/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 17:17     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-10 17:28       ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 22:25   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-10 22:33     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 05/35] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 16:24   ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 17:19     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-10 22:50   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 17:17     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 19:17       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 06/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 16:42   ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 17:22     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-10 17:35       ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 23:29   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 20:35     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 23:18       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 17:28         ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-12 23:16           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-19 18:20             ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-21 21:48               ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 07/35] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 23:36   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 22:49     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 08/35] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 09/35] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 23:44   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 22:59     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 10/35] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 17:06   ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 17:27     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-10 17:40       ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 23:52   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 15:36     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 11/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 12/35] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2025-01-09  5:22   ` Pawan Gupta
2025-01-09 15:26     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-09 16:40       ` Pawan Gupta
2025-01-09 16:42         ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-10 18:45     ` David Laight
2025-01-10 20:30       ` Pawan Gupta
2025-01-10 20:35         ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-10 18:35   ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 20:50     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11  0:10   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-24 15:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-24 15:59     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 13/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11  0:53   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 15:59     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-12 21:35       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 14/35] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 15/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11  1:07   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 16:40     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 16/35] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11  1:10   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 16:45     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 17/35] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11  1:21   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 16:47     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 18/35] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11 16:39   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 17:01     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 19/35] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-02-11 16:43   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 16:57     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 20/35] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-02-11 18:07   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 17:20     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-17 17:33       ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-17 20:19         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-17 20:38           ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-17 23:39             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-18  2:24               ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-18  7:05                 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-18  8:52                   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-20 22:04                     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-26 18:57                       ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-26 20:14                         ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-26 21:01                           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-26 21:51                             ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-27 13:39                               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-26 21:03                           ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-26 22:13                             ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-26 22:18                               ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-26 22:34                                 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-26 23:44                               ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-27  0:35                                 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-27  1:23                                   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-27  3:50                                     ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-27 14:08                                       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-27 14:36                                         ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-27 15:01                                           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-27 15:22                                             ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-27 15:37                                               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-27 16:05                                                 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-27 17:07                                                   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 21/35] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-01-09  3:43   ` Pawan Gupta
2025-01-09 15:08     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 18:41   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 18:54     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 19:04       ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 20:34         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 20:53           ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 22:38             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 18:55     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 22/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 23/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2025-02-11 19:01   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 24/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 25/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 26/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 27/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 28/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 29/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 30/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2025-02-11 19:03   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 17:22     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 31/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 32/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 33/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 34/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 35/35] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
     [not found] ` <20250110083627.xankiqhczr7ksldv@desk>
2025-01-10 15:39   ` [PATCH v3 00/35] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls Borislav Petkov
     [not found]     ` <20250110171410.ttbt7cohzdjwi4hk@desk>
2025-01-12 11:38       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-13 17:41         ` Pawan Gupta

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