From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 04/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2025 14:24:44 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250108202515.385902-5-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250108202515.385902-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Restructure mds mitigation selection to use select/update/apply
functions to create consistent vulnerability handling.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 592d40551432..ff2d6f2e01f4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -34,6 +34,25 @@
#include "cpu.h"
+/*
+ * Speculation Vulnerability Handling
+ *
+ * Each vulnerability is handled with the following functions:
+ * <vuln>_select_mitigation() -- Selects a mitigation to use. This should
+ * take into account all relevant command line
+ * options.
+ * <vuln>_update_mitigation() -- This is called after all vulnerabilities have
+ * selected a mitigation, in case the selection
+ * may want to change based on other choices
+ * made. This function is optional.
+ * <vuln>_apply_mitigation() -- Enable the selected mitigation.
+ *
+ * The compile-time mitigation in all cases should be AUTO. An explicit
+ * command-line option can override AUTO. If no such option is
+ * provided, <vuln>_select_mitigation() will override AUTO to the best
+ * mitigation option.
+ */
+
static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -41,6 +60,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mds_update_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -165,6 +186,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();
ssb_select_mitigation();
l1tf_select_mitigation();
+ mds_select_mitigation();
md_clear_select_mitigation();
srbds_select_mitigation();
l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
@@ -175,6 +197,14 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
*/
srso_select_mitigation();
gds_select_mitigation();
+
+ /*
+ * After mitigations are selected, some may need to update their
+ * choices.
+ */
+ mds_update_mitigation();
+
+ mds_apply_mitigation();
}
/*
@@ -229,9 +259,6 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
}
-#undef pr_fmt
-#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MDS: " fmt
-
/* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MDS) ? MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
@@ -277,12 +304,20 @@ enum rfds_mitigations {
static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+/* Return TRUE if any VERW-based mitigation is enabled. */
+static bool __init verw_mitigation_enabled(void)
+{
+ return (mds_mitigation != MDS_MITIGATION_OFF ||
+ (taa_mitigation != TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ taa_mitigation != TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED) ||
+ mmio_mitigation != MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
+ rfds_mitigation != RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF);
+}
+
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
{
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off())
mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
- return;
- }
if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO)
mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
@@ -290,9 +325,29 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
+ }
+}
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+static void __init mds_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off())
+ return;
+
+ /* If TAA, MMIO, or RFDS are being mitigated, MDS gets mitigated too. */
+ if (verw_mitigation_enabled()) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+ else
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+}
+static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
(mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
cpu_smt_disable(false);
@@ -595,7 +650,6 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
{
- mds_select_mitigation();
taa_select_mitigation();
mmio_select_mitigation();
rfds_select_mitigation();
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-08 20:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 138+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-08 20:24 [PATCH v3 00/35] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 01/35] x86/bugs: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER David Kaplan
2025-02-28 11:53 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 02/35] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines David Kaplan
2025-02-28 11:53 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 03/35] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds David Kaplan
2025-02-28 11:53 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2025-02-10 16:13 ` [PATCH v3 04/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 17:17 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-10 17:28 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 22:25 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-10 22:33 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 05/35] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 16:24 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 17:19 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-10 22:50 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 17:17 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 19:17 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 06/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 16:42 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 17:22 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-10 17:35 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 23:29 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 20:35 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 23:18 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 17:28 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-12 23:16 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-19 18:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-21 21:48 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 07/35] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 23:36 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 22:49 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 08/35] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 09/35] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 23:44 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 22:59 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 10/35] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 17:06 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 17:27 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-10 17:40 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 23:52 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 15:36 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 11/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 12/35] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2025-01-09 5:22 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-01-09 15:26 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-09 16:40 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-01-09 16:42 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-10 18:45 ` David Laight
2025-01-10 20:30 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-01-10 20:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-10 18:35 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 20:50 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 0:10 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-24 15:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-24 15:59 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 13/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11 0:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 15:59 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-12 21:35 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 14/35] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 15/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11 1:07 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 16:40 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 16/35] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11 1:10 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 16:45 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 17/35] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11 1:21 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 16:47 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 18/35] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11 16:39 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 17:01 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 19/35] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-02-11 16:43 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 16:57 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 20/35] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-02-11 18:07 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 17:20 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-17 17:33 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-17 20:19 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-17 20:38 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-17 23:39 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-18 2:24 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-18 7:05 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-18 8:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-20 22:04 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-26 18:57 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-26 20:14 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-26 21:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-26 21:51 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-27 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-26 21:03 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-26 22:13 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-26 22:18 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-26 22:34 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-26 23:44 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-27 0:35 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-27 1:23 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-27 3:50 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-27 14:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-27 14:36 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-27 15:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-27 15:22 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-27 15:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-27 16:05 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-27 17:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 21/35] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-01-09 3:43 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-01-09 15:08 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 18:41 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 18:54 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 19:04 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 20:34 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 20:53 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 22:38 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 18:55 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 22/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 23/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2025-02-11 19:01 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 24/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 25/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 26/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 27/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 28/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 29/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 30/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2025-02-11 19:03 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 17:22 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 31/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 32/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 33/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 34/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 35/35] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
[not found] ` <20250110083627.xankiqhczr7ksldv@desk>
2025-01-10 15:39 ` [PATCH v3 00/35] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20250110171410.ttbt7cohzdjwi4hk@desk>
2025-01-12 11:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-13 17:41 ` Pawan Gupta
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