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From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 03/35] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2025 14:24:43 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250108202515.385902-4-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250108202515.385902-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>

Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds to create consistent
vulnerability handling.  These AUTO mitigations will be turned into the
appropriate default mitigations in the <vuln>_select_mitigation()
functions.  In a later patch, these will be used with the new attack
vector controls to help select appropriate mitigations.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index c0cd10182e90..90278d0c071b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -757,6 +757,7 @@ extern enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation;
 
 enum mds_mitigations {
 	MDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO,
 	MDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
 	MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV,
 };
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index bbe4c772e557..592d40551432 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 
 /* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
 static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
-	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MDS) ? MDS_MITIGATION_FULL : MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MDS) ? MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 static bool mds_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
 
 static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
@@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
 
 enum taa_mitigations {
 	TAA_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	TAA_MITIGATION_AUTO,
 	TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
 	TAA_MITIGATION_VERW,
 	TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED,
@@ -252,27 +253,29 @@ enum taa_mitigations {
 
 /* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
 static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init =
-	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_TAA) ? TAA_MITIGATION_VERW : TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_TAA) ? TAA_MITIGATION_AUTO : TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
 
 enum mmio_mitigations {
 	MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	MMIO_MITIGATION_AUTO,
 	MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
 	MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW,
 };
 
 /* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
 static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init =
-	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ? MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW : MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ?	MMIO_MITIGATION_AUTO : MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
 
 enum rfds_mitigations {
 	RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	RFDS_MITIGATION_AUTO,
 	RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW,
 	RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
 };
 
 /* Default mitigation for Register File Data Sampling */
 static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
-	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 
 static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
 {
@@ -281,6 +284,9 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO)
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
 	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
 			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
@@ -510,6 +516,9 @@ static void __init rfds_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
 		return;
 
+	if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_AUTO)
+		rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW;
+
 	if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
 	else
@@ -1976,6 +1985,7 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
 
 	switch (mds_mitigation) {
 	case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO:
 	case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:
 		if (sched_smt_active() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
 			pr_warn_once(MDS_MSG_SMT);
@@ -1987,6 +1997,7 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
 
 	switch (taa_mitigation) {
 	case TAA_MITIGATION_VERW:
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_AUTO:
 	case TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
 		if (sched_smt_active())
 			pr_warn_once(TAA_MSG_SMT);
@@ -1998,6 +2009,7 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
 
 	switch (mmio_mitigation) {
 	case MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW:
+	case MMIO_MITIGATION_AUTO:
 	case MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
 		if (sched_smt_active())
 			pr_warn_once(MMIO_MSG_SMT);
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-01-08 20:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 138+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-01-08 20:24 [PATCH v3 00/35] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 01/35] x86/bugs: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER David Kaplan
2025-02-28 11:53   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 02/35] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines David Kaplan
2025-02-28 11:53   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2025-02-28 11:53   ` [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 04/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 16:13   ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 17:17     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-10 17:28       ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 22:25   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-10 22:33     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 05/35] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 16:24   ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 17:19     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-10 22:50   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 17:17     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 19:17       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 06/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 16:42   ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 17:22     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-10 17:35       ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 23:29   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 20:35     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 23:18       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 17:28         ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-12 23:16           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-19 18:20             ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-21 21:48               ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 07/35] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 23:36   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 22:49     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 08/35] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 09/35] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 23:44   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 22:59     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 10/35] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-10 17:06   ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 17:27     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-10 17:40       ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 23:52   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 15:36     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 11/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 12/35] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2025-01-09  5:22   ` Pawan Gupta
2025-01-09 15:26     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-09 16:40       ` Pawan Gupta
2025-01-09 16:42         ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-10 18:45     ` David Laight
2025-01-10 20:30       ` Pawan Gupta
2025-01-10 20:35         ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-10 18:35   ` Brendan Jackman
2025-02-10 20:50     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11  0:10   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-24 15:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-24 15:59     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 13/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11  0:53   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 15:59     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-12 21:35       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 14/35] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 15/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11  1:07   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 16:40     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 16/35] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11  1:10   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 16:45     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 17/35] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11  1:21   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 16:47     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 18/35] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2025-02-11 16:39   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 17:01     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 19/35] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-02-11 16:43   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 16:57     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 20/35] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-02-11 18:07   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 17:20     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-17 17:33       ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-17 20:19         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-17 20:38           ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-17 23:39             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-18  2:24               ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-18  7:05                 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-18  8:52                   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-20 22:04                     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-26 18:57                       ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-26 20:14                         ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-26 21:01                           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-26 21:51                             ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-27 13:39                               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-26 21:03                           ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-26 22:13                             ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-26 22:18                               ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-26 22:34                                 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-26 23:44                               ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-27  0:35                                 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-27  1:23                                   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-27  3:50                                     ` Pawan Gupta
2025-02-27 14:08                                       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-27 14:36                                         ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-27 15:01                                           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-27 15:22                                             ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-27 15:37                                               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-27 16:05                                                 ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-27 17:07                                                   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 21/35] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-01-09  3:43   ` Pawan Gupta
2025-01-09 15:08     ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 18:41   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 18:54     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 19:04       ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 20:34         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 20:53           ` Kaplan, David
2025-02-11 22:38             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11 18:55     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 22/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 23/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2025-02-11 19:01   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 24/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 25/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 26/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 27/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 28/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 29/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 30/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2025-02-11 19:03   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-12 17:22     ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 31/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 32/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 33/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 34/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2025-01-08 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 35/35] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
     [not found] ` <20250110083627.xankiqhczr7ksldv@desk>
2025-01-10 15:39   ` [PATCH v3 00/35] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls Borislav Petkov
     [not found]     ` <20250110171410.ttbt7cohzdjwi4hk@desk>
2025-01-12 11:38       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-13 17:41         ` Pawan Gupta

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