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* [PATCH] selinux: don't reserve xattr slot when we won't fill it
@ 2026-04-26 23:23 David Windsor
  2026-04-27 23:32 ` Paul Moore
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: David Windsor @ 2026-04-26 23:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley
  Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek, selinux, linux-security-module, linux-kernel

Move lsm_get_xattr_slot() below the SBLABEL_MNT check so we don't leave
a NULL-named slot in the array when returning -EOPNOTSUPP; filesystem
initxattrs() callbacks stop iterating at the first NULL ->name, silently
dropping xattrs installed by later LSMs.

Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 97801966bf32..4ff118a9395f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2966,7 +2966,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 {
 	const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
-	struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
+	struct xattr *xattr;
 	u32 newsid, clen;
 	u16 newsclass;
 	int rc;
@@ -2992,6 +2992,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	    !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
+	xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
 	if (xattr) {
 		rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
 						   &context, &clen);

base-commit: 254f49634ee16a731174d2ae34bc50bd5f45e731
-- 
2.53.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] selinux: don't reserve xattr slot when we won't fill it
  2026-04-26 23:23 [PATCH] selinux: don't reserve xattr slot when we won't fill it David Windsor
@ 2026-04-27 23:32 ` Paul Moore
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2026-04-27 23:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Windsor, Stephen Smalley
  Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek, selinux, linux-security-module, linux-kernel

On Apr 26, 2026 David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Move lsm_get_xattr_slot() below the SBLABEL_MNT check so we don't leave
> a NULL-named slot in the array when returning -EOPNOTSUPP; filesystem
> initxattrs() callbacks stop iterating at the first NULL ->name, silently
> dropping xattrs installed by later LSMs.
> 
> Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
> ---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++-
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Good catch, thanks.  These seems like a stable candidate so I've merged
it into selinux/stable-7.1 and we likely send it up to Linus later this
week.

> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 97801966bf32..4ff118a9395f 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -2966,7 +2966,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
>  {
>  	const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
>  	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
> -	struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
> +	struct xattr *xattr;
>  	u32 newsid, clen;
>  	u16 newsclass;
>  	int rc;
> @@ -2992,6 +2992,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
>  	    !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
>  		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  
> +	xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
>  	if (xattr) {
>  		rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
>  						   &context, &clen);
> 
> base-commit: 254f49634ee16a731174d2ae34bc50bd5f45e731
> -- 
> 2.53.0

--
paul-moore.com

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

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