* [PATCH] selinux: don't reserve xattr slot when we won't fill it
@ 2026-04-26 23:23 David Windsor
2026-04-27 23:32 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: David Windsor @ 2026-04-26 23:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek, selinux, linux-security-module, linux-kernel
Move lsm_get_xattr_slot() below the SBLABEL_MNT check so we don't leave
a NULL-named slot in the array when returning -EOPNOTSUPP; filesystem
initxattrs() callbacks stop iterating at the first NULL ->name, silently
dropping xattrs installed by later LSMs.
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 97801966bf32..4ff118a9395f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2966,7 +2966,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
{
const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
- struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
+ struct xattr *xattr;
u32 newsid, clen;
u16 newsclass;
int rc;
@@ -2992,6 +2992,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
if (xattr) {
rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
&context, &clen);
base-commit: 254f49634ee16a731174d2ae34bc50bd5f45e731
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH] selinux: don't reserve xattr slot when we won't fill it
2026-04-26 23:23 [PATCH] selinux: don't reserve xattr slot when we won't fill it David Windsor
@ 2026-04-27 23:32 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2026-04-27 23:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Windsor, Stephen Smalley
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek, selinux, linux-security-module, linux-kernel
On Apr 26, 2026 David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Move lsm_get_xattr_slot() below the SBLABEL_MNT check so we don't leave
> a NULL-named slot in the array when returning -EOPNOTSUPP; filesystem
> initxattrs() callbacks stop iterating at the first NULL ->name, silently
> dropping xattrs installed by later LSMs.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
> ---
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++-
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Good catch, thanks. These seems like a stable candidate so I've merged
it into selinux/stable-7.1 and we likely send it up to Linus later this
week.
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 97801966bf32..4ff118a9395f 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -2966,7 +2966,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> {
> const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
> struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
> - struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
> + struct xattr *xattr;
> u32 newsid, clen;
> u16 newsclass;
> int rc;
> @@ -2992,6 +2992,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> + xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
> if (xattr) {
> rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
> &context, &clen);
>
> base-commit: 254f49634ee16a731174d2ae34bc50bd5f45e731
> --
> 2.53.0
--
paul-moore.com
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