From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
"Nikunj A Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Michael Roth" <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Naveen Rao <naveen.rao@amd.com>,
David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 09/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry
Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2026 18:56:10 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260804235611.4053375-10-kim.phillips@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260804235611.4053375-1-kim.phillips@amd.com>
AMD EPYC 5th generation and above processors support IBPB-on-Entry
for SNP guests. By invoking an Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier
(IBPB) on VMRUN, old indirect branch predictions are prevented
from influencing indirect branches within the guest.
SNP guests may choose to enable IBPB-on-Entry by setting
SEV_FEATURES bit 21 (IbpbOnEntry).
Host support for IBPB on Entry is indicated by CPUID
Fn8000_001F_EAX[IbpbOnEntry], bit 31.
If supported, indicate support for IBPB on Entry in
sev_supported_vmsa_features bit 21 (IbpbOnEntry).
Also add SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY to the sev_init2 selftest's
SNP_ONLY_FEATURES and KNOWN_FEATURES to validate it is accepted
for SNP guests and rejected for SEV-ES.
For more info, refer to page 615, Section 15.36.17 "Side-Channel
Protection", AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 2: System
Programming Part 2, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024 (see Link).
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Assisted-by: ClaudeCode:claude-opus-4-7
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 4 +++-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 3 +++
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c | 4 +++-
5 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 3d0940a3b9f3..11e40644b967 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -460,6 +460,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES (19*32+27) /* Allowed SEV Features */
#define X86_FEATURE_SVSM (19*32+28) /* "svsm" SVSM present */
#define X86_FEATURE_HV_INUSE_WR_ALLOWED (19*32+30) /* Allow Write to in-use hypervisor-owned pages */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY (19*32+31) /* SEV-SNP IBPB on VM Entry */
/* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */
#define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0) /* No Nested Data Breakpoints */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index facabba26a91..9d8107824d10 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -310,9 +310,11 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_4K_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AV
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION BIT_ULL(4)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT_ULL(5)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC BIT_ULL(9)
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY BIT_ULL(21)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ONLY_MASK (SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE | \
- SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC)
+ SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC | \
+ SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY)
#define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID BIT_ULL(63)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 6baf458383f4..85a692840886 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -3224,6 +3224,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
if (tsc_khz && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC;
+
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY))
+ sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY;
}
}
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 3d0940a3b9f3..11e40644b967 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -460,6 +460,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES (19*32+27) /* Allowed SEV Features */
#define X86_FEATURE_SVSM (19*32+28) /* "svsm" SVSM present */
#define X86_FEATURE_HV_INUSE_WR_ALLOWED (19*32+30) /* Allow Write to in-use hypervisor-owned pages */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY (19*32+31) /* SEV-SNP IBPB on VM Entry */
/* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */
#define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0) /* No Nested Data Breakpoints */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c
index 2e016cae4ebe..ff4322a940c6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c
@@ -16,10 +16,12 @@
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE BIT_ULL(0)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT_ULL(5)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC BIT_ULL(9)
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY BIT_ULL(21)
/* Features valid only for SNP guests, rejected for SEV-ES and below. */
#define SNP_ONLY_FEATURES (SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE | \
- SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC)
+ SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC | \
+ SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY)
/*
* Some features may have hidden dependencies, or may only work
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-04 23:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-04 23:56 [PATCH v4 00/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry and BTB Isolation Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] x86/bugs: Only log missing retpoline when it's actually the missing mitigation Kim Phillips
2026-08-05 0:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-05 14:51 ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-05 22:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-06 20:12 ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-07 5:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] cpu/bugs: Allow forcing Automatic IBRS with SNP active using spectre_v2=eibrs Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] cpu/bugs: Fall back to AutoIBRS when retpoline unavailable on SNP CPUs Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] cpu/bugs: Allow spectre_v2=ibrs on x86 vendors other than Intel Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] KVM: SEV: Define SVM_SEV_FEAT_* flags using BIT_ULL() Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] KVM: selftests: sev_init2: Use BIT_ULL for VMSA feature bit definition Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] KVM: SEV: Disallow setting SNP-only features for non-SNP guests via a single mask Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] KVM: SEV: Advertise SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` Kim Phillips [this message]
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for SNP BTB Isolation Kim Phillips
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260804235611.4053375-10-kim.phillips@amd.com \
--to=kim.phillips@amd.com \
--cc=borislav.petkov@amd.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=david.kaplan@amd.com \
--cc=kprateek.nayak@amd.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-coco@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=michael.roth@amd.com \
--cc=naveen.rao@amd.com \
--cc=nikunj@amd.com \
--cc=pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox