From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
"Nikunj A Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Michael Roth" <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Naveen Rao <naveen.rao@amd.com>,
David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>, <stable@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v4 01/10] x86/bugs: Only log missing retpoline when it's actually the missing mitigation
Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2026 18:56:02 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260804235611.4053375-2-kim.phillips@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260804235611.4053375-1-kim.phillips@amd.com>
spectre_v2_select_retpoline() unconditionally emits a pr_err when the
kernel lacks retpoline support before returning SPECTRE_V2_NONE to its
callers. A caller may then select an alternative mitigation, making the
"no mitigation available!" message alarming and misleading to
administrators on a system that is actually mitigated.
Drop the pr_err from the helper and emit it once from
spectre_v2_update_mitigation(). Guard it on
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) so it only fires when retpoline
truly cannot be built in, and restrict it to the cases where retpoline
was the implied choice: SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, or SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO
when should_mitigate_vuln(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) indicates we actually
intended to mitigate. This avoids the spurious error on a
CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE=n kernel where a caller of
spectre_v2_select_retpoline() selects an alternative mitigation, leaving
the system protected while the old message claimed otherwise.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Assisted-by: ClaudeCode:claude-opus-4-7
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index ddf0db5326fa..b345f64f4258 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1956,10 +1956,8 @@ early_param("spectre_v2", spectre_v2_parse_cmdline);
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
{
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)) {
- pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE))
return SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
- }
return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
}
@@ -2247,6 +2245,13 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_update_mitigation(void)
}
}
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) &&
+ spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE &&
+ (spectre_v2_cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE ||
+ (spectre_v2_cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO &&
+ should_mitigate_vuln(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))))
+ pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]);
}
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-04 23:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-04 23:56 [PATCH v4 00/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry and BTB Isolation Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` Kim Phillips [this message]
2026-08-05 0:44 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] x86/bugs: Only log missing retpoline when it's actually the missing mitigation Borislav Petkov
2026-08-05 14:51 ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-05 22:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-06 20:12 ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-07 5:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] cpu/bugs: Allow forcing Automatic IBRS with SNP active using spectre_v2=eibrs Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] cpu/bugs: Fall back to AutoIBRS when retpoline unavailable on SNP CPUs Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] cpu/bugs: Allow spectre_v2=ibrs on x86 vendors other than Intel Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] KVM: SEV: Define SVM_SEV_FEAT_* flags using BIT_ULL() Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] KVM: selftests: sev_init2: Use BIT_ULL for VMSA feature bit definition Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] KVM: SEV: Disallow setting SNP-only features for non-SNP guests via a single mask Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] KVM: SEV: Advertise SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for SNP BTB Isolation Kim Phillips
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