[RFC PATCH 0/2] net: af_unix: Useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS

[RFC PATCH 0/2] net: af_unix: Useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS

[Jori Koolstra]

Right now if some LSM such as Smack denies an AF_UNIX socket peer to
receive an SCM_RIGHTS fd the SCM_RIGHTS fd array will be cut short at
that point, and MSG_CTRUNC is set on return of recvmsg(). This is
highly problematic behaviour, because it leaves the receiver
wondering what happened. As per man page MSG_CTRUNC is supposed to
indicate that the control buffer was sized too short, but suddenly
a permission error might result in the exact same flag being set.
Moreover, the receiver has no chance to determine how many fds got
originally sent and how many were suppressed.[1]

Add two MSG_* flags:
 - MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL is set whenever any file is rejected by the LSM
   during recvmsg(2) of SCM_RIGHTS fds.
 - If MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER is passed as a flag to recvmsg(), the SCM_RIGHTS
   fd array is always passed in its full original size. However, any
   files rejected by the LSM are replaced in this array with -EPERM
   instead of an assigned fd, while keeping the original order. If the
   flag is not set, the original truncate behavior is used.

I am putting this out for RFC for two reasons:

1) The MSG_* space is quite limited. We can do without MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL 
   if needed.
2) Does userspace ever do anything else than bail out if MSG_CTRUNC is
   found set? If not, we could maybe also get rid of MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER
   and just make this the default behavior.

[1]: https://github.com/uapi-group/kernel-features#useful-handling-of-lsm-denials-on-scm_rights

Jori Koolstra (2):
  net: af_unix: Useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS
  selftest: Add tests for useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS

 fs/file.c                                     |  21 +-
 include/linux/file.h                          |   4 +-
 include/linux/socket.h                        |   3 +
 include/net/scm.h                             |   8 +-
 io_uring/openclose.c                          |   2 +-
 kernel/pid.c                                  |   2 +-
 kernel/seccomp.c                              |   2 +-
 net/compat.c                                  |   7 +-
 net/core/scm.c                                |  11 +-
 .../net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/helper.h         |  37 ++++
 .../net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/receiver.c       | 187 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/sender.c         | 126 ++++++++++++
 .../lsm_blocking/test_scm_rights_smack.sh     | 172 ++++++++++++++++
 13 files changed, 563 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/helper.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/receiver.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/sender.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/test_scm_rights_smack.sh

-- 
2.54.0

[RFC PATCH 1/2] net: af_unix: Useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS

[Jori Koolstra]

Right now if some LSM such as Smack denies an AF_UNIX socket peer to
receive an SCM_RIGHTS fd the SCM_RIGHTS fd array will be cut short at
that point, and MSG_CTRUNC is set on return of recvmsg(). This is
highly problematic behaviour, because it leaves the receiver
wondering what happened. As per man page MSG_CTRUNC is supposed to
indicate that the control buffer was sized too short, but suddenly
a permission error might result in the exact same flag being set.
Moreover, the receiver has no chance to determine how many fds got
originally sent and how many were suppressed.[1]

Add two MSG_* flags:
 - MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL is set whenever any file is rejected by the LSM
   during recvmsg() of SCM_RIGHTS fds.
 - If MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER is passed as a flag to recvmsg(), the SCM_RIGHTS
   fd array is always passed in its full original size. However, any
   files rejected by the LSM are replaced in this array with -EPERM
   instead of an assigned fd, while keeping the original order. If the
   flag is not set, the original truncate behavior is used.

[1]: https://github.com/uapi-group/kernel-features#useful-handling-of-lsm-denials-on-scm_rights

Signed-off-by: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl>
---
 fs/file.c              | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
 include/linux/file.h   |  4 +++-
 include/linux/socket.h |  3 +++
 include/net/scm.h      |  8 ++++----
 io_uring/openclose.c   |  2 +-
 kernel/pid.c           |  2 +-
 kernel/seccomp.c       |  2 +-
 net/compat.c           |  7 ++++---
 net/core/scm.c         | 11 ++++++-----
 9 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/file.c b/fs/file.c
index 2c81c0b162d0..cc33a1e77049 100644
--- a/fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/file.c
@@ -1370,10 +1370,11 @@ int replace_fd(unsigned fd, struct file *file, unsigned flags)
 }
 
 /**
- * receive_fd() - Install received file into file descriptor table
+ * receive_fd_msg() - Install received file into file descriptor table
  * @file: struct file that was received from another process
  * @ufd: __user pointer to write new fd number to
  * @o_flags: the O_* flags to apply to the new fd entry
+ * @msg_flags: the MSG_* flags to set for recvmsg(2)
  *
  * Installs a received file into the file descriptor table, with appropriate
  * checks and count updates. Optionally writes the fd number to userspace, if
@@ -1384,13 +1385,21 @@ int replace_fd(unsigned fd, struct file *file, unsigned flags)
  *
  * Returns newly install fd or -ve on error.
  */
-int receive_fd(struct file *file, int __user *ufd, unsigned int o_flags)
+int receive_fd_msg(struct file *file, int __user *ufd, unsigned int o_flags,
+	       unsigned int *msg_flags)
 {
 	int error;
 
 	error = security_file_receive(file);
-	if (error)
+	if (error) {
+		if (msg_flags)
+			*msg_flags |= MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL;
+
+		if (ufd)
+			put_user(-EPERM, ufd);
+
 		return error;
+	}
 
 	FD_PREPARE(fdf, o_flags, file);
 	if (fdf.err)
@@ -1406,6 +1415,12 @@ int receive_fd(struct file *file, int __user *ufd, unsigned int o_flags)
 	__receive_sock(fd_prepare_file(fdf));
 	return fd_publish(fdf);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(receive_fd_msg);
+
+int receive_fd(struct file *file, unsigned int o_flags)
+{
+	return receive_fd_msg(file, NULL, o_flags, NULL);
+}
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(receive_fd);
 
 int receive_fd_replace(int new_fd, struct file *file, unsigned int o_flags)
diff --git a/include/linux/file.h b/include/linux/file.h
index 27484b444d31..38f022d997a6 100644
--- a/include/linux/file.h
+++ b/include/linux/file.h
@@ -118,7 +118,9 @@ DEFINE_FREE(fput, struct file *, if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(_T)) fput(_T))
 
 extern void fd_install(unsigned int fd, struct file *file);
 
-int receive_fd(struct file *file, int __user *ufd, unsigned int o_flags);
+int receive_fd_msg(struct file *file, int __user *ufd, unsigned int o_flags,
+		   unsigned int *msg_flags);
+int receive_fd(struct file *file, unsigned int o_flags);
 
 int receive_fd_replace(int new_fd, struct file *file, unsigned int o_flags);
 
diff --git a/include/linux/socket.h b/include/linux/socket.h
index ec4a0a025793..3809a8add2fc 100644
--- a/include/linux/socket.h
+++ b/include/linux/socket.h
@@ -342,6 +342,9 @@ struct ucred {
 					  * plain text and require encryption
 					  */
 
+#define MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL 0x200000
+#define MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER 0x400000
+
 #define MSG_SOCK_DEVMEM 0x2000000	/* Receive devmem skbs as cmsg */
 #define MSG_ZEROCOPY	0x4000000	/* Use user data in kernel path */
 #define MSG_SPLICE_PAGES 0x8000000	/* Splice the pages from the iterator in sendmsg() */
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index c52519669349..983efa952c8e 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ struct scm_cookie {
 #endif
 };
 
-void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
-void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
+void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, int recv_flags);
+void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, int recv_flags);
 int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
 void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm);
 struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
@@ -108,11 +108,11 @@ void scm_recv_unix(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 		   struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags);
 
 static inline int scm_recv_one_fd(struct file *f, int __user *ufd,
-				  unsigned int flags)
+				  unsigned int o_flags, unsigned int *msg_flags)
 {
 	if (!ufd)
 		return -EFAULT;
-	return receive_fd(f, ufd, flags);
+	return receive_fd_msg(f, ufd, o_flags, msg_flags);
 }
 
 #endif /* __LINUX_NET_SCM_H */
diff --git a/io_uring/openclose.c b/io_uring/openclose.c
index c71242915dad..1b6cb05b0e3d 100644
--- a/io_uring/openclose.c
+++ b/io_uring/openclose.c
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ int io_install_fixed_fd(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
 	int ret;
 
 	ifi = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_fixed_install);
-	ret = receive_fd(req->file, NULL, ifi->o_flags);
+	ret = receive_fd(req->file, ifi->o_flags);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		req_set_fail(req);
 	io_req_set_res(req, ret, 0);
diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
index fd5c2d4aa349..62af6874192d 100644
--- a/kernel/pid.c
+++ b/kernel/pid.c
@@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ static int pidfd_getfd(struct pid *pid, int fd)
 	if (IS_ERR(file))
 		return PTR_ERR(file);
 
-	ret = receive_fd(file, NULL, O_CLOEXEC);
+	ret = receive_fd(file, O_CLOEXEC);
 	fput(file);
 
 	return ret;
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 066909393c38..ad5ab16fe2b1 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ static void seccomp_handle_addfd(struct seccomp_kaddfd *addfd, struct seccomp_kn
 	 */
 	list_del_init(&addfd->list);
 	if (!addfd->setfd)
-		fd = receive_fd(addfd->file, NULL, addfd->flags);
+		fd = receive_fd(addfd->file, addfd->flags);
 	else
 		fd = receive_fd_replace(addfd->fd, addfd->file, addfd->flags);
 	addfd->ret = fd;
diff --git a/net/compat.c b/net/compat.c
index 2c9bd0edac99..056bce0927c4 100644
--- a/net/compat.c
+++ b/net/compat.c
@@ -287,18 +287,19 @@ static int scm_max_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg)
 	return (msg->msg_controllen - sizeof(struct compat_cmsghdr)) / sizeof(int);
 }
 
-void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, int recv_flags)
 {
 	struct compat_cmsghdr __user *cm =
 		(struct compat_cmsghdr __user *)msg->msg_control_user;
 	unsigned int o_flags = (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC) ? O_CLOEXEC : 0;
+	bool filter_rights = recv_flags & MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER;
 	int fdmax = min_t(int, scm_max_fds_compat(msg), scm->fp->count);
 	int __user *cmsg_data = CMSG_COMPAT_DATA(cm);
 	int err = 0, i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < fdmax; i++) {
-		err = scm_recv_one_fd(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags);
-		if (err < 0)
+		err = scm_recv_one_fd(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags, &msg->msg_flags);
+		if (err < 0 && !filter_rights)
 			break;
 	}
 
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index eec13f50ecaf..035329645d8f 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -351,10 +351,11 @@ static int scm_max_fds(struct msghdr *msg)
 	return (msg->msg_controllen - sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) / sizeof(int);
 }
 
-void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, int recv_flags)
 {
 	struct cmsghdr __user *cm =
 		(__force struct cmsghdr __user *)msg->msg_control_user;
+	bool filter_rights = recv_flags & MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER;
 	unsigned int o_flags = (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC) ? O_CLOEXEC : 0;
 	int fdmax = min_t(int, scm_max_fds(msg), scm->fp->count);
 	int __user *cmsg_data = CMSG_USER_DATA(cm);
@@ -365,13 +366,13 @@ void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
 		return;
 
 	if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) {
-		scm_detach_fds_compat(msg, scm);
+		scm_detach_fds_compat(msg, scm, recv_flags);
 		return;
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < fdmax; i++) {
-		err = scm_recv_one_fd(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags);
-		if (err < 0)
+		err = scm_recv_one_fd(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags, &msg->msg_flags);
+		if (err < 0 && !filter_rights)
 			break;
 	}
 
@@ -524,7 +525,7 @@ static bool __scm_recv_common(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
 	scm_passec(sk, msg, scm);
 
 	if (scm->fp)
-		scm_detach_fds(msg, scm);
+		scm_detach_fds(msg, scm, flags);
 
 	return true;
 }
-- 
2.54.0

Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] net: af_unix: Useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS

[Kuniyuki Iwashima]

On Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 10:51 AM Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl> wrote:
>
> Right now if some LSM such as Smack denies an AF_UNIX socket peer to
> receive an SCM_RIGHTS fd the SCM_RIGHTS fd array will be cut short at
> that point, and MSG_CTRUNC is set on return of recvmsg(). This is
> highly problematic behaviour, because it leaves the receiver
> wondering what happened. As per man page MSG_CTRUNC is supposed to
> indicate that the control buffer was sized too short, but suddenly
> a permission error might result in the exact same flag being set.
> Moreover, the receiver has no chance to determine how many fds got
> originally sent and how many were suppressed.[1]
>
> Add two MSG_* flags:

Since we only have 5 bits remaining for future extension,
we need to consider the use case a bit more carefully.


>  - MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL is set whenever any file is rejected by the LSM
>    during recvmsg() of SCM_RIGHTS fds.

Is this really needed ?

Even if the fd array is truncated, the application will traverse
the array anyway since it has some fds already installed (to
clean up in case of MSG_CTRUNC ?).

Then, it will find the -EPERM entry.

I assume no one uses MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL without
MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER.


>  - If MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER is passed as a flag to recvmsg(), the SCM_RIGHTS

Does this flag need per-recvmsg() granularity ?

If the application does not welcome the truncated fd array,
it would have passed MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER to every
recvmsg(), no ?

( and I feel _FILTER sounds like "please do filtering (truncase)".
  Maybe _NOTRUNC ? )


>    fd array is always passed in its full original size. However, any
>    files rejected by the LSM are replaced in this array with -EPERM
>    instead of an assigned fd, while keeping the original order. If the
>    flag is not set, the original truncate behavior is used.
>
> [1]: https://github.com/uapi-group/kernel-features#useful-handling-of-lsm-denials-on-scm_rights
>
> Signed-off-by: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl>
> ---
>  fs/file.c              | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
>  include/linux/file.h   |  4 +++-
>  include/linux/socket.h |  3 +++
>  include/net/scm.h      |  8 ++++----
>  io_uring/openclose.c   |  2 +-
>  kernel/pid.c           |  2 +-
>  kernel/seccomp.c       |  2 +-
>  net/compat.c           |  7 ++++---
>  net/core/scm.c         | 11 ++++++-----
>  9 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/file.c b/fs/file.c
> index 2c81c0b162d0..cc33a1e77049 100644
> --- a/fs/file.c
> +++ b/fs/file.c
> @@ -1370,10 +1370,11 @@ int replace_fd(unsigned fd, struct file *file, unsigned flags)
>  }
>
>  /**
> - * receive_fd() - Install received file into file descriptor table
> + * receive_fd_msg() - Install received file into file descriptor table
>   * @file: struct file that was received from another process
>   * @ufd: __user pointer to write new fd number to
>   * @o_flags: the O_* flags to apply to the new fd entry
> + * @msg_flags: the MSG_* flags to set for recvmsg(2)
>   *
>   * Installs a received file into the file descriptor table, with appropriate
>   * checks and count updates. Optionally writes the fd number to userspace, if
> @@ -1384,13 +1385,21 @@ int replace_fd(unsigned fd, struct file *file, unsigned flags)
>   *
>   * Returns newly install fd or -ve on error.
>   */
> -int receive_fd(struct file *file, int __user *ufd, unsigned int o_flags)
> +int receive_fd_msg(struct file *file, int __user *ufd, unsigned int o_flags,
> +              unsigned int *msg_flags)
>  {
>         int error;
>
>         error = security_file_receive(file);
> -       if (error)
> +       if (error) {
> +               if (msg_flags)
> +                       *msg_flags |= MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL;
> +
> +               if (ufd)
> +                       put_user(-EPERM, ufd);
> +
>                 return error;
> +       }
>
>         FD_PREPARE(fdf, o_flags, file);
>         if (fdf.err)
> @@ -1406,6 +1415,12 @@ int receive_fd(struct file *file, int __user *ufd, unsigned int o_flags)
>         __receive_sock(fd_prepare_file(fdf));
>         return fd_publish(fdf);
>  }
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(receive_fd_msg);
> +
> +int receive_fd(struct file *file, unsigned int o_flags)
> +{
> +       return receive_fd_msg(file, NULL, o_flags, NULL);
> +}
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(receive_fd);
>
>  int receive_fd_replace(int new_fd, struct file *file, unsigned int o_flags)
> diff --git a/include/linux/file.h b/include/linux/file.h
> index 27484b444d31..38f022d997a6 100644
> --- a/include/linux/file.h
> +++ b/include/linux/file.h
> @@ -118,7 +118,9 @@ DEFINE_FREE(fput, struct file *, if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(_T)) fput(_T))
>
>  extern void fd_install(unsigned int fd, struct file *file);
>
> -int receive_fd(struct file *file, int __user *ufd, unsigned int o_flags);
> +int receive_fd_msg(struct file *file, int __user *ufd, unsigned int o_flags,
> +                  unsigned int *msg_flags);
> +int receive_fd(struct file *file, unsigned int o_flags);
>
>  int receive_fd_replace(int new_fd, struct file *file, unsigned int o_flags);
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/socket.h b/include/linux/socket.h
> index ec4a0a025793..3809a8add2fc 100644
> --- a/include/linux/socket.h
> +++ b/include/linux/socket.h
> @@ -342,6 +342,9 @@ struct ucred {
>                                           * plain text and require encryption
>                                           */
>
> +#define MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL 0x200000
> +#define MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER 0x400000
> +
>  #define MSG_SOCK_DEVMEM 0x2000000      /* Receive devmem skbs as cmsg */
>  #define MSG_ZEROCOPY   0x4000000       /* Use user data in kernel path */
>  #define MSG_SPLICE_PAGES 0x8000000     /* Splice the pages from the iterator in sendmsg() */
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index c52519669349..983efa952c8e 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ struct scm_cookie {
>  #endif
>  };
>
> -void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
> -void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
> +void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, int recv_flags);
> +void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, int recv_flags);
>  int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
>  void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm);
>  struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
> @@ -108,11 +108,11 @@ void scm_recv_unix(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>                    struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags);
>
>  static inline int scm_recv_one_fd(struct file *f, int __user *ufd,
> -                                 unsigned int flags)
> +                                 unsigned int o_flags, unsigned int *msg_flags)
>  {
>         if (!ufd)
>                 return -EFAULT;
> -       return receive_fd(f, ufd, flags);
> +       return receive_fd_msg(f, ufd, o_flags, msg_flags);
>  }
>
>  #endif /* __LINUX_NET_SCM_H */
> diff --git a/io_uring/openclose.c b/io_uring/openclose.c
> index c71242915dad..1b6cb05b0e3d 100644
> --- a/io_uring/openclose.c
> +++ b/io_uring/openclose.c
> @@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ int io_install_fixed_fd(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
>         int ret;
>
>         ifi = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_fixed_install);
> -       ret = receive_fd(req->file, NULL, ifi->o_flags);
> +       ret = receive_fd(req->file, ifi->o_flags);
>         if (ret < 0)
>                 req_set_fail(req);
>         io_req_set_res(req, ret, 0);
> diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
> index fd5c2d4aa349..62af6874192d 100644
> --- a/kernel/pid.c
> +++ b/kernel/pid.c
> @@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ static int pidfd_getfd(struct pid *pid, int fd)
>         if (IS_ERR(file))
>                 return PTR_ERR(file);
>
> -       ret = receive_fd(file, NULL, O_CLOEXEC);
> +       ret = receive_fd(file, O_CLOEXEC);
>         fput(file);
>
>         return ret;
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 066909393c38..ad5ab16fe2b1 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ static void seccomp_handle_addfd(struct seccomp_kaddfd *addfd, struct seccomp_kn
>          */
>         list_del_init(&addfd->list);
>         if (!addfd->setfd)
> -               fd = receive_fd(addfd->file, NULL, addfd->flags);
> +               fd = receive_fd(addfd->file, addfd->flags);
>         else
>                 fd = receive_fd_replace(addfd->fd, addfd->file, addfd->flags);
>         addfd->ret = fd;
> diff --git a/net/compat.c b/net/compat.c
> index 2c9bd0edac99..056bce0927c4 100644
> --- a/net/compat.c
> +++ b/net/compat.c
> @@ -287,18 +287,19 @@ static int scm_max_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg)
>         return (msg->msg_controllen - sizeof(struct compat_cmsghdr)) / sizeof(int);
>  }
>
> -void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> +void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, int recv_flags)
>  {
>         struct compat_cmsghdr __user *cm =
>                 (struct compat_cmsghdr __user *)msg->msg_control_user;
>         unsigned int o_flags = (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC) ? O_CLOEXEC : 0;
> +       bool filter_rights = recv_flags & MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER;
>         int fdmax = min_t(int, scm_max_fds_compat(msg), scm->fp->count);
>         int __user *cmsg_data = CMSG_COMPAT_DATA(cm);
>         int err = 0, i;
>
>         for (i = 0; i < fdmax; i++) {
> -               err = scm_recv_one_fd(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags);
> -               if (err < 0)
> +               err = scm_recv_one_fd(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags, &msg->msg_flags);
> +               if (err < 0 && !filter_rights)
>                         break;
>         }
>
> diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
> index eec13f50ecaf..035329645d8f 100644
> --- a/net/core/scm.c
> +++ b/net/core/scm.c
> @@ -351,10 +351,11 @@ static int scm_max_fds(struct msghdr *msg)
>         return (msg->msg_controllen - sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) / sizeof(int);
>  }
>
> -void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> +void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, int recv_flags)
>  {
>         struct cmsghdr __user *cm =
>                 (__force struct cmsghdr __user *)msg->msg_control_user;
> +       bool filter_rights = recv_flags & MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER;
>         unsigned int o_flags = (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC) ? O_CLOEXEC : 0;
>         int fdmax = min_t(int, scm_max_fds(msg), scm->fp->count);
>         int __user *cmsg_data = CMSG_USER_DATA(cm);
> @@ -365,13 +366,13 @@ void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
>                 return;
>
>         if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) {
> -               scm_detach_fds_compat(msg, scm);
> +               scm_detach_fds_compat(msg, scm, recv_flags);
>                 return;
>         }
>
>         for (i = 0; i < fdmax; i++) {
> -               err = scm_recv_one_fd(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags);
> -               if (err < 0)
> +               err = scm_recv_one_fd(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags, &msg->msg_flags);
> +               if (err < 0 && !filter_rights)
>                         break;
>         }
>
> @@ -524,7 +525,7 @@ static bool __scm_recv_common(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
>         scm_passec(sk, msg, scm);
>
>         if (scm->fp)
> -               scm_detach_fds(msg, scm);
> +               scm_detach_fds(msg, scm, flags);
>
>         return true;
>  }
> --
> 2.54.0
>

Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] net: af_unix: Useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS

[Jori Koolstra]

> Op 30-04-2026 04:04 CEST schreef Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>:
> 
>  
> On Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 10:51 AM Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl> wrote:
> >
> > Right now if some LSM such as Smack denies an AF_UNIX socket peer to
> > receive an SCM_RIGHTS fd the SCM_RIGHTS fd array will be cut short at
> > that point, and MSG_CTRUNC is set on return of recvmsg(). This is
> > highly problematic behaviour, because it leaves the receiver
> > wondering what happened. As per man page MSG_CTRUNC is supposed to
> > indicate that the control buffer was sized too short, but suddenly
> > a permission error might result in the exact same flag being set.
> > Moreover, the receiver has no chance to determine how many fds got
> > originally sent and how many were suppressed.[1]
> >
> > Add two MSG_* flags:
> 
> Since we only have 5 bits remaining for future extension,
> we need to consider the use case a bit more carefully.
> 

Right. Since it wasn't a lot of work I implemented it exactly as the request
was made from userspace, and then discuss it from there. By the way, I suppose
nothing can be done about that small flag space?

> 
> >  - MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL is set whenever any file is rejected by the LSM
> >    during recvmsg() of SCM_RIGHTS fds.
> 
> Is this really needed ?
> 
> Even if the fd array is truncated, the application will traverse
> the array anyway since it has some fds already installed (to
> clean up in case of MSG_CTRUNC ?).
> 
> Then, it will find the -EPERM entry.
> 
> I assume no one uses MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL without
> MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER.
> 

I guess that is a fair assumption to make. We can certainly do without
MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL if saving flags is important. I also suggested that
we may see whether we can make MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER the default behavior.
In the mean time I've found grep.app, and it turns out the answer is no.
Apparently almost no one checks even for the truncation flag (mostly 1 fd
is passed and then it is check the cmsg lenght). But cpython has this for
instance:

    /* Close all descriptors coming from SCM_RIGHTS, so they don't leak. */
    for (cmsgh = ((msg.msg_controllen > 0) ? CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg) : NULL);
         cmsgh != NULL; cmsgh = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, cmsgh)) {
        cmsg_status = get_cmsg_data_len(&msg, cmsgh, &cmsgdatalen);
        if (cmsg_status < 0)
            break;
        if (cmsgh->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
            cmsgh->cmsg_type == SCM_RIGHTS) {
            size_t numfds;
            int *fdp;
            numfds = cmsgdatalen / sizeof(int);
            fdp = (int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsgh);
            while (numfds-- > 0)
                close(*fdp++);
        }
        if (cmsg_status != 0)
            break;
    }

> 
> >  - If MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER is passed as a flag to recvmsg(), the SCM_RIGHTS
> 
> Does this flag need per-recvmsg() granularity ?
> 

Perhaps not. What would be the alternative? A fcntl option for the socket fd?

> If the application does not welcome the truncated fd array,
> it would have passed MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER to every
> recvmsg(), no ?
> 

Correct.


Thanks,
Jori.

Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] net: af_unix: Useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS

[Kuniyuki Iwashima]

On Fri, May 1, 2026 at 8:34 AM Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl> wrote:
>
>
> > Op 30-04-2026 04:04 CEST schreef Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>:
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 10:51 AM Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl> wrote:
> > >
> > > Right now if some LSM such as Smack denies an AF_UNIX socket peer to
> > > receive an SCM_RIGHTS fd the SCM_RIGHTS fd array will be cut short at
> > > that point, and MSG_CTRUNC is set on return of recvmsg(). This is
> > > highly problematic behaviour, because it leaves the receiver
> > > wondering what happened. As per man page MSG_CTRUNC is supposed to
> > > indicate that the control buffer was sized too short, but suddenly
> > > a permission error might result in the exact same flag being set.
> > > Moreover, the receiver has no chance to determine how many fds got
> > > originally sent and how many were suppressed.[1]
> > >
> > > Add two MSG_* flags:
> >
> > Since we only have 5 bits remaining for future extension,
> > we need to consider the use case a bit more carefully.
> >
>
> Right. Since it wasn't a lot of work I implemented it exactly as the request
> was made from userspace, and then discuss it from there. By the way, I suppose
> nothing can be done about that small flag space?

We could reuse an existing flag (e.g. MSG_FIN, MSG_RST)
if we were confident enough that the userspace does not use
the flag for a specific socket type.

Another option is to add another syscall, recvmsg2.


>
> >
> > >  - MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL is set whenever any file is rejected by the LSM
> > >    during recvmsg() of SCM_RIGHTS fds.
> >
> > Is this really needed ?
> >
> > Even if the fd array is truncated, the application will traverse
> > the array anyway since it has some fds already installed (to
> > clean up in case of MSG_CTRUNC ?).
> >
> > Then, it will find the -EPERM entry.
> >
> > I assume no one uses MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL without
> > MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER.
> >
>
> I guess that is a fair assumption to make. We can certainly do without
> MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL if saving flags is important. I also suggested that
> we may see whether we can make MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER the default behavior.
> In the mean time I've found grep.app, and it turns out the answer is no.
> Apparently almost no one checks even for the truncation flag (mostly 1 fd
> is passed and then it is check the cmsg lenght). But cpython has this for
> instance:
>
>     /* Close all descriptors coming from SCM_RIGHTS, so they don't leak. */
>     for (cmsgh = ((msg.msg_controllen > 0) ? CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg) : NULL);
>          cmsgh != NULL; cmsgh = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, cmsgh)) {
>         cmsg_status = get_cmsg_data_len(&msg, cmsgh, &cmsgdatalen);
>         if (cmsg_status < 0)
>             break;
>         if (cmsgh->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
>             cmsgh->cmsg_type == SCM_RIGHTS) {
>             size_t numfds;
>             int *fdp;
>             numfds = cmsgdatalen / sizeof(int);
>             fdp = (int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsgh);
>             while (numfds-- > 0)
>                 close(*fdp++);
>         }
>         if (cmsg_status != 0)
>             break;
>     }
>
> >
> > >  - If MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER is passed as a flag to recvmsg(), the SCM_RIGHTS
> >
> > Does this flag need per-recvmsg() granularity ?
> >
>
> Perhaps not. What would be the alternative? A fcntl option for the socket fd?

I'd add a new socket option like

setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_RIGHTS_TRUNC, &(int){0}, sizeof(int));


>
> > If the application does not welcome the truncated fd array,
> > it would have passed MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER to every
> > recvmsg(), no ?
> >
>
> Correct.
>
>
> Thanks,
> Jori.

Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] net: af_unix: Useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS

[Jori Koolstra]

> Op 02-05-2026 03:24 CEST schreef Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>:
> 
> > >
> > > Does this flag need per-recvmsg() granularity ?
> > >
> >
> > Perhaps not. What would be the alternative? A fcntl option for the socket fd?
> 
> I'd add a new socket option like
> 
> setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_RIGHTS_TRUNC, &(int){0}, sizeof(int));
> 
> 

I think this is reasonable suggestion (and better than using the MSG_ flags).
Let's just let this sit for a few days to see if anyone else has suggestions/
objections.

[RFC PATCH 2/2] selftest: Add tests for useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS

[Jori Koolstra]

Tests SCM_RIGHTS fd passing using Smack LSM blocking in combination with
the MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER flag.

Signed-off-by: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl>
---
 .../net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/helper.h         |  37 ++++
 .../net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/receiver.c       | 187 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/sender.c         | 126 ++++++++++++
 .../lsm_blocking/test_scm_rights_smack.sh     | 172 ++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 522 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/helper.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/receiver.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/sender.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/test_scm_rights_smack.sh

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/helper.h b/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/helper.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e827560ee78d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/helper.h
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+
+#define MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL 0x200000
+#define MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER 0x400000
+
+#define CMSG_IS_SCM_RIGHTS(cmsg) ({		\
+	typeof(cmsg) _cmsg = (cmsg);		\
+	_cmsg &&				\
+	_cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&	\
+	_cmsg->cmsg_type == SCM_RIGHTS;		\
+})
+
+#define MIN(a, b) ({ \
+	typeof(a) _a = (a); \
+	typeof(b) _b = (b); \
+	_a < _b ? _a : _b; \
+})
+
+#define MAX_FDS 10
+
+static inline int read_current_label(char *label, size_t size)
+{
+	int fd = open("/proc/self/attr/current", O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return fd;
+
+	ssize_t r = read(fd, label, size - 1);
+	close(fd);
+	if (r <= 0)
+		return r;
+
+	label[r] = '\0';
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/receiver.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/receiver.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f5af9dcddc22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/receiver.c
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+/*
+ * receiver.c - Receive a file descriptor over a Unix domain socket via SCM_RIGHTS
+ *
+ * Usage: ./receiver <socket_path>
+ *
+ * Listens on the given Unix socket path, accepts a connection, and
+ * attempts to receive file descriptors via SCM_RIGHTS. Reports
+ * whether the fds were delivered or blocked.
+ *
+ * Used for testing LSM (Smack) blocking of fd passing.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/xattr.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+
+#include "helper.h"
+
+#define RECV_LOG(fmt, ...) printf("receiver: " fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define RECV_ERR(fmt, ...) fprintf(stderr, "receiver: " fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+static int recv_fds(int sock, int *fds)
+{
+	char buf[1];
+	char ctrl[CMSG_SPACE(MAX_FDS * sizeof(int))];
+
+	struct iovec iov = {
+		.iov_base = buf,
+		.iov_len  = sizeof(buf),
+	};
+	struct msghdr msg = {
+		.msg_iov        = &iov,
+		.msg_iovlen     = 1,
+		.msg_control    = ctrl,
+		.msg_controllen = sizeof(ctrl),
+	};
+
+	ssize_t bytes_read = recvmsg(sock, &msg, MSG_RIGHTS_FILTER);
+	if (bytes_read < 0) {
+		perror("receiver: recvmsg");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (bytes_read == 0) {
+		RECV_ERR("connection closed, no data received\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (msg.msg_flags & MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL)
+		RECV_LOG("MSG_RIGHTS_DENIAL set - some fds were blocked by the LSM!\n");
+
+	struct cmsghdr *cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+	if (!CMSG_IS_SCM_RIGHTS(cmsg)) {
+		RECV_ERR("no SCM_RIGHTS in control message\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	int num_fd_slots = (cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_LEN(0)) / sizeof(int);
+	memcpy(fds, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), num_fd_slots  * sizeof(int));
+
+	RECV_LOG("got %d fd slots:", num_fd_slots);
+	for (int i = 0; i < num_fd_slots ; i++)
+		printf(" %d", fds[i]);
+	putchar('\n');
+
+	return num_fd_slots;
+}
+
+static inline int print_current_label(void)
+{
+	char label[256];
+	if (!read_current_label(label, sizeof(label))) {
+		RECV_LOG("running with Smack label '%s'\n", label);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	if (argc != 2) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <socket_path>\n", argv[0]);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (print_current_label()) {
+		RECV_ERR("cannot read process Smack label");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	int listen_sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (listen_sock < 0) {
+		perror("receiver: socket");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	struct sockaddr_un addr = {};
+	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	strncpy(addr.sun_path, argv[1], sizeof(addr.sun_path) - 1);
+
+	/* Remove any stale socket file */
+	unlink(argv[1]);
+
+	if (bind(listen_sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) {
+		perror("receiver: bind");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (listen(listen_sock, 1) < 0) {
+		perror("receiver: listen");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	RECV_LOG("listening on '%s'\n", argv[1]);
+
+	int conn_sock = accept(listen_sock, NULL, NULL);
+	if (conn_sock < 0) {
+		perror("receiver: accept");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	RECV_LOG("connection accepted\n");
+
+	/* Try to receive the fds */
+	int fds[MAX_FDS];
+	int num_fds = recv_fds(conn_sock, fds);
+	if (num_fds < 0)
+		goto out_sock;
+
+	/* Try to use the received fds -- read and print their contents */
+	RECV_LOG("attempting to read from received fds...\n");
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < num_fds; ++i) {
+		char readbuf[256];
+
+		if (fds[i] < 0) {
+			RECV_LOG("fd in position %i blocked\n", i);
+			continue;
+		} else if (fds[i] == 0) {
+			RECV_LOG("bad fd in position %i\n", i);
+			goto out_recv;
+		}
+
+		ssize_t n = read(fds[i], readbuf, sizeof(readbuf) - 1);
+		if (n < 0) {
+			perror("receiver: read from received fd");
+			goto out_recv;
+		}
+
+		readbuf[n] = '\0';
+		RECV_LOG("read %zd bytes from fd at position %i: '%s'\n", n, i, readbuf);
+	}
+
+	RECV_LOG("final result:\n");
+	for (int j = 0; j < num_fds; ++j) {
+		if (fds[j] < 0) {
+			printf("BLOCKED");
+		} else {
+			printf("PASSED");
+			close(fds[j]);
+		}
+		putchar(' ');
+	}
+
+	close(conn_sock);
+	close(listen_sock);
+	unlink(argv[1]);
+	return 0;
+
+out_recv:
+	for (int j = 0; j < num_fds; ++j) {
+		if (fds[j] > 0)
+			close(fds[j]);
+	}
+
+out_sock:
+	close(conn_sock);
+	close(listen_sock);
+	unlink(argv[1]);
+	return -1;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/sender.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/sender.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b1c76d23b8bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/sender.c
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+/*
+ * sender.c - Send file descriptors over a Unix domain socket via SCM_RIGHTS
+ *
+ * Usage: ./sender <socket_path> <file_to_send> [<file_to_send>...]
+ *
+ * Opens the specified files and sends their fds to a receiver connected
+ * on the given Unix socket path. Used for testing LSM blocking of fd
+ * passing.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+
+#include "helper.h"
+
+#define SEND_LOG(fmt, ...) fprintf(stdout, "sender: " fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define SEND_ERR(fmt, ...) fprintf(stderr, "sender: " fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+static int send_fds(int sock, int *fds, int num_fds)
+{
+	if (num_fds > MAX_FDS)
+		return -1;
+
+	char buf[1] = { 'X' };
+	char ctrl[CMSG_SPACE(MAX_FDS * sizeof(int))] = { 0 };
+
+	struct iovec iov = {
+		.iov_base = buf,
+		.iov_len  = sizeof(buf),
+	};
+	struct msghdr msg = {
+		.msg_iov        = &iov,
+		.msg_iovlen     = 1,
+		.msg_control    = ctrl,
+		.msg_controllen = CMSG_SPACE(num_fds * sizeof(int)),
+	};
+
+	struct cmsghdr *cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+	cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
+	cmsg->cmsg_type  = SCM_RIGHTS;
+	cmsg->cmsg_len   = CMSG_LEN(num_fds * sizeof(int));
+	memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), fds, num_fds * sizeof(int));
+
+	ssize_t bytes_send = sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0);
+	if (bytes_send < 0) {
+		perror("sender: sendmsg");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int print_current_label(void)
+{
+	char label[256];
+	if (!read_current_label(label, sizeof(label))) {
+		SEND_LOG("running with Smack label '%s'\n", label);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	if (argc < 3 || argc > 2 + MAX_FDS) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <socket_path> <file_to_send> [<file_to_send>...]\\n",
+			argv[0]);
+		fprintf(stderr, "Up to a maximum of %d files", MAX_FDS);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (print_current_label()) {
+		SEND_ERR("cannot read process Smack label");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	int sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (sock < 0) {
+		perror("sender: socket");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	struct sockaddr_un addr = {};
+	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	strncpy(addr.sun_path, argv[1], sizeof(addr.sun_path) - 1);
+
+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) {
+		perror("sender: connect");
+		goto out_sock;
+	}
+
+	SEND_LOG("connected to '%s'\n", argv[1]);
+
+	int num_files = argc - 2;
+	int fds[MAX_FDS];
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < num_files; i++) {
+		fds[i] = open(argv[2 + i], O_RDONLY);
+		if (fds[i] < 0) {
+			perror("sender: open file");
+			goto out_opened;
+		}
+		SEND_LOG("opened '%s' as fd %d\n", argv[2 + i], fds[i]);
+	}
+
+	if (send_fds(sock, fds, num_files) < 0)
+		goto out_opened;
+
+	SEND_LOG("fds successfully sent:");
+	for (int j = 0; j < num_files; j++)
+		printf(" %d", fds[j]);
+	putchar('\n');
+
+out_opened:
+	for (int j = 0; j < i; j++)
+		close(fds[j]);
+out_sock:
+	close(sock);
+	return -1;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/test_scm_rights_smack.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/test_scm_rights_smack.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..76fcfdd2cd4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/lsm_blocking/test_scm_rights_smack.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#
+# test_scm_rights_smack.sh - Test SCM_RIGHTS fd passing using Smack LSM blocking
+#
+# Must be run as root on a kernel with Smack enabled (security=smack).
+# Requires: capsh (libcap), setfattr/getfattr (attr)
+#
+# We use the following Smack labels:
+#   "Sender"   - label for the sending process
+#   "Receiver" - label for the receiving process
+#   "SecretX"   - labels for the files being passed
+#
+# Socket communication (Sender <-> Receiver) is always allowed.
+# The test controls whether Receiver can access "SecretX"-labeled fds.
+#
+
+
+readonly SOCK="/tmp/scm_test.sock"
+readonly TESTFILE1="/tmp/scm_test_secret_1"
+readonly TESTFILE2="/tmp/scm_test_secret_2"
+readonly SENDER="./sender"
+readonly RECEIVER="./receiver"
+
+set -e
+
+run_tests() {
+
+	preflight
+	setup
+
+	run_test "TEST 1" \
+		"Receiver should NOT have access to Secret1." \
+		"Receiver Secret1 ---
+Receiver Secret2 ---" \
+		"$TESTFILE1" \
+		"BLOCKED"
+
+	run_test "TEST 2" \
+		"Receiver should have access to Secret1." \
+		"Receiver Secret1 r--
+Receiver Secret2 ---" \
+		"$TESTFILE1" \
+		"PASSED"
+
+	run_test "TEST 3" \
+		"Receiver should have access to Secret2, but NOT Secret1." \
+		"Receiver Secret1 ---
+Receiver Secret2 r--" \
+		"$TESTFILE1 $TESTFILE2" \
+		"BLOCKED PASSED"
+}
+
+run_test() {
+	local name="$1"
+	local description="$2"
+	local rules="$3"
+	local files="$4"
+	local expected="$5"
+
+	echo ""
+	echo "$name: $description"
+	echo "Rules:"
+	echo "$rules"
+	echo "Expected: $expected"
+	echo ""
+
+	while IFS= read -r rule; do
+		[ -n "$rule" ] && echo "$rule" > /sys/fs/smackfs/load2
+	done <<< "$rules"
+
+	local output status last_line
+	output=$(send_fds "$SOCK" $files)
+	status=$?
+	echo "$output"
+	last_line=$(echo "$output" | tail -n 1 | xargs)
+
+	if [ "$status" -ne 0 ]; then
+		echo "TEST FAILED: receiver returned $status"
+		return 1
+	fi
+
+	if [[ "$last_line" == "$expected" ]]; then
+		echo "TEST PASSED: outcome was $expected as expected"
+		return 0
+	else
+		echo "TEST FAILED: expected $expected, got '$last_line'"
+		return 1
+	fi
+}
+
+setup() {
+
+	printf "Secret 1" > "$TESTFILE1"
+	printf "Secret 2" > "$TESTFILE2"
+
+	setfattr -n security.SMACK64 -v "Secret1" "$TESTFILE1"
+	setfattr -n security.SMACK64 -v "Secret2" "$TESTFILE2"
+	setfattr -n security.SMACK64 -v "Tmp" /tmp
+
+	echo "Sender	Receiver	-w-" > /sys/fs/smackfs/load2
+	echo "Receiver	Sender		-w-" > /sys/fs/smackfs/load2
+	echo "Sender	Tmp 		rwx" > /sys/fs/smackfs/load2
+	echo "Receiver	Tmp		rwx" > /sys/fs/smackfs/load2
+	echo "Sender	Secret1		r--" > /sys/fs/smackfs/load2
+	echo "Sender	Secret2		r--" > /sys/fs/smackfs/load2
+}
+
+send_fds() {
+
+	local sk="$1"
+	shift
+	local files="$*"
+
+	(
+	    echo "Receiver" > /proc/self/attr/current
+	    exec capsh --drop=cap_mac_override,cap_mac_admin -- -c "$RECEIVER $sk"
+	) &
+	local recv_pid=$!
+	sleep 1
+
+	(
+	    echo "Sender" > /proc/self/attr/current
+	    exec capsh --drop=cap_mac_override,cap_mac_admin -- -c "$SENDER $sk $files"
+	) || true
+
+	local recv_status=0
+	wait "$recv_pid" || recv_status=$?
+
+	if [ "$recv_status" -ne 0 ]; then
+	    echo "receiver exited with $recv_status"
+	fi
+	return "$recv_status"
+}
+
+preflight() {
+
+	if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
+	    echo "ERROR: must be run as root"
+	    exit 1
+	fi
+
+	if ! grep -q smack /sys/kernel/security/lsm 2>/dev/null; then
+	    echo "ERROR: Smack is not active"
+	    echo "  Check: cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm"
+	    echo "  Boot with: security=smack"
+	    exit 1
+	fi
+
+	if ! mountpoint -q /sys/fs/smackfs 2>/dev/null; then
+	    echo "Mounting smackfs..."
+	    mount -t smackfs smackfs /sys/fs/smackfs
+	fi
+
+	if ! command -v capsh &>/dev/null; then
+	    echo "ERROR: capsh not found (install libcap)"
+	    exit 1
+	fi
+
+	# Build the test programs if needed
+	if [ ! -x "$SENDER" ]; then
+	    echo "Building sender..."
+	    gcc -Wall -o sender sender.c
+	fi
+	if [ ! -x "$RECEIVER" ]; then
+	    echo "Building receiver..."
+	    gcc -Wall -o receiver receiver.c
+	fi
+
+}
+
+run_tests
-- 
2.54.0