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* [PATCH net] mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag
@ 2026-07-09 13:12 Doruk Tan Ozturk
  2026-07-16 10:09 ` Simon Horman
                   ` (3 more replies)
  0 siblings, 4 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Doruk Tan Ozturk @ 2026-07-09 13:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: alex.aring, stefan, miquel.raynal
  Cc: davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, horms, phoebe.buckheister,
	linux-wpan, netdev, linux-kernel, stable, Doruk Tan Ozturk

llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the
AEAD request as

	assoclen += datalen - authlen;

where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen
(4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies
that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A
secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes
datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to
aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so
crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that
only spans the real frame.

The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any
IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is
shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction.

Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault
in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed.

Fixes: 4c14a2fb5d14 ("mac802154: add llsec decryption method")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Assisted-by: 0sec:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
---
 net/mac802154/llsec.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/mac802154/llsec.c b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
index 5e7cc11fab3a..364a1ac1d771 100644
--- a/net/mac802154/llsec.c
+++ b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
@@ -893,6 +893,11 @@ llsec_do_decrypt_auth(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct mac802154_llsec *sec,
 
 	sg_init_one(&sg, skb_mac_header(skb), assoclen + datalen);
 
+	if (datalen < authlen) {
+		kfree_sensitive(req);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
 	if (!(hdr->sec.level & IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC)) {
 		assoclen += datalen - authlen;
 		datalen = authlen;
-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH net] mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag
  2026-07-09 13:12 [PATCH net] mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag Doruk Tan Ozturk
@ 2026-07-16 10:09 ` Simon Horman
  2026-07-16 13:23 ` Breno Leitao
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Simon Horman @ 2026-07-16 10:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Doruk Tan Ozturk
  Cc: alex.aring, stefan, miquel.raynal, davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni,
	phoebe.buckheister, linux-wpan, netdev, linux-kernel, stable

On Thu, Jul 09, 2026 at 03:12:46PM +0200, Doruk Tan Ozturk wrote:
> llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the
> AEAD request as
> 
> 	assoclen += datalen - authlen;
> 
> where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen
> (4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies
> that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A
> secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes
> datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to
> aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so
> crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that
> only spans the real frame.
> 
> The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any
> IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is
> shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction.
> 
> Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault
> in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed.
> 
> Fixes: 4c14a2fb5d14 ("mac802154: add llsec decryption method")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Reported-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
> Assisted-by: 0sec:claude-opus-4-8
> Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>

Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH net] mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag
  2026-07-09 13:12 [PATCH net] mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag Doruk Tan Ozturk
  2026-07-16 10:09 ` Simon Horman
@ 2026-07-16 13:23 ` Breno Leitao
  2026-07-16 19:31 ` Doruk Tan Ozturk
  2026-07-16 19:31 ` [PATCH net v2] " Doruk Tan Ozturk
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2026-07-16 13:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Doruk Tan Ozturk
  Cc: alex.aring, stefan, miquel.raynal, davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni,
	horms, phoebe.buckheister, linux-wpan, netdev, linux-kernel,
	stable

On Thu, Jul 09, 2026 at 03:12:46PM +0200, Doruk Tan Ozturk wrote:

> Reported-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
> Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>

Usually you don't have Reported-by if you are fixing something yourself.

> ---
>  net/mac802154/llsec.c | 5 +++++
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/net/mac802154/llsec.c b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
> index 5e7cc11fab3a..364a1ac1d771 100644
> --- a/net/mac802154/llsec.c
> +++ b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
> @@ -893,6 +893,11 @@ llsec_do_decrypt_auth(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct mac802154_llsec *sec,

Why not returning here, before sg_init_one()? here you alrady have
datalen and authlen.

>  	sg_init_one(&sg, skb_mac_header(skb), assoclen + datalen);
>  
> +	if (datalen < authlen) {
> +		kfree_sensitive(req);
> +		return -EBADMSG;
> +	}
> +
>  	if (!(hdr->sec.level & IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC)) {
>  		assoclen += datalen - authlen;
>  		datalen = authlen;
> -- 
> 2.43.0
> 
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH net] mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag
  2026-07-09 13:12 [PATCH net] mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag Doruk Tan Ozturk
  2026-07-16 10:09 ` Simon Horman
  2026-07-16 13:23 ` Breno Leitao
@ 2026-07-16 19:31 ` Doruk Tan Ozturk
  2026-07-16 19:31 ` [PATCH net v2] " Doruk Tan Ozturk
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Doruk Tan Ozturk @ 2026-07-16 19:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Breno Leitao
  Cc: Alexander Aring, Stefan Schmidt, Miquel Raynal, davem, edumazet,
	kuba, pabeni, Simon Horman, linux-wpan, netdev, linux-kernel,
	stable

Will do both in v2, thanks.

-Doruk

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* [PATCH net v2] mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag
  2026-07-09 13:12 [PATCH net] mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag Doruk Tan Ozturk
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2026-07-16 19:31 ` Doruk Tan Ozturk
@ 2026-07-16 19:31 ` Doruk Tan Ozturk
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Doruk Tan Ozturk @ 2026-07-16 19:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: alex.aring, stefan, miquel.raynal
  Cc: davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, horms, leitao, linux-wpan, netdev,
	linux-kernel, stable

llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the
AEAD request as

	assoclen += datalen - authlen;

where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen
(4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies
that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A
secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes
datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to
aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so
crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that
only spans the real frame.

The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any
IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is
shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction.

Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault
in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed.

Fixes: 4c14a2fb5d14 ("mac802154: add llsec decryption method")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: 0sec:multi-model
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
---

v2 (Breno Leitao review):
 - drop the redundant self-Reported-by.
 - move the length check above sg_init_one() (datalen/authlen are
   already available there).
 - Assisted-by trailer -> 0sec:multi-model.
Carrying Simon Horman Reviewed-by; v2 only moves the same check earlier.
 net/mac802154/llsec.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/mac802154/llsec.c b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
index 5e7cc11fab3a..85452ef9a58c 100644
--- a/net/mac802154/llsec.c
+++ b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
@@ -891,6 +891,11 @@ llsec_do_decrypt_auth(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct mac802154_llsec *sec,
 	data = skb_mac_header(skb) + skb->mac_len;
 	datalen = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - data;
 
+	if (datalen < authlen) {
+		kfree_sensitive(req);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
 	sg_init_one(&sg, skb_mac_header(skb), assoclen + datalen);
 
 	if (!(hdr->sec.level & IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC)) {
-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-07-16 19:31 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2026-07-09 13:12 [PATCH net] mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag Doruk Tan Ozturk
2026-07-16 10:09 ` Simon Horman
2026-07-16 13:23 ` Breno Leitao
2026-07-16 19:31 ` Doruk Tan Ozturk
2026-07-16 19:31 ` [PATCH net v2] " Doruk Tan Ozturk

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