* [PATCH net v2 0/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt()
@ 2026-08-26 17:13 Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
0 siblings, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-26 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: edumazet, ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni
Cc: kuniyu, horms, matttbe, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin,
ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity,
xmei5, tgopinath, kys, blbllhy
From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com>
do_tcp_getsockopt() has two lockless reads of icsk_ca_ops. Since BPF
struct_ops congestion control made icsk_ca_ops point to dynamically
allocated memory, a concurrent setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) can replace
the pointer and free the old object while either reader is using it.
Patch 1 fixes the TCP_CONGESTION path by copying ca_ops->name to a
stack buffer while holding rcu_read_lock(). It also uses READ_ONCE()
for the lockless load and annotates every explicit icsk_ca_ops store
with WRITE_ONCE().
Patch 2 fixes the TCP_CC_INFO path by keeping the READ_ONCE() load,
ca_ops->get_info lookup, and call inside an RCU read-side critical
section.
Changes since v1 [1]:
- Add READ_ONCE() to both lockless icsk_ca_ops loads.
- Add WRITE_ONCE() to all six explicit icsk_ca_ops stores.
- Include the data-race annotations in the UAF series as requested
by Eric Dumazet [2].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260821182449.79785-1-blbllhy@gmail.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CANn89iKr1ypEFeL+7te3xWoNaK5AFyYQmr+pDh2zSZAxfgNKjw@mail.gmail.com/
Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) (2):
tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION)
tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO)
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c | 4 ++--
net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +-
net/mptcp/protocol.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
base-commit: f967455fb2a5a2079b9eb5823e9ccf359174bf9f
--
2.55.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION)
2026-08-26 17:13 [PATCH net v2 0/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt() Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
@ 2026-08-26 17:13 ` Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
2026-08-26 17:30 ` Eric Dumazet
2026-08-27 10:38 ` Matthieu Baerts
2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
1 sibling, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-26 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: edumazet, ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni
Cc: kuniyu, horms, matttbe, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin,
ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity,
xmei5, tgopinath, kys, blbllhy, stable
From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com>
do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name without holding
rcu_read_lock(). Since commit 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support
tcp_congestion_ops in bpf"), icsk_ca_ops can point to dynamically
allocated BPF struct_ops memory that may be freed concurrently via
setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION), leading to a use-after-free.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60
Read of size 16 at addr ffff888013505260 by task exploit/149
_copy_to_user+0x37/0x60
do_tcp_getsockopt+0x158a/0x2460 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4585)
tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0
__sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170
Fix this by holding rcu_read_lock() around the ca_ops->name access,
using READ_ONCE() to load icsk_ca_ops, and copying the name to a
stack buffer before releasing the lock. Also annotate every explicit
icsk_ca_ops store with WRITE_ONCE() to fix the accompanying KCSAN
data-race issue.
Fixes: 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Xiang Mei (Microsoft) <xmei5@asu.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260821182449.79785-2-blbllhy@gmail.com/
Cc: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-opus-4.6
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <blbllhy@gmail.com>
---
Note: The adjacent TCP_ULP case has a similar read pattern on
icsk_ulp_ops->name, but icsk_ulp_ops always points to static
module data (no BPF struct_ops equivalent), so it is not affected.
Changes in v2:
- Add READ_ONCE() for the icsk_ca_ops load.
- Add WRITE_ONCE() for every explicit icsk_ca_ops store.
---
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 14 +++++++++++---
net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c | 4 ++--
net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +-
net/mptcp/protocol.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index b4237d0e994d..4918f48ba76d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -4577,16 +4577,24 @@ int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
val = !inet_csk_in_pingpong_mode(sk);
break;
- case TCP_CONGESTION:
+ case TCP_CONGESTION: {
+ char ca_name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX] = {};
+
if (copy_from_sockptr(&len, optlen, sizeof(int)))
return -EFAULT;
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, TCP_CA_NAME_MAX);
if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &len, sizeof(int)))
return -EFAULT;
- if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name, len))
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ca_ops = READ_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops);
+ memcpy(ca_name, ca_ops->name, sizeof(ca_name));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, ca_name, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
-
+ }
case TCP_ULP:
if (copy_from_sockptr(&len, optlen, sizeof(int)))
return -EFAULT;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c
index e9f6c77e0631..8e83ef81fc18 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ void tcp_assign_congestion_control(struct sock *sk)
ca = rcu_dereference(net->ipv4.tcp_congestion_control);
if (unlikely(!bpf_try_module_get(ca, ca->owner)))
ca = &tcp_reno;
- icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca;
+ WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, ca);
rcu_read_unlock();
memset(icsk->icsk_ca_priv, 0, sizeof(icsk->icsk_ca_priv));
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static void tcp_reinit_congestion_control(struct sock *sk,
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
tcp_cleanup_congestion_control(sk);
- icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca;
+ WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, ca);
icsk->icsk_ca_setsockopt = 1;
memset(icsk->icsk_ca_priv, 0, sizeof(icsk->icsk_ca_priv));
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c
index 274e628e7cf8..99f68c2992d0 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ __bpf_kfunc static void dctcp_init(struct sock *sk)
/* No ECN support? Fall back to Reno. Also need to clear
* ECT from sk since it is set during 3WHS for DCTCP.
*/
- inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_ops = &dctcp_reno;
+ WRITE_ONCE(inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_ops, &dctcp_reno);
INET_ECN_dontxmit(sk);
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
index f3fa0b18eda0..0ddfd5af6e58 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ void tcp_ca_openreq_child(struct sock *sk, const struct dst_entry *dst)
ca = tcp_ca_find_key(ca_key);
if (likely(ca && bpf_try_module_get(ca, ca->owner))) {
icsk->icsk_ca_dst_locked = tcp_ca_dst_locked(dst);
- icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca;
+ WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, ca);
ca_got_dst = true;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
index f2709d585edb..74727b7eb446 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -4092,7 +4092,7 @@ static void tcp_ca_dst_init(struct sock *sk, const struct dst_entry *dst)
if (likely(ca && bpf_try_module_get(ca, ca->owner))) {
bpf_module_put(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, icsk->icsk_ca_ops->owner);
icsk->icsk_ca_dst_locked = tcp_ca_dst_locked(dst);
- icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca;
+ WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, ca);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
diff --git a/net/mptcp/protocol.c b/net/mptcp/protocol.c
index b474d03620a7..006de39e8165 100644
--- a/net/mptcp/protocol.c
+++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.c
@@ -3218,7 +3218,7 @@ static void mptcp_ca_reset(struct sock *sk)
/* no need to keep a reference to the ops, the name will suffice */
tcp_cleanup_congestion_control(sk);
- icsk->icsk_ca_ops = NULL;
+ WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, NULL);
}
static int mptcp_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
--
2.55.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH net v2 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO)
2026-08-26 17:13 [PATCH net v2 0/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt() Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
@ 2026-08-26 17:13 ` Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
2026-08-26 17:31 ` Eric Dumazet
1 sibling, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-26 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: edumazet, ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni
Cc: kuniyu, horms, matttbe, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin,
ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity,
xmei5, tgopinath, kys, blbllhy, stable
From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com>
do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops and dereferences the
get_info function pointer without rcu_read_lock(). With BPF struct_ops
congestion control, ca_ops can point to dynamically allocated memory
that is freed concurrently, resulting in a use-after-free when the
kernel dereferences or calls through the stale pointer.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888013701258 by task exploit/149
do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4564)
tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0
__sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170
Fix this by wrapping the ca_ops load and get_info call within
rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), and using READ_ONCE() to load
the icsk_ca_ops pointer.
Fixes: 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-opus-4.6
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <blbllhy@gmail.com>
---
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260821182449.79785-3-blbllhy@gmail.com/ (v1)
Changes in v2:
- Add READ_ONCE() for the icsk_ca_ops load.
---
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index 4918f48ba76d..c45776d3ed90 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -4562,9 +4562,11 @@ int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
if (copy_from_sockptr(&len, optlen, sizeof(int)))
return -EFAULT;
- ca_ops = icsk->icsk_ca_ops;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ca_ops = READ_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops);
if (ca_ops && ca_ops->get_info)
sz = ca_ops->get_info(sk, ~0U, &attr, &info);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sz);
if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &len, sizeof(int)))
--
2.55.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION)
2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
@ 2026-08-26 17:30 ` Eric Dumazet
2026-08-27 10:38 ` Matthieu Baerts
1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2026-08-26 17:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
Cc: ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni, kuniyu, horms, matttbe, martineau,
geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin, ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf,
linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity, xmei5, tgopinath, kys,
stable
On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 7:14 PM Cen Zhang (Microsoft) <blbllhy@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com>
>
> do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name without holding
> rcu_read_lock(). Since commit 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support
> tcp_congestion_ops in bpf"), icsk_ca_ops can point to dynamically
> allocated BPF struct_ops memory that may be freed concurrently via
> setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION), leading to a use-after-free.
>
> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60
> Read of size 16 at addr ffff888013505260 by task exploit/149
> _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60
> do_tcp_getsockopt+0x158a/0x2460 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4585)
> tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0
> __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170
>
> Fix this by holding rcu_read_lock() around the ca_ops->name access,
> using READ_ONCE() to load icsk_ca_ops, and copying the name to a
> stack buffer before releasing the lock. Also annotate every explicit
> icsk_ca_ops store with WRITE_ONCE() to fix the accompanying KCSAN
> data-race issue.
>
> Fixes: 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf")
> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
> Reported-by: Xiang Mei (Microsoft) <xmei5@asu.edu>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260821182449.79785-2-blbllhy@gmail.com/
> Cc: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-opus-4.6
> Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <blbllhy@gmail.com>
> ---
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Thanks.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v2 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO)
2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
@ 2026-08-26 17:31 ` Eric Dumazet
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2026-08-26 17:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
Cc: ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni, kuniyu, horms, matttbe, martineau,
geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin, ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf,
linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity, xmei5, tgopinath, kys,
stable
On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 7:14 PM Cen Zhang (Microsoft) <blbllhy@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com>
>
> do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops and dereferences the
> get_info function pointer without rcu_read_lock(). With BPF struct_ops
> congestion control, ca_ops can point to dynamically allocated memory
> that is freed concurrently, resulting in a use-after-free when the
> kernel dereferences or calls through the stale pointer.
>
> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0
> Read of size 8 at addr ffff888013701258 by task exploit/149
> do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4564)
> tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0
> __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170
>
> Fix this by wrapping the ca_ops load and get_info call within
> rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), and using READ_ONCE() to load
> the icsk_ca_ops pointer.
>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Thanks.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION)
2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
2026-08-26 17:30 ` Eric Dumazet
@ 2026-08-27 10:38 ` Matthieu Baerts
2026-08-27 23:50 ` Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
1 sibling, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Matthieu Baerts @ 2026-08-27 10:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
Cc: kuniyu, horms, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin, ast,
netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity, xmei5,
tgopinath, kys, stable, edumazet, ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni
Hi Cen,
On 26/08/2026 19:13, Cen Zhang (Microsoft) wrote:
> From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com>
>
> do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name without holding
> rcu_read_lock(). Since commit 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support
> tcp_congestion_ops in bpf"), icsk_ca_ops can point to dynamically
> allocated BPF struct_ops memory that may be freed concurrently via
> setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION), leading to a use-after-free.
>
> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60
> Read of size 16 at addr ffff888013505260 by task exploit/149
> _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60
> do_tcp_getsockopt+0x158a/0x2460 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4585)
> tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0
> __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170
>
> Fix this by holding rcu_read_lock() around the ca_ops->name access,
> using READ_ONCE() to load icsk_ca_ops, and copying the name to a
> stack buffer before releasing the lock. Also annotate every explicit
> icsk_ca_ops store with WRITE_ONCE() to fix the accompanying KCSAN
> data-race issue.
(...)
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
> index b4237d0e994d..4918f48ba76d 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
> @@ -4577,16 +4577,24 @@ int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
> val = !inet_csk_in_pingpong_mode(sk);
> break;
>
> - case TCP_CONGESTION:
> + case TCP_CONGESTION: {
> + char ca_name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX] = {};
> +
> if (copy_from_sockptr(&len, optlen, sizeof(int)))
> return -EFAULT;
> len = min_t(unsigned int, len, TCP_CA_NAME_MAX);
> if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &len, sizeof(int)))
> return -EFAULT;
> - if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name, len))
> +
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + ca_ops = READ_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops);
It looks like you (or your assistant) forgot to declare ca_ops:
const struct tcp_congestion_ops *ca_ops;
Also, I *guess* a 'rcu_read_lock' is needed in mptcp_ca_reset() from
net/mptcp/protocol.c, above the modification you did, to get the name, no?
Apart from that, the modifications look good to me.
Cheers,
Matt
--
Sponsored by the NGI0 Core fund.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION)
2026-08-27 10:38 ` Matthieu Baerts
@ 2026-08-27 23:50 ` Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-27 23:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: matttbe
Cc: AutonomousCodeSecurity, andriin, ast, blbllhy, bpf, davem,
edumazet, geliang, horms, kafai, kuba, kuniyu, kys, linux-kernel,
martineau, mptcp, ncardwell, netdev, pabeni, stable, tgopinath,
xmei5, yhs
On Thu, Aug 27, 2026 at 12:38:36PM +0200, Matthieu Baerts wrote:
> It looks like you (or your assistant) forgot to declare ca_ops:
>
> const struct tcp_congestion_ops *ca_ops;
>
> Also, I *guess* a 'rcu_read_lock' is needed in mptcp_ca_reset() from
> net/mptcp/protocol.c, above the modification you did, to get the name, no?
Thanks for catching this. I messed up the local version and missed the
undeclared ca_ops. I will fix it in v3.
I also checked mptcp_ca_reset(). It is only called before the socket is
published (mptcp_init_sock) or with the socket lock held
(mptcp_disconnect). The ca_ops->name copy sits between
tcp_assign_congestion_control() and tcp_cleanup_congestion_control(), so
the ops object stays referenced and that read is already safe. The v2
WRITE_ONCE() on the subsequent NULL store is on the MPTCP meta socket,
not the TCP sockets these two UAFs race with, so I will drop it in v3.
Thanks,
Cen
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-08-27 23:50 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2026-08-26 17:13 [PATCH net v2 0/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt() Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
2026-08-26 17:30 ` Eric Dumazet
2026-08-27 10:38 ` Matthieu Baerts
2026-08-27 23:50 ` Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) Cen Zhang (Microsoft)
2026-08-26 17:31 ` Eric Dumazet
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