* [PATCH net v2 0/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt() @ 2026-08-26 17:13 Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 0 siblings, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-26 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw) To: edumazet, ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni Cc: kuniyu, horms, matttbe, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin, ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity, xmei5, tgopinath, kys, blbllhy From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com> do_tcp_getsockopt() has two lockless reads of icsk_ca_ops. Since BPF struct_ops congestion control made icsk_ca_ops point to dynamically allocated memory, a concurrent setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) can replace the pointer and free the old object while either reader is using it. Patch 1 fixes the TCP_CONGESTION path by copying ca_ops->name to a stack buffer while holding rcu_read_lock(). It also uses READ_ONCE() for the lockless load and annotates every explicit icsk_ca_ops store with WRITE_ONCE(). Patch 2 fixes the TCP_CC_INFO path by keeping the READ_ONCE() load, ca_ops->get_info lookup, and call inside an RCU read-side critical section. Changes since v1 [1]: - Add READ_ONCE() to both lockless icsk_ca_ops loads. - Add WRITE_ONCE() to all six explicit icsk_ca_ops stores. - Include the data-race annotations in the UAF series as requested by Eric Dumazet [2]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260821182449.79785-1-blbllhy@gmail.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CANn89iKr1ypEFeL+7te3xWoNaK5AFyYQmr+pDh2zSZAxfgNKjw@mail.gmail.com/ Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) (2): tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) net/ipv4/tcp.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- net/mptcp/protocol.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) base-commit: f967455fb2a5a2079b9eb5823e9ccf359174bf9f -- 2.55.0 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) 2026-08-26 17:13 [PATCH net v2 0/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt() Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-26 17:13 ` Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-26 17:30 ` Eric Dumazet 2026-08-27 10:38 ` Matthieu Baerts 2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 1 sibling, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-26 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw) To: edumazet, ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni Cc: kuniyu, horms, matttbe, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin, ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity, xmei5, tgopinath, kys, blbllhy, stable From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com> do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name without holding rcu_read_lock(). Since commit 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf"), icsk_ca_ops can point to dynamically allocated BPF struct_ops memory that may be freed concurrently via setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION), leading to a use-after-free. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60 Read of size 16 at addr ffff888013505260 by task exploit/149 _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60 do_tcp_getsockopt+0x158a/0x2460 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4585) tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0 __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170 Fix this by holding rcu_read_lock() around the ca_ops->name access, using READ_ONCE() to load icsk_ca_ops, and copying the name to a stack buffer before releasing the lock. Also annotate every explicit icsk_ca_ops store with WRITE_ONCE() to fix the accompanying KCSAN data-race issue. Fixes: 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf") Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Xiang Mei (Microsoft) <xmei5@asu.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260821182449.79785-2-blbllhy@gmail.com/ Cc: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <blbllhy@gmail.com> --- Note: The adjacent TCP_ULP case has a similar read pattern on icsk_ulp_ops->name, but icsk_ulp_ops always points to static module data (no BPF struct_ops equivalent), so it is not affected. Changes in v2: - Add READ_ONCE() for the icsk_ca_ops load. - Add WRITE_ONCE() for every explicit icsk_ca_ops store. --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 14 +++++++++++--- net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- net/mptcp/protocol.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index b4237d0e994d..4918f48ba76d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -4577,16 +4577,24 @@ int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, val = !inet_csk_in_pingpong_mode(sk); break; - case TCP_CONGESTION: + case TCP_CONGESTION: { + char ca_name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX] = {}; + if (copy_from_sockptr(&len, optlen, sizeof(int))) return -EFAULT; len = min_t(unsigned int, len, TCP_CA_NAME_MAX); if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &len, sizeof(int))) return -EFAULT; - if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name, len)) + + rcu_read_lock(); + ca_ops = READ_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops); + memcpy(ca_name, ca_ops->name, sizeof(ca_name)); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, ca_name, len)) return -EFAULT; return 0; - + } case TCP_ULP: if (copy_from_sockptr(&len, optlen, sizeof(int))) return -EFAULT; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c index e9f6c77e0631..8e83ef81fc18 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ void tcp_assign_congestion_control(struct sock *sk) ca = rcu_dereference(net->ipv4.tcp_congestion_control); if (unlikely(!bpf_try_module_get(ca, ca->owner))) ca = &tcp_reno; - icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca; + WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, ca); rcu_read_unlock(); memset(icsk->icsk_ca_priv, 0, sizeof(icsk->icsk_ca_priv)); @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static void tcp_reinit_congestion_control(struct sock *sk, struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); tcp_cleanup_congestion_control(sk); - icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca; + WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, ca); icsk->icsk_ca_setsockopt = 1; memset(icsk->icsk_ca_priv, 0, sizeof(icsk->icsk_ca_priv)); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c index 274e628e7cf8..99f68c2992d0 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ __bpf_kfunc static void dctcp_init(struct sock *sk) /* No ECN support? Fall back to Reno. Also need to clear * ECT from sk since it is set during 3WHS for DCTCP. */ - inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_ops = &dctcp_reno; + WRITE_ONCE(inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_ops, &dctcp_reno); INET_ECN_dontxmit(sk); } diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c index f3fa0b18eda0..0ddfd5af6e58 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c @@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ void tcp_ca_openreq_child(struct sock *sk, const struct dst_entry *dst) ca = tcp_ca_find_key(ca_key); if (likely(ca && bpf_try_module_get(ca, ca->owner))) { icsk->icsk_ca_dst_locked = tcp_ca_dst_locked(dst); - icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca; + WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, ca); ca_got_dst = true; } rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index f2709d585edb..74727b7eb446 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -4092,7 +4092,7 @@ static void tcp_ca_dst_init(struct sock *sk, const struct dst_entry *dst) if (likely(ca && bpf_try_module_get(ca, ca->owner))) { bpf_module_put(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, icsk->icsk_ca_ops->owner); icsk->icsk_ca_dst_locked = tcp_ca_dst_locked(dst); - icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca; + WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, ca); } rcu_read_unlock(); } diff --git a/net/mptcp/protocol.c b/net/mptcp/protocol.c index b474d03620a7..006de39e8165 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/protocol.c +++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.c @@ -3218,7 +3218,7 @@ static void mptcp_ca_reset(struct sock *sk) /* no need to keep a reference to the ops, the name will suffice */ tcp_cleanup_congestion_control(sk); - icsk->icsk_ca_ops = NULL; + WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, NULL); } static int mptcp_init_sock(struct sock *sk) -- 2.55.0 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) 2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-26 17:30 ` Eric Dumazet 2026-08-27 10:38 ` Matthieu Baerts 1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Eric Dumazet @ 2026-08-26 17:30 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) Cc: ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni, kuniyu, horms, matttbe, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin, ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity, xmei5, tgopinath, kys, stable On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 7:14 PM Cen Zhang (Microsoft) <blbllhy@gmail.com> wrote: > > From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com> > > do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name without holding > rcu_read_lock(). Since commit 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support > tcp_congestion_ops in bpf"), icsk_ca_ops can point to dynamically > allocated BPF struct_ops memory that may be freed concurrently via > setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION), leading to a use-after-free. > > BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60 > Read of size 16 at addr ffff888013505260 by task exploit/149 > _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60 > do_tcp_getsockopt+0x158a/0x2460 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4585) > tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0 > __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170 > > Fix this by holding rcu_read_lock() around the ca_ops->name access, > using READ_ONCE() to load icsk_ca_ops, and copying the name to a > stack buffer before releasing the lock. Also annotate every explicit > icsk_ca_ops store with WRITE_ONCE() to fix the accompanying KCSAN > data-race issue. > > Fixes: 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf") > Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> > Reported-by: Xiang Mei (Microsoft) <xmei5@asu.edu> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260821182449.79785-2-blbllhy@gmail.com/ > Cc: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 > Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <blbllhy@gmail.com> > --- Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Thanks. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) 2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-26 17:30 ` Eric Dumazet @ 2026-08-27 10:38 ` Matthieu Baerts 2026-08-27 23:50 ` Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 1 sibling, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: Matthieu Baerts @ 2026-08-27 10:38 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) Cc: kuniyu, horms, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin, ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity, xmei5, tgopinath, kys, stable, edumazet, ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni Hi Cen, On 26/08/2026 19:13, Cen Zhang (Microsoft) wrote: > From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com> > > do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name without holding > rcu_read_lock(). Since commit 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support > tcp_congestion_ops in bpf"), icsk_ca_ops can point to dynamically > allocated BPF struct_ops memory that may be freed concurrently via > setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION), leading to a use-after-free. > > BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60 > Read of size 16 at addr ffff888013505260 by task exploit/149 > _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60 > do_tcp_getsockopt+0x158a/0x2460 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4585) > tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0 > __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170 > > Fix this by holding rcu_read_lock() around the ca_ops->name access, > using READ_ONCE() to load icsk_ca_ops, and copying the name to a > stack buffer before releasing the lock. Also annotate every explicit > icsk_ca_ops store with WRITE_ONCE() to fix the accompanying KCSAN > data-race issue. (...) > diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c > index b4237d0e994d..4918f48ba76d 100644 > --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c > +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c > @@ -4577,16 +4577,24 @@ int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, > val = !inet_csk_in_pingpong_mode(sk); > break; > > - case TCP_CONGESTION: > + case TCP_CONGESTION: { > + char ca_name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX] = {}; > + > if (copy_from_sockptr(&len, optlen, sizeof(int))) > return -EFAULT; > len = min_t(unsigned int, len, TCP_CA_NAME_MAX); > if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &len, sizeof(int))) > return -EFAULT; > - if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name, len)) > + > + rcu_read_lock(); > + ca_ops = READ_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops); It looks like you (or your assistant) forgot to declare ca_ops: const struct tcp_congestion_ops *ca_ops; Also, I *guess* a 'rcu_read_lock' is needed in mptcp_ca_reset() from net/mptcp/protocol.c, above the modification you did, to get the name, no? Apart from that, the modifications look good to me. Cheers, Matt -- Sponsored by the NGI0 Core fund. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) 2026-08-27 10:38 ` Matthieu Baerts @ 2026-08-27 23:50 ` Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-27 23:50 UTC (permalink / raw) To: matttbe Cc: AutonomousCodeSecurity, andriin, ast, blbllhy, bpf, davem, edumazet, geliang, horms, kafai, kuba, kuniyu, kys, linux-kernel, martineau, mptcp, ncardwell, netdev, pabeni, stable, tgopinath, xmei5, yhs On Thu, Aug 27, 2026 at 12:38:36PM +0200, Matthieu Baerts wrote: > It looks like you (or your assistant) forgot to declare ca_ops: > > const struct tcp_congestion_ops *ca_ops; > > Also, I *guess* a 'rcu_read_lock' is needed in mptcp_ca_reset() from > net/mptcp/protocol.c, above the modification you did, to get the name, no? Thanks for catching this. I messed up the local version and missed the undeclared ca_ops. I will fix it in v3. I also checked mptcp_ca_reset(). It is only called before the socket is published (mptcp_init_sock) or with the socket lock held (mptcp_disconnect). The ca_ops->name copy sits between tcp_assign_congestion_control() and tcp_cleanup_congestion_control(), so the ops object stays referenced and that read is already safe. The v2 WRITE_ONCE() on the subsequent NULL store is on the MPTCP meta socket, not the TCP sockets these two UAFs race with, so I will drop it in v3. Thanks, Cen ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH net v2 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) 2026-08-26 17:13 [PATCH net v2 0/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt() Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-26 17:13 ` Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-26 17:31 ` Eric Dumazet 1 sibling, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-26 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw) To: edumazet, ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni Cc: kuniyu, horms, matttbe, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin, ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity, xmei5, tgopinath, kys, blbllhy, stable From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com> do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops and dereferences the get_info function pointer without rcu_read_lock(). With BPF struct_ops congestion control, ca_ops can point to dynamically allocated memory that is freed concurrently, resulting in a use-after-free when the kernel dereferences or calls through the stale pointer. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888013701258 by task exploit/149 do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4564) tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0 __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170 Fix this by wrapping the ca_ops load and get_info call within rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), and using READ_ONCE() to load the icsk_ca_ops pointer. Fixes: 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf") Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <blbllhy@gmail.com> --- Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260821182449.79785-3-blbllhy@gmail.com/ (v1) Changes in v2: - Add READ_ONCE() for the icsk_ca_ops load. --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 4918f48ba76d..c45776d3ed90 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -4562,9 +4562,11 @@ int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, if (copy_from_sockptr(&len, optlen, sizeof(int))) return -EFAULT; - ca_ops = icsk->icsk_ca_ops; + rcu_read_lock(); + ca_ops = READ_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops); if (ca_ops && ca_ops->get_info) sz = ca_ops->get_info(sk, ~0U, &attr, &info); + rcu_read_unlock(); len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sz); if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &len, sizeof(int))) -- 2.55.0 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v2 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) 2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) @ 2026-08-26 17:31 ` Eric Dumazet 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Eric Dumazet @ 2026-08-26 17:31 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) Cc: ncardwell, davem, kuba, pabeni, kuniyu, horms, matttbe, martineau, geliang, yhs, kafai, andriin, ast, netdev, mptcp, bpf, linux-kernel, AutonomousCodeSecurity, xmei5, tgopinath, kys, stable On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 7:14 PM Cen Zhang (Microsoft) <blbllhy@gmail.com> wrote: > > From: "Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)" <blbllhy@gmail.com> > > do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops and dereferences the > get_info function pointer without rcu_read_lock(). With BPF struct_ops > congestion control, ca_ops can point to dynamically allocated memory > that is freed concurrently, resulting in a use-after-free when the > kernel dereferences or calls through the stale pointer. > > BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0 > Read of size 8 at addr ffff888013701258 by task exploit/149 > do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4564) > tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0 > __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170 > > Fix this by wrapping the ca_ops load and get_info call within > rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), and using READ_ONCE() to load > the icsk_ca_ops pointer. > Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Thanks. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-08-27 23:50 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2026-08-26 17:13 [PATCH net v2 0/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt() Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 1/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-26 17:30 ` Eric Dumazet 2026-08-27 10:38 ` Matthieu Baerts 2026-08-27 23:50 ` Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-26 17:13 ` [PATCH net v2 2/2] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO) Cen Zhang (Microsoft) 2026-08-26 17:31 ` Eric Dumazet
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