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* [PATCH net] xfrm: prevent some integer overflows in verify_ functions
@ 2024-12-17  8:42 Dan Carpenter
  2024-12-17 12:03 ` Herbert Xu
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Dan Carpenter @ 2024-12-17  8:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Herbert Xu
  Cc: Steffen Klassert, David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski,
	Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman, netdev, linux-kernel, kernel-janitors

The xfrm_alg_len() type functions take the alg->alg_key_len which
is the length in bits and converts it to bytes and add it to
sizeof(*alg).

	return sizeof(*alg) + ((alg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);

The alg->alg_key_len is type unsigned int.  That means that if we pick
an ->alg_key_len which is greater than "UINT_MAX - 7" it leads to an
integer overflow and the key length is treated as zero.  The result
is that xfrm_alg_len() function will return "sizeof(*alg) + 0".

However, so far as I can see this does not cause a problem.  All the
places which use this length consistently do the same conversion.  The
type of thing I was looking for would be code which uses partial keys
or code which uses a different type instead of u32 for ->alg_key_len.
I didn't find anything like that so I can't see a negative impact from
this bug.  Still fixing it is the right thing to do.

Fixes: 31c26852cb2a ("[IPSEC]: Verify key payload in verify_one_algo")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 08c6d6f0179f..686c6a24d92b 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ static int verify_one_alg(struct nlattr **attrs, enum xfrm_attr_type_t type,
 		return 0;
 
 	algp = nla_data(rt);
+	if (algp->alg_key_len > INT_MAX) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid AUTH/CRYPT/COMP key length");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	if (nla_len(rt) < (int)xfrm_alg_len(algp)) {
 		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid AUTH/CRYPT/COMP attribute length");
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -75,6 +79,10 @@ static int verify_auth_trunc(struct nlattr **attrs,
 		return 0;
 
 	algp = nla_data(rt);
+	if (algp->alg_key_len > INT_MAX) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid AUTH_TRUNC key length");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	if (nla_len(rt) < (int)xfrm_alg_auth_len(algp)) {
 		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid AUTH_TRUNC attribute length");
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -93,6 +101,10 @@ static int verify_aead(struct nlattr **attrs, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
 		return 0;
 
 	algp = nla_data(rt);
+	if (algp->alg_key_len > INT_MAX) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid AEAD key length");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	if (nla_len(rt) < (int)aead_len(algp)) {
 		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid AEAD attribute length");
 		return -EINVAL;
-- 
2.45.2


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2024-12-18 11:59 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2024-12-17  8:42 [PATCH net] xfrm: prevent some integer overflows in verify_ functions Dan Carpenter
2024-12-17 12:03 ` Herbert Xu
2024-12-17 12:32   ` Dan Carpenter
2024-12-18  9:42     ` [PATCH net] xfrm: Rewrite key length conversion to avoid overflows Herbert Xu
2024-12-18 10:54       ` Dan Carpenter
2024-12-18 11:58         ` Herbert Xu

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