From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, qemu-arm@nongnu.org, jugraham@redhat.com,
shan.gavin@gmail.com, qemu-block@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFCv1] virtio: Inherit max bounce buffer size from bus parent if possible
Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 16:54:36 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260611165238-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260611183708.GA222320@fedora>
On Thu, Jun 11, 2026 at 02:37:08PM -0400, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 11, 2026 at 11:09:35AM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 11, 2026 at 04:04:20PM +0100, Peter Maydell wrote:
> > > On Thu, 11 Jun 2026 at 15:46, Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2026 at 10:20:22AM -0400, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
> > > > > Gavin posted the lspci output:
> > > > >
> > > > > Region 0: Memory at 661ffd000000 (64-bit, prefetchable) [size=16M]
> > > > > Region 2: Memory at 662000000000 (64-bit, prefetchable) [size=128G]
> > > > > Region 4: Memory at 661ffe000000 (64-bit, prefetchable) [size=32M]
> > > > >
> > > > > These are prefetchable memory BARs, so I would expect them to be
> > > > > mmappable. Why does QEMU have no way of knowing upfront whether they can
> > > > > be mmapped?
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > They can be mmapped. The issue is just that after mmap flatview uses
> > > > memcpy/memmove on them, and that might not match what guest driver is
> > > > expecting specifically for 1/2/4/8 byte accesses.
> > >
> > > Huh? The guest driver has nothing to do with it, surely.
> >
> > My answer is I don't know.
> >
> > But the commit that introduced the regression says:
> >
> > The assumption here is that accesses initiated by the VM are
> > driven by a device specific driver, which knows the device
> > capabilities.
> >
> > > The
> > > problem is that for some PCI devices (like the network card
> > > mentioned in 4a2e242bbb30's commit message) the BAR is *not*
> > > safe for arbitrary access (because the actual real host hardware
> > > inside it is not RAM).
> >
> > But we don't do arbitrary access. Why would we?
> >
> > > That commit disabled direct access
> > > for all vfio MRs, which is safe but overcautious. Would
> > > "direct access is OK if this is a prefetchable memory BAR" be OK?
> > > Or do some prefetchable memory BARs still have restrictions
> > > beyond those of real RAM?
>
> I wonder the same thing.
pci spec mostly made prefetcheable the default, and made
it a very weak signal.
but really, direct access is just always ok. bounce buffers
just do not have the bug of memory core besides that
they buy us nothing.
> > >
> > > > Removing mmap is one solution, this is what vfio does now.
> > > > Fixing flatview is another.
> > >
> > > No, you can't fix this in flatview. If a BAR is not safe for
> > > direct access then it is not safe for direct access.
> > >
> > > -- PMM
> >
> > There's no such thing as "not safe for direct access" in PCI.
> > All operations are memory operations.
> > What can be unsafe is accesses of specific width and length.
> >
> > So we should not use variable length memcpy/memmove which
> > do that. Fixes length memcpy/memmove exactly mimic what
> > guest does, so they are safe.
>
> The bounce buffer approach doesn't seem like a solution to me: if the
> device has alignment and size restrictions on accesses, then the bounce
> buffer won't get them right because it doesn't know where the registers
> live within the BAR.
>
> Also, the guest initiated I/O to a VIRTIO device pointing to a buffer in
> another PCI device's BAR. In this case any failure to handle BAR
> accesses would be the guest's problem. It cannot assume that the VIRTIO
> device follows a specific DMA transfer pattern with respect to
> alignment/size.
>
> Stefan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-11 20:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-08 0:18 [PATCH RFCv1] virtio: Inherit max bounce buffer size from bus parent if possible Gavin Shan
2026-06-08 8:55 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-06-08 11:11 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-08 11:38 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-06-09 2:08 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-09 16:25 ` Peter Xu
2026-06-10 0:32 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10 9:54 ` Pavel Hrdina
2026-06-10 10:55 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10 12:12 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 12:19 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10 12:27 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 13:00 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10 13:54 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10 14:06 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 15:36 ` Peter Xu
2026-06-10 16:11 ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-10 16:19 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 19:10 ` Peter Xu
2026-06-10 21:03 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 21:27 ` Peter Xu
2026-06-10 21:44 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 16:18 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 4:33 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-11 5:31 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 6:28 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-11 6:34 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 12:33 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-11 12:48 ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 14:10 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 14:55 ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 15:05 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 15:25 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 15:29 ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 15:57 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 16:16 ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 16:42 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 16:53 ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 17:02 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 18:20 ` Peter Xu
2026-06-11 20:52 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 21:20 ` Peter Xu
2026-06-11 21:59 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-12 19:44 ` Alex Williamson
2026-06-12 21:24 ` Peter Xu
2026-06-14 16:10 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 21:15 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 16:13 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-12 4:25 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-12 8:43 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-12 10:25 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-11 6:51 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 12:23 ` Pavel Hrdina
2026-06-10 14:04 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10 14:08 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 9:49 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 18:30 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-06-10 21:00 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 14:20 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-06-11 14:45 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 15:04 ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 15:09 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 18:37 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-06-11 20:54 ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2026-06-15 15:54 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-06-15 19:59 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 1:19 ` Gavin Shan
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