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From: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: "Peter Maydell" <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
	"Gavin Shan" <gshan@redhat.com>,
	"Pavel Hrdina" <phrdina@redhat.com>,
	"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, qemu-arm@nongnu.org, jugraham@redhat.com,
	shan.gavin@gmail.com, "Alex Williamson" <alex@shazbot.org>,
	"David Hildenbrand" <david@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFCv1] virtio: Inherit max bounce buffer size from bus parent if possible
Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 17:20:31 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aismn4D1wXI6tipv@x1.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260611164624-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>

On Thu, Jun 11, 2026 at 04:52:20PM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 11, 2026 at 02:20:54PM -0400, Peter Xu wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 11, 2026 at 01:02:34PM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2026 at 05:53:54PM +0100, Peter Maydell wrote:
> > > > On Thu, 11 Jun 2026 at 17:42, Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2026 at 05:16:09PM +0100, Peter Maydell wrote:
> > > > > > On Thu, 11 Jun 2026 at 16:57, Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > Then I'd like to see an example where we have an actual good reason
> > > > > > > to do execute arbitrary width accesses on device RAM when the
> > > > > > > driver does not execute them, please.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > That's the case we started with, with this GPU where the
> > > > > > virtio data structures are in this PCI BAR. We want the
> > > > > > virtio backend to have the freedom to say "I'm just going
> > > > > > to assume the ring buffer etc is in RAM, and I don't need to
> > > > > > care about carefully ensuring that I only do word accesses".
> > > > >
> > > > > virtio backend does not need to assume anything. any spec
> > > > > compliant guest guarantees it. any address given to
> > > > > a virtio device is ram.
> > > > 
> > > > OK, but how do we tell if the mmap() PCI BAR we have is RAM
> > > > or not ? Some of them are, some of them aren't...
> > > > 
> > > > -- PMM
> > > 
> > > We don't care? If guest asked a virtio device to access
> > > memory then that memory better support accesses guest
> > > requested, and on virtio that means any width.
> > 
> > Yes that's also my understanding that QEMU shouldn't care, if on bare metal
> > if it is a grey area with undefined behavior, then QEMU should also be fine
> > to make it undefined.
> > 
> > Only one (IMHO, very slight..) concern is, if such "undefined behavior"
> > operation may crash QEMU rather than causing a sigbus like what normally
> > would happen on a bare metal.
> 
> bus errors are uncommon on bare metal. they aren't usually
> handled all that well.

Ah, not something I was expecting to happen regularly.

In this case, the whole concern is about a possible malicious guest that
might have installed a VFIO assigned device MMIO region (which may be
register based; RAM-based is non-issue) to be a DMA target of anything.

> 
> >  I'll put that discussion at last since I
> > don't know if it's that important.
> > 
> > So taking that e1000 bug into account,
> 
> Won't the patch I sent resolve e1000 too?

If you mean:

https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260611093049-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org

Roughly, yes. But it is only to show the idea, not really a real patch?

I think we need to cover all the rest details (I mentioned all these in my
previous reply too below):

- we should better leave memcpy()/memmove() as before for non-ram-device,
  only do that for ram-devices

- per PeterM's comment, __builtin_memmove() may still have unwanted side
  effects (I agree, it looks broken before and maybe we were lucky?)  need
  to switch to atomics?

- two spots missing per my previous email here:

  https://lore.kernel.org/all/aimEl9QQ_LTRPLtd@x1.local/

  IIUC we should also fix these two, or is it intended to be left?

  address_space_read()
  address_space_write_rom()

> 
> > looks like we have more of such user
> > that wants explicit control over the memory operations, likely with
> > attibutes:
> > 
> > - Aligned only
> > 
> > - No vectored inst
> > 
> > - No possible duplication (perhaps it means, only use atomic access??? per
> >   PeterM's explanation in another email)
> > 
> > I wonder if we should do this by default to all IOs, I think it might have
> > an unwanted impact on general perf.  One idea is we can introduce a new bit
> > in MemTxAttrs: say, mmio_strict, which will follow above stricter rule of
> > doing IO.
> > 
> > Then for ram_device, when doing memory access we should also use the same
> > set, hence something like:
> > 
> >   if (memory_access_is_direct(mr, ...)) {
> >     if (MemTxAttrs.mmio_strict || memory_region_is_ram_device(mr)) {
> >         memmove_strict_mmio(); // or memmove_no_vector(), or ...
> >     }
> >   }
> > 
> > I also want to bring us to the same page on differenciating two things:
> > 
> > - about direct access definition: so far, I want to define this almost as
> >   "it is directly accessible from host virtual address space".  It means
> >   ram_device definitely falls into this category, so it's a sub-category
> >   only but enforces strict mmio as above
> > 
> > - bounce buffer: I want to make sure we're on the same page this is
> >   something totally solving different problem of what we're looking at for
> >   ram_device.  Essentially this is only needed if mem is not "direct
> >   access".  Otherwise we shouldn't need it (including ram_device).
> 
> 
> I think ram_device_direct_access is a hack that should go away.
> It's a work around for a memory core bug that we should just fix.

I didn't find ram_device_direct_access, if you meant ram_device_mem_ops, I
agree it'll be nice if we can avoid it.

> 
> 
> 
> > I'm not sure if above sounds reasonable.  The hope is with that we should
> > fix both this GPU and e1000 issues (e1000, and maybe other places, needs to
> > start passing MemTxAttrs.mmio_strict, though, if we want to keep the
> > default to be still fast-path to use memcpy()/memmove()?).
> > 
> > Thanks,
> > 
> > =========================
> > 
> > Two cases here on the concern:
> > 
> > (1) if fully emulated device, non-issue afaiu because whatever DMA does
> > (with vectored ops) will only apply to QEMU process (like a bounce
> > buffer..) so it won't crash,
> > 
> > (2) if it's a VFIO device (not the GPU case, but when like realtek and some
> > guest driver registers it as a DMA target), logically the guest should
> > receive a bus error, but for QEMU's case it may crash QEMU with SIGBUS:
> 
> what and why would crash qemu?

If what Alex described issue happened in commit 4a2e242bbb ("memory: Don't
use memcpy for ram_device regions"), IIUC it will crash qemu, but maybe I
was wrong.  Alex knows the best.

So in general, we don't want malicious guest to be able to DoS the host
process (hence, to me "niche security use case"..).

Thanks,

> 
> > sigbus_handler() doesn't process anything except memory failures so far, it
> > seems.  The right thing might be that we forward this sigbus to guest, but
> > I didn't check further.
> > 
> > But I don't know if it would really happen, better verify it, and even if
> > it will happen I still think it's a very niche security use case to cover
> > so far.  Doesn't seem to be a blocker to fix a real perf problem first with
> > RAM-like GPU devices.
> > 
> > -- 
> > Peter Xu
> 

-- 
Peter Xu



  reply	other threads:[~2026-06-11 21:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-08  0:18 [PATCH RFCv1] virtio: Inherit max bounce buffer size from bus parent if possible Gavin Shan
2026-06-08  8:55 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-06-08 11:11   ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-08 11:38     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-06-09  2:08       ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-09 16:25         ` Peter Xu
2026-06-10  0:32           ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10  9:54     ` Pavel Hrdina
2026-06-10 10:55       ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10 12:12         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 12:19           ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10 12:27             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 13:00               ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10 13:54                 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10 14:06                   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 15:36                     ` Peter Xu
2026-06-10 16:11                       ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-10 16:19                         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 19:10                           ` Peter Xu
2026-06-10 21:03                             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 21:27                               ` Peter Xu
2026-06-10 21:44                                 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 16:18                       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11  4:33                         ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-11  5:31                           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11  6:28                             ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-11  6:34                               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 12:33                                 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-11 12:48                                   ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 14:10                                     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 14:55                                       ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 15:05                                         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 15:25                                           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 15:29                                           ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 15:57                                             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 16:16                                               ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 16:42                                                 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 16:53                                                   ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 17:02                                                     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 18:20                                                       ` Peter Xu
2026-06-11 20:52                                                         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 21:20                                                           ` Peter Xu [this message]
2026-06-11 21:59                                                             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-12 19:44                                                             ` Alex Williamson
2026-06-12 21:24                                                               ` Peter Xu
2026-06-14 16:10                                                               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 21:15                                                       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 16:13                                           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-12  4:25                                     ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-12  8:43                                       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-12 10:25                                         ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-11  6:51                               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 12:23         ` Pavel Hrdina
2026-06-10 14:04           ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10 14:08             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10  9:49 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 18:30   ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-06-10 21:00     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 14:20       ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-06-11 14:45         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 15:04           ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 15:09             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 18:37               ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-06-11 20:54                 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-15 15:54                   ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-06-15 19:59                     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11  1:19     ` Gavin Shan

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