From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: "Peter Maydell" <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
"Gavin Shan" <gshan@redhat.com>,
"Pavel Hrdina" <phrdina@redhat.com>,
"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, qemu-arm@nongnu.org, jugraham@redhat.com,
shan.gavin@gmail.com, "Alex Williamson" <alex@shazbot.org>,
"David Hildenbrand" <david@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFCv1] virtio: Inherit max bounce buffer size from bus parent if possible
Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 17:59:57 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260611172830-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aismn4D1wXI6tipv@x1.local>
On Thu, Jun 11, 2026 at 05:20:31PM -0400, Peter Xu wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 11, 2026 at 04:52:20PM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 11, 2026 at 02:20:54PM -0400, Peter Xu wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2026 at 01:02:34PM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2026 at 05:53:54PM +0100, Peter Maydell wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, 11 Jun 2026 at 17:42, Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2026 at 05:16:09PM +0100, Peter Maydell wrote:
> > > > > > > On Thu, 11 Jun 2026 at 16:57, Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > > Then I'd like to see an example where we have an actual good reason
> > > > > > > > to do execute arbitrary width accesses on device RAM when the
> > > > > > > > driver does not execute them, please.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > That's the case we started with, with this GPU where the
> > > > > > > virtio data structures are in this PCI BAR. We want the
> > > > > > > virtio backend to have the freedom to say "I'm just going
> > > > > > > to assume the ring buffer etc is in RAM, and I don't need to
> > > > > > > care about carefully ensuring that I only do word accesses".
> > > > > >
> > > > > > virtio backend does not need to assume anything. any spec
> > > > > > compliant guest guarantees it. any address given to
> > > > > > a virtio device is ram.
> > > > >
> > > > > OK, but how do we tell if the mmap() PCI BAR we have is RAM
> > > > > or not ? Some of them are, some of them aren't...
> > > > >
> > > > > -- PMM
> > > >
> > > > We don't care? If guest asked a virtio device to access
> > > > memory then that memory better support accesses guest
> > > > requested, and on virtio that means any width.
> > >
> > > Yes that's also my understanding that QEMU shouldn't care, if on bare metal
> > > if it is a grey area with undefined behavior, then QEMU should also be fine
> > > to make it undefined.
> > >
> > > Only one (IMHO, very slight..) concern is, if such "undefined behavior"
> > > operation may crash QEMU rather than causing a sigbus like what normally
> > > would happen on a bare metal.
> >
> > bus errors are uncommon on bare metal. they aren't usually
> > handled all that well.
>
> Ah, not something I was expecting to happen regularly.
>
> In this case, the whole concern is about a possible malicious guest that
> might have installed a VFIO assigned device MMIO region (which may be
> register based; RAM-based is non-issue) to be a DMA target of anything.
>
> >
> > > I'll put that discussion at last since I
> > > don't know if it's that important.
> > >
> > > So taking that e1000 bug into account,
> >
> > Won't the patch I sent resolve e1000 too?
>
> If you mean:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260611093049-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org
>
> Roughly, yes. But it is only to show the idea, not really a real patch?
>
> I think we need to cover all the rest details (I mentioned all these in my
> previous reply too below):
>
> - we should better leave memcpy()/memmove() as before for non-ram-device,
> only do that for ram-devices
>
> - per PeterM's comment, __builtin_memmove() may still have unwanted side
> effects (I agree, it looks broken before and maybe we were lucky?) need
> to switch to atomics?
>
> - two spots missing per my previous email here:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/aimEl9QQ_LTRPLtd@x1.local/
>
> IIUC we should also fix these two, or is it intended to be left?
>
> address_space_read()
> address_space_write_rom()
>
> >
> > > looks like we have more of such user
> > > that wants explicit control over the memory operations, likely with
> > > attibutes:
> > >
> > > - Aligned only
> > >
> > > - No vectored inst
> > >
> > > - No possible duplication (perhaps it means, only use atomic access??? per
> > > PeterM's explanation in another email)
> > >
> > > I wonder if we should do this by default to all IOs, I think it might have
> > > an unwanted impact on general perf. One idea is we can introduce a new bit
> > > in MemTxAttrs: say, mmio_strict, which will follow above stricter rule of
> > > doing IO.
> > >
> > > Then for ram_device, when doing memory access we should also use the same
> > > set, hence something like:
> > >
> > > if (memory_access_is_direct(mr, ...)) {
> > > if (MemTxAttrs.mmio_strict || memory_region_is_ram_device(mr)) {
> > > memmove_strict_mmio(); // or memmove_no_vector(), or ...
> > > }
> > > }
> > >
> > > I also want to bring us to the same page on differenciating two things:
> > >
> > > - about direct access definition: so far, I want to define this almost as
> > > "it is directly accessible from host virtual address space". It means
> > > ram_device definitely falls into this category, so it's a sub-category
> > > only but enforces strict mmio as above
> > >
> > > - bounce buffer: I want to make sure we're on the same page this is
> > > something totally solving different problem of what we're looking at for
> > > ram_device. Essentially this is only needed if mem is not "direct
> > > access". Otherwise we shouldn't need it (including ram_device).
> >
> >
> > I think ram_device_direct_access is a hack that should go away.
> > It's a work around for a memory core bug that we should just fix.
>
> I didn't find ram_device_direct_access, if you meant ram_device_mem_ops, I
> agree it'll be nice if we can avoid it.
Yes. Simply revert 4a2e242bbb that adds that.
> >
> >
> >
> > > I'm not sure if above sounds reasonable. The hope is with that we should
> > > fix both this GPU and e1000 issues (e1000, and maybe other places, needs to
> > > start passing MemTxAttrs.mmio_strict, though, if we want to keep the
> > > default to be still fast-path to use memcpy()/memmove()?).
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > >
> > > =========================
> > >
> > > Two cases here on the concern:
> > >
> > > (1) if fully emulated device, non-issue afaiu because whatever DMA does
> > > (with vectored ops) will only apply to QEMU process (like a bounce
> > > buffer..) so it won't crash,
> > >
> > > (2) if it's a VFIO device (not the GPU case, but when like realtek and some
> > > guest driver registers it as a DMA target), logically the guest should
> > > receive a bus error, but for QEMU's case it may crash QEMU with SIGBUS:
> >
> > what and why would crash qemu?
>
> If what Alex described issue happened in commit 4a2e242bbb ("memory: Don't
> use memcpy for ram_device regions"), IIUC it will crash qemu, but maybe I
> was wrong. Alex knows the best.
>
> So in general, we don't want malicious guest to be able to DoS the host
> process (hence, to me "niche security use case"..).
>
> Thanks,
>
> >
> > > sigbus_handler() doesn't process anything except memory failures so far, it
> > > seems. The right thing might be that we forward this sigbus to guest, but
> > > I didn't check further.
> > >
> > > But I don't know if it would really happen, better verify it, and even if
> > > it will happen I still think it's a very niche security use case to cover
> > > so far. Doesn't seem to be a blocker to fix a real perf problem first with
> > > RAM-like GPU devices.
> > >
> > > --
> > > Peter Xu
> >
>
> --
> Peter Xu
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-11 22:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-08 0:18 [PATCH RFCv1] virtio: Inherit max bounce buffer size from bus parent if possible Gavin Shan
2026-06-08 8:55 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-06-08 11:11 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-08 11:38 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-06-09 2:08 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-09 16:25 ` Peter Xu
2026-06-10 0:32 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10 9:54 ` Pavel Hrdina
2026-06-10 10:55 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10 12:12 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 12:19 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10 12:27 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 13:00 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10 13:54 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10 14:06 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 15:36 ` Peter Xu
2026-06-10 16:11 ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-10 16:19 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 19:10 ` Peter Xu
2026-06-10 21:03 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 21:27 ` Peter Xu
2026-06-10 21:44 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 16:18 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 4:33 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-11 5:31 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 6:28 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-11 6:34 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 12:33 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-11 12:48 ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 14:10 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 14:55 ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 15:05 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 15:25 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 15:29 ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 15:57 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 16:16 ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 16:42 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 16:53 ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 17:02 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 18:20 ` Peter Xu
2026-06-11 20:52 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 21:20 ` Peter Xu
2026-06-11 21:59 ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2026-06-12 19:44 ` Alex Williamson
2026-06-12 21:24 ` Peter Xu
2026-06-14 16:10 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 21:15 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 16:13 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-12 4:25 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-12 8:43 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-12 10:25 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-11 6:51 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 12:23 ` Pavel Hrdina
2026-06-10 14:04 ` Gavin Shan
2026-06-10 14:08 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 9:49 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-10 18:30 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-06-10 21:00 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 14:20 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-06-11 14:45 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 15:04 ` Peter Maydell
2026-06-11 15:09 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 18:37 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-06-11 20:54 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-15 15:54 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-06-15 19:59 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2026-06-11 1:19 ` Gavin Shan
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