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From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: ast@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Subject: [PATCH stable 4.20 00/10] BPF stable fixes
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 21:23:20 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190128202330.32664-1-daniel@iogearbox.net> (raw)

The following patches are targeted at 4.20 stable tree.

Thanks!

Daniel Borkmann (10):
  bpf: move {prev_,}insn_idx into verifier env
  bpf: move tmp variable into ax register in interpreter
  bpf: enable access to ax register also from verifier rewrite
  bpf: restrict map value pointer arithmetic for unprivileged
  bpf: restrict stack pointer arithmetic for unprivileged
  bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds for unprivileged
  bpf: fix check_map_access smin_value test when pointer contains offset
  bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
  bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from
    different paths
  bpf: fix inner map masking to prevent oob under speculation

 include/linux/bpf_verifier.h |  13 ++
 include/linux/filter.h       |  10 +-
 kernel/bpf/core.c            |  54 +++--
 kernel/bpf/map_in_map.c      |  17 +-
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c        | 369 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 5 files changed, 377 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)

-- 
2.17.1


             reply	other threads:[~2019-01-28 20:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-28 20:23 Daniel Borkmann [this message]
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 01/10] bpf: move {prev_,}insn_idx into verifier env Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 02/10] bpf: move tmp variable into ax register in interpreter Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 03/10] bpf: enable access to ax register also from verifier rewrite Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 04/10] bpf: restrict map value pointer arithmetic for unprivileged Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 05/10] bpf: restrict stack " Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 06/10] bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds " Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 07/10] bpf: fix check_map_access smin_value test when pointer contains offset Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 08/10] bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 09/10] bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 10/10] bpf: fix inner map masking to prevent oob under speculation Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 21:19 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 00/10] BPF stable fixes Sasha Levin

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