From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: ast@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Subject: [PATCH stable 4.20 06/10] bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds for unprivileged
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 21:23:26 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190128202330.32664-7-daniel@iogearbox.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190128202330.32664-1-daniel@iogearbox.net>
[ commit 9d7eceede769f90b66cfa06ad5b357140d5141ed upstream ]
For unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds, meaning their smin_value is
negative and their smax_value is positive, we need to reject arithmetic
with pointer to map value. For unprivileged the goal is to mask every
map pointer arithmetic and this cannot reliably be done when it is
unknown at verification time whether the scalar value is negative or
positive. Given this is a corner case, the likelihood of breaking should
be very small.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 288f045cb6a6..072e0416ac56 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2997,8 +2997,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
+ u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg;
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
- u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
dst_reg = ®s[dst];
@@ -3031,6 +3031,13 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n",
dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]);
return -EACCES;
+ case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
+ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && !known && (smin_val < 0) != (smax_val < 0)) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root\n",
+ off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ /* fall-through */
default:
break;
}
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-28 20:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-28 20:23 [PATCH stable 4.20 00/10] BPF stable fixes Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 01/10] bpf: move {prev_,}insn_idx into verifier env Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 02/10] bpf: move tmp variable into ax register in interpreter Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 03/10] bpf: enable access to ax register also from verifier rewrite Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 04/10] bpf: restrict map value pointer arithmetic for unprivileged Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 05/10] bpf: restrict stack " Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` Daniel Borkmann [this message]
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 07/10] bpf: fix check_map_access smin_value test when pointer contains offset Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 08/10] bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 09/10] bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 10/10] bpf: fix inner map masking to prevent oob under speculation Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 21:19 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 00/10] BPF stable fixes Sasha Levin
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