From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, ast@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH stable 4.20 00/10] BPF stable fixes
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:19:03 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190128211903.GN3973@sasha-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190128202330.32664-1-daniel@iogearbox.net>
On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 09:23:20PM +0100, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
>The following patches are targeted at 4.20 stable tree.
>
>Thanks!
>
>Daniel Borkmann (10):
> bpf: move {prev_,}insn_idx into verifier env
> bpf: move tmp variable into ax register in interpreter
> bpf: enable access to ax register also from verifier rewrite
> bpf: restrict map value pointer arithmetic for unprivileged
> bpf: restrict stack pointer arithmetic for unprivileged
> bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds for unprivileged
> bpf: fix check_map_access smin_value test when pointer contains offset
> bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
> bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from
> different paths
> bpf: fix inner map masking to prevent oob under speculation
>
> include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 13 ++
> include/linux/filter.h | 10 +-
> kernel/bpf/core.c | 54 +++--
> kernel/bpf/map_in_map.c | 17 +-
> kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 369 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> 5 files changed, 377 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
I've queued these and the 4.19 ones, thank you.
--
Thanks,
Sasha
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-28 21:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-28 20:23 [PATCH stable 4.20 00/10] BPF stable fixes Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 01/10] bpf: move {prev_,}insn_idx into verifier env Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 02/10] bpf: move tmp variable into ax register in interpreter Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 03/10] bpf: enable access to ax register also from verifier rewrite Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 04/10] bpf: restrict map value pointer arithmetic for unprivileged Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 05/10] bpf: restrict stack " Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 06/10] bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds " Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 07/10] bpf: fix check_map_access smin_value test when pointer contains offset Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 08/10] bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 09/10] bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 20:23 ` [PATCH stable 4.20 10/10] bpf: fix inner map masking to prevent oob under speculation Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-28 21:19 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
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