* FAILED: patch "[PATCH] Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree
@ 2026-07-16 12:44 gregkh
2026-07-22 10:51 ` [PATCH 5.10.y] Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size Sasha Levin
2026-07-22 11:01 ` Sasha Levin
0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: gregkh @ 2026-07-16 12:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: hexlabsecurity, dmitry.torokhov; +Cc: stable
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 66725039f7090afe14c31bd259e2059a68f04023
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2026071638-seltzer-gambling-3268@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' 'HEAD^..'
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 66725039f7090afe14c31bd259e2059a68f04023 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 14:19:43 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size
mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a
fixed-size on-stack buffer
struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH];
which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes,
i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from
the device:
packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE);
if (packet_size <= 0)
goto out;
...
error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size,
(u8 *)touch);
packet_size is a single device register byte (0x0F) and the only check
is the lower bound packet_size <= 0; it is never bounded against the
size of touch[]. A malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller
(or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can report a packet_size of
up to 255, so __mms114_read_reg() writes up to 175 bytes past the end of
touch[] on the IRQ-thread stack: a stack out-of-bounds write that can
overwrite the stack canary, saved registers and the return address.
A well-formed device never reports more than the buffer holds, so reject
an oversized packet and drop the report, consistent with the handler's
other error paths, rather than reading past the buffer.
Fixes: 07b8481d4aff ("Input: add MELFAS mms114 touchscreen driver")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-dc4b8dc4-v1-1-d7cb0a828d92@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
diff --git a/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c b/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c
index 9597214d9d3c..4d748a13408d 100644
--- a/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c
+++ b/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c
@@ -226,6 +226,12 @@ static irqreturn_t mms114_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
if (packet_size <= 0)
goto out;
+ if (packet_size > sizeof(touch)) {
+ dev_err(&client->dev, "Invalid packet size %d (max %zu)\n",
+ packet_size, sizeof(touch));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/* MMS136 has slightly different event size */
if (data->type == TYPE_MMS134S || data->type == TYPE_MMS136)
touch_size = packet_size / MMS136_EVENT_SIZE;
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 5.10.y] Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size
2026-07-16 12:44 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree gregkh
@ 2026-07-22 10:51 ` Sasha Levin
2026-07-22 11:01 ` Sasha Levin
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-07-22 10:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Bryam Vargas, Dmitry Torokhov
From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a
fixed-size on-stack buffer
struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH];
which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes,
i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from
the device:
packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE);
if (packet_size <= 0)
goto out;
...
error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size,
(u8 *)touch);
packet_size is a single device register byte (0x0F) and the only check
is the lower bound packet_size <= 0; it is never bounded against the
size of touch[]. A malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller
(or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can report a packet_size of
up to 255, so __mms114_read_reg() writes up to 175 bytes past the end of
touch[] on the IRQ-thread stack: a stack out-of-bounds write that can
overwrite the stack canary, saved registers and the return address.
A well-formed device never reports more than the buffer holds, so reject
an oversized packet and drop the report, consistent with the handler's
other error paths, rather than reading past the buffer.
Fixes: 07b8481d4aff ("Input: add MELFAS mms114 touchscreen driver")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-dc4b8dc4-v1-1-d7cb0a828d92@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 66725039f7090afe14c31bd259e2059a68f04023)
[ sashal: adjusted for 5.10, which lacks 53fefdd1d3a3 ("Input: mms114 -
support MMS136") and bf93349b11ab ("Input: mms114 - add support for
touch keys"): kept the flat touch_size = packet_size / MMS114_PACKET_NUM
computation instead of the MMS136/MMS134S event-size selection, and used
&data->client->dev in the new dev_err() since mms114_interrupt() has no
client local here. ]
---
drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c b/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c
index 1f96657310b751..f89676655dd3f3 100644
--- a/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c
+++ b/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c
@@ -209,6 +209,12 @@ static irqreturn_t mms114_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
if (packet_size <= 0)
goto out;
+ if (packet_size > sizeof(touch)) {
+ dev_err(&data->client->dev, "Invalid packet size %d (max %zu)\n",
+ packet_size, sizeof(touch));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
touch_size = packet_size / MMS114_PACKET_NUM;
error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size,
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 5.10.y] Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size
2026-07-16 12:44 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree gregkh
2026-07-22 10:51 ` [PATCH 5.10.y] Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size Sasha Levin
@ 2026-07-22 11:01 ` Sasha Levin
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-07-22 11:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Bryam Vargas, Dmitry Torokhov, Sasha Levin
From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
[ Upstream commit 66725039f7090afe14c31bd259e2059a68f04023 ]
mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a
fixed-size on-stack buffer
struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH];
which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes,
i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from
the device:
packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE);
if (packet_size <= 0)
goto out;
...
error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size,
(u8 *)touch);
packet_size is a single device register byte (0x0F) and the only check
is the lower bound packet_size <= 0; it is never bounded against the
size of touch[]. A malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller
(or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can report a packet_size of
up to 255, so __mms114_read_reg() writes up to 175 bytes past the end of
touch[] on the IRQ-thread stack: a stack out-of-bounds write that can
overwrite the stack canary, saved registers and the return address.
A well-formed device never reports more than the buffer holds, so reject
an oversized packet and drop the report, consistent with the handler's
other error paths, rather than reading past the buffer.
Fixes: 07b8481d4aff ("Input: add MELFAS mms114 touchscreen driver")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-dc4b8dc4-v1-1-d7cb0a828d92@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c b/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c
index 1f96657310b751..f89676655dd3f3 100644
--- a/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c
+++ b/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c
@@ -209,6 +209,12 @@ static irqreturn_t mms114_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
if (packet_size <= 0)
goto out;
+ if (packet_size > sizeof(touch)) {
+ dev_err(&data->client->dev, "Invalid packet size %d (max %zu)\n",
+ packet_size, sizeof(touch));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
touch_size = packet_size / MMS114_PACKET_NUM;
error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size,
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2026-07-16 12:44 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree gregkh
2026-07-22 10:51 ` [PATCH 5.10.y] Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size Sasha Levin
2026-07-22 11:01 ` Sasha Levin
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