* [PATCH 5.10.y 2/4] SUNRPC: Rename automatic variables in unwrap_priv_data()
2026-09-08 18:41 ` [PATCH 5.10.y 1/4] SUNRPC: Fix crasher in unwrap_integ_data() Sasha Levin
@ 2026-09-08 18:42 ` Sasha Levin
2026-09-08 18:42 ` [PATCH 5.10.y 3/4] SUNRPC: Convert unwrap_priv_data() to use xdr_stream Sasha Levin
2026-09-08 18:42 ` [PATCH 5.10.y 4/4] SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length Sasha Levin
2 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-09-08 18:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Chuck Lever, Jeff Layton, Sasha Levin
From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit f4a59e822f8116baf51a9fc86590e4391bd542d2 ]
Clean up: To help orient readers, name the stack variables to match
the XDR field names.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Stable-dep-of: a919c5c88769 ("SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
index 5b3a75f1b3816..b9674a77b048a 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
@@ -981,16 +981,28 @@ fix_priv_head(struct xdr_buf *buf, int pad)
}
}
+/*
+ * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.2.3
+ *
+ * struct rpc_gss_priv_data {
+ * opaque databody_priv<>
+ * };
+ *
+ * struct rpc_gss_data_t {
+ * unsigned int seq_num;
+ * proc_req_arg_t arg;
+ * };
+ */
static int
-unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
+svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq,
+ struct gss_ctx *ctx)
{
- u32 priv_len, maj_stat;
+ u32 len, seq_num, maj_stat;
int pad, remaining_len, offset;
- u32 rseqno;
clear_bit(RQ_SPLICE_OK, &rqstp->rq_flags);
- priv_len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
+ len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
if (rqstp->rq_deferred) {
/* Already decrypted last time through! The sequence number
* check at out_seq is unnecessary but harmless: */
@@ -1000,14 +1012,14 @@ unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gs
* request to the end, where head[0].iov_len is just the bytes
* not yet read from the head, so these two values are different: */
remaining_len = total_buf_len(buf);
- if (priv_len > remaining_len)
+ if (len > remaining_len)
goto unwrap_failed;
- pad = remaining_len - priv_len;
+ pad = remaining_len - len;
buf->len -= pad;
fix_priv_head(buf, pad);
- maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, 0, priv_len, buf);
- pad = priv_len - buf->len;
+ maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, 0, len, buf);
+ pad = len - buf->len;
/* The upper layers assume the buffer is aligned on 4-byte boundaries.
* In the krb5p case, at least, the data ends up offset, so we need to
* move it around. */
@@ -1023,8 +1035,8 @@ unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gs
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto bad_unwrap;
out_seq:
- rseqno = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
- if (rseqno != seq)
+ seq_num = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
+ if (seq_num != seq)
goto bad_seqno;
return 0;
@@ -1032,7 +1044,7 @@ unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gs
trace_rpcgss_svc_unwrap_failed(rqstp);
return -EINVAL;
bad_seqno:
- trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_bad(rqstp, seq, rseqno);
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_bad(rqstp, seq, seq_num);
return -EINVAL;
bad_unwrap:
trace_rpcgss_svc_unwrap(rqstp, maj_stat);
@@ -1651,8 +1663,8 @@ svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
/* placeholders for length and seq. number: */
svc_putnl(resv, 0);
svc_putnl(resv, 0);
- if (unwrap_priv_data(rqstp, &rqstp->rq_arg,
- gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx))
+ if (svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv(rqstp, &rqstp->rq_arg,
+ gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx))
goto garbage_args;
rqstp->rq_auth_slack = RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE * 2;
break;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.10.y 3/4] SUNRPC: Convert unwrap_priv_data() to use xdr_stream
2026-09-08 18:41 ` [PATCH 5.10.y 1/4] SUNRPC: Fix crasher in unwrap_integ_data() Sasha Levin
2026-09-08 18:42 ` [PATCH 5.10.y 2/4] SUNRPC: Rename automatic variables in unwrap_priv_data() Sasha Levin
@ 2026-09-08 18:42 ` Sasha Levin
2026-09-08 18:42 ` [PATCH 5.10.y 4/4] SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length Sasha Levin
2 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-09-08 18:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Chuck Lever, Jeff Layton, Sasha Levin
From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 42140718ea26c47fb06c679451a6aa6703545136 ]
Done as part of hardening the server-side RPC header decoding path.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ sashal: Reduced backport -- upstream 42140718ea26c touches 3 file(s), this
backport carries 1. Not backported here:
include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h
net/sunrpc/xdr.c
This note is generated from the file lists only; see the resolution record
for the reasoning. ]
Stable-dep-of: a919c5c88769 ("SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 64 ++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
index b9674a77b048a..78f67a0725579 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
@@ -970,17 +970,6 @@ total_buf_len(struct xdr_buf *buf)
return buf->head[0].iov_len + buf->page_len + buf->tail[0].iov_len;
}
-static void
-fix_priv_head(struct xdr_buf *buf, int pad)
-{
- if (buf->page_len == 0) {
- /* We need to adjust head and buf->len in tandem in this
- * case to make svc_defer() work--it finds the original
- * buffer start using buf->len - buf->head[0].iov_len. */
- buf->head[0].iov_len -= pad;
- }
-}
-
/*
* RFC 2203, Section 5.3.2.3
*
@@ -993,49 +982,37 @@ fix_priv_head(struct xdr_buf *buf, int pad)
* proc_req_arg_t arg;
* };
*/
-static int
-svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq,
- struct gss_ctx *ctx)
+static noinline_for_stack int
+svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
{
- u32 len, seq_num, maj_stat;
- int pad, remaining_len, offset;
+ struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream;
+ u32 len, maj_stat, seq_num, offset;
+ struct xdr_buf *buf = xdr->buf;
+ unsigned int saved_len;
clear_bit(RQ_SPLICE_OK, &rqstp->rq_flags);
- len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
+ if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &len) < 0)
+ goto unwrap_failed;
if (rqstp->rq_deferred) {
/* Already decrypted last time through! The sequence number
* check at out_seq is unnecessary but harmless: */
goto out_seq;
}
- /* buf->len is the number of bytes from the original start of the
- * request to the end, where head[0].iov_len is just the bytes
- * not yet read from the head, so these two values are different: */
- remaining_len = total_buf_len(buf);
- if (len > remaining_len)
+ if (len > xdr_stream_remaining(xdr))
goto unwrap_failed;
- pad = remaining_len - len;
- buf->len -= pad;
- fix_priv_head(buf, pad);
-
- maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, 0, len, buf);
- pad = len - buf->len;
- /* The upper layers assume the buffer is aligned on 4-byte boundaries.
- * In the krb5p case, at least, the data ends up offset, so we need to
- * move it around. */
- /* XXX: This is very inefficient. It would be better to either do
- * this while we encrypt, or maybe in the receive code, if we can peak
- * ahead and work out the service and mechanism there. */
- offset = xdr_pad_size(buf->head[0].iov_len);
- if (offset) {
- buf->buflen = RPCSVC_MAXPAYLOAD;
- xdr_shift_buf(buf, offset);
- fix_priv_head(buf, pad);
- }
+ offset = xdr_stream_pos(xdr);
+
+ saved_len = buf->len;
+ maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, offset, offset + len, buf);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto bad_unwrap;
+ xdr->nwords -= XDR_QUADLEN(saved_len - buf->len);
+
out_seq:
- seq_num = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
+ /* gss_unwrap() decrypted the sequence number. */
+ if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &seq_num) < 0)
+ goto unwrap_failed;
if (seq_num != seq)
goto bad_seqno;
return 0;
@@ -1663,8 +1640,9 @@ svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
/* placeholders for length and seq. number: */
svc_putnl(resv, 0);
svc_putnl(resv, 0);
- if (svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv(rqstp, &rqstp->rq_arg,
- gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx))
+ svcxdr_init_decode(rqstp);
+ if (svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv(rqstp, gc->gc_seq,
+ rsci->mechctx))
goto garbage_args;
rqstp->rq_auth_slack = RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE * 2;
break;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.10.y 4/4] SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length
2026-09-08 18:41 ` [PATCH 5.10.y 1/4] SUNRPC: Fix crasher in unwrap_integ_data() Sasha Levin
2026-09-08 18:42 ` [PATCH 5.10.y 2/4] SUNRPC: Rename automatic variables in unwrap_priv_data() Sasha Levin
2026-09-08 18:42 ` [PATCH 5.10.y 3/4] SUNRPC: Convert unwrap_priv_data() to use xdr_stream Sasha Levin
@ 2026-09-08 18:42 ` Sasha Levin
2 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-09-08 18:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Chris Mason, Jeff Layton, Chuck Lever, Sasha Levin
From: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com>
[ Upstream commit a919c5c88769cf8fb3ec071e6078d830bf512489 ]
svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv() validates only an upper bound on the
wire-supplied opaque length before handing the buffer to
gss_unwrap():
if (len > xdr_stream_remaining(xdr))
goto unwrap_failed;
offset = xdr_stream_pos(xdr);
...
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, offset, offset + len, buf);
The wire value `len` flows unchanged as the upper bound into the
krb5 unwrap path, so a len in [0, 16] passes this check and is
handed to gss_unwrap(). For a krb5 v2 context that lands in
gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), which reads the 16-byte RFC 4121 token
header fields at ptr+4 and ptr+6 and then calls rotate_left()
before any integrity check. With a sub-header length the header
reads run past the token, and _rotate_left()'s `shift %= buf->len`
path can divide by zero when buf->len has been driven to zero by
the truncated token. A header-only token (len == 16) is equally
invalid: with a non-zero RRC field and the opaque blob ending at
the XDR buffer boundary, rotate_left() builds a zero-length
subbuffer, reaching the same division.
Reject the token at the server entry point before it reaches the
krb5 unwrap core. A valid sealed RFC 4121 token must contain
the 16-byte header plus at least some encrypted payload.
Fix by adding a minimum-length check immediately after the
existing upper-bound check:
if (len <= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)
goto unwrap_failed;
Fixes: 7c9fdcfb1b64 ("[PATCH] knfsd: svcrpc: gss: server-side implementation of rpcsec_gss privacy")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: kres (claude-opus-4-7)
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260524010213.557424-2-cel@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
index 78f67a0725579..68504e62138bb 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
@@ -1001,6 +1001,8 @@ svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
}
if (len > xdr_stream_remaining(xdr))
goto unwrap_failed;
+ if (len <= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)
+ goto unwrap_failed;
offset = xdr_stream_pos(xdr);
saved_len = buf->len;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread