From: Evgeniy Polyakov <johnpol@2ka.mipt.ru>
To: David McCullough <davidm@snapgear.com>
Cc: cryptoapi@lists.logix.cz, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@pobox.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] API for true Random Number Generators to add entropy (2.6.11)
Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2005 08:52:51 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1111729971.20797.1.camel@uganda> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1111665551.23532.90.camel@uganda>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 8304 bytes --]
On Thu, 2005-03-24 at 14:59 +0300, Evgeniy Polyakov wrote:
> For example here is patch to enable acrypto support for hw_random.c
> It is very simple and support only upto 4 bytes request, of course it
> is not interested for anyone, but it is only 2-minutes example:
Full port.
--- ./drivers/char/hw_random.c.orig 2005-03-24 13:36:05.000000000 +0300
+++ ./drivers/char/hw_random.c 2005-03-25 08:46:03.841601032 +0300
@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@
#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/acrypto.h>
+#include <linux/crypto_def.h>
+#include <linux/crypto_stat.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
#ifdef __i386__
#include <asm/msr.h>
@@ -73,6 +77,8 @@
#endif
#define RNG_MISCDEV_MINOR 183 /* official */
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(rng_lock);
static int rng_dev_open (struct inode *inode, struct file *filp);
static ssize_t rng_dev_read (struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t size,
@@ -482,7 +488,6 @@
static ssize_t rng_dev_read (struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t size,
loff_t * offp)
{
- static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(rng_lock);
unsigned int have_data;
u32 data = 0;
ssize_t ret = 0;
@@ -526,7 +531,163 @@
return ret;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_ACRYPTO
+static struct crypto_device *hwr_cdev;
+static struct crypto_capability hwr_caps[] = {
+ {CRYPTO_OP_RNG, 0, 0, 100},
+};
+static int hwr_pid, hwr_need_exit;
+static struct completion hwr_thread_exited;
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(hwr_wait);
+
+
+static void hwr_data_ready(struct crypto_device *dev)
+{
+ wake_up(&hwr_wait);
+}
+
+static int hwr_process(void *data)
+{
+ struct crypto_device *dev = data;
+ struct crypto_session *s, *n;
+ u32 rng_data = 0;
+ unsigned int have_data, size;
+ int i;
+ u8 *ptr;
+
+ daemonize("%s", dev->name);
+ allow_signal(SIGTERM);
+
+ while (!hwr_need_exit) {
+ interruptible_sleep_on_timeout(&hwr_wait, 10);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(s, n, &dev->session_list, dev_queue_entry) {
+ if (!session_completed(s) && !session_is_processed(s)) {
+ start_process_session(s);
+
+ if (s->data.sg_src_num != s->data.sg_dst_num) {
+ dprintk("%s: session %llu [%llu]: different src/dst sg numbers: %d %d.\n",
+ dev->name, s->ci.id, s->ci.dev_id,
+ s->data.sg_src_num, s->data.sg_dst_num);
+ broke_session(s);
+ goto out_complete_session;
+ }
+
+ for (i=0; i<s->data.sg_src_num; ++i) {
+ if (s->data.sg_dst[i].length != s->data.sg_src[i].length) {
+ dprintk("%s: session %llu [%llu]: sg %d different src/dst lengths: %u %u.\n",
+ dev->name, s->ci.id, s->ci.dev_id, i,
+ s->data.sg_src[i].length, s->data.sg_dst[i].length);
+ if (s->data.sg_dst[i].length)
+ s->data.sg_src[i].length = s->data.sg_dst[i].length;
+ else
+ s->data.sg_dst[i].length = s->data.sg_src[i].length;
+
+ }
+
+ size = s->data.sg_dst[i].length;
+
+ while (size) {
+ spin_lock(&rng_lock);
+ have_data = 0;
+ if (rng_ops->data_present()) {
+ rng_data = rng_ops->data_read();
+ have_data = rng_ops->n_bytes;
+ }
+ spin_unlock (&rng_lock);
+
+ ptr = kmap_atomic(s->data.sg_dst[i].page, KM_USER0) + s->data.sg_dst[i].offset +
+ s->data.sg_dst[i].length - size;
+
+ while (size && have_data) {
+ *ptr = rng_data & 0xff;
+ size--;
+ have_data--;
+ rng_data >>= 8;
+ }
+ kunmap_atomic(ptr, KM_USER0);
+
+ if (size)
+ msleep_interruptible(1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ crypto_stat_complete_inc(s);
+
+out_complete_session:
+ crypto_session_dequeue_route(s);
+ complete_session(s);
+ stop_process_session(s);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ complete_and_exit(&hwr_thread_exited, 0);
+}
+
+static int hwr_acrypto_init(struct rng_operations *ops)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ hwr_cdev = kmalloc(sizeof(*hwr_cdev), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!hwr_cdev) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to allocate new crypto_device structure.\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ memset(hwr_cdev, 0, sizeof(*hwr_cdev));
+
+ hwr_cdev->cap = hwr_caps;
+ hwr_cdev->cap_number = sizeof(hwr_caps)/sizeof(hwr_caps[0]);
+ hwr_cdev->priv = ops;
+ hwr_cdev->data_ready = &hwr_data_ready;
+ snprintf(hwr_cdev->name, sizeof(hwr_cdev->name), "%s", "hwr");
+
+ init_completion(&hwr_thread_exited);
+ hwr_pid = kernel_thread(hwr_process, hwr_cdev, CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES);
+ if (hwr_pid < 0) {
+ err = hwr_pid;
+ goto err_out_free_cdev;
+ }
+ err = crypto_device_add(hwr_cdev);
+ if (err)
+ goto err_out_remove_thread;
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s acrypto support is turned on.\n", hwr_cdev->name);
+
+err_out_remove_thread:
+ hwr_need_exit = 1;
+ kill_proc(hwr_pid, SIGTERM, 0);
+ wait_for_completion(&hwr_thread_exited);
+err_out_free_cdev:
+ kfree(hwr_cdev);
+ hwr_cdev = NULL;
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void hwr_acrypto_fini(void)
+{
+ crypto_device_remove(hwr_cdev);
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s acrypto support is turned off.\n", hwr_cdev->name);
+
+ hwr_need_exit = 1;
+ kill_proc(hwr_pid, SIGTERM, 0);
+ wait_for_completion(&hwr_thread_exited);
+
+ kfree(hwr_cdev);
+ hwr_cdev = NULL;
+}
+#else
+static int hwr_acrypto_init(struct rng_operations *ops)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void hwr_acrypto_fini(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
/*
* rng_init_one - look for and attempt to init a single RNG
@@ -549,9 +710,15 @@
goto err_out_cleanup_hw;
}
+ rc = hwr_acrypto_init(rng_ops);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err_out_misc_unregister;
+
DPRINTK ("EXIT, returning 0\n");
return 0;
+err_out_misc_unregister:
+ misc_deregister(&rng_miscdev);
err_out_cleanup_hw:
rng_ops->cleanup();
err_out:
@@ -617,6 +784,8 @@
{
DPRINTK ("ENTER\n");
+ hwr_acrypto_fini();
+
misc_deregister (&rng_miscdev);
if (rng_ops->cleanup)
--
Evgeniy Polyakov
Crash is better than data corruption -- Arthur Grabowski
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-03-25 5:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 97+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-03-15 13:36 ocf-linux-20050315 - Asynchronous Crypto support for linux David McCullough
2005-03-24 4:27 ` [PATCH] API for true Random Number Generators to add entropy (2.6.11) David McCullough
2005-03-24 4:30 ` [PATCH] API for true Random Number Generators to add entropy (2.4.29) David McCullough
2005-03-24 4:33 ` [PATCH] API for true Random Number Generators to add entropy (2.6.11) Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 4:46 ` David McCullough
2005-03-24 4:49 ` Michal Ludvig
2005-03-24 5:13 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 12:37 ` Folkert van Heusden
2005-03-24 12:52 ` David McCullough
2005-03-24 20:51 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 7:18 ` Jan Engelhardt
2005-03-24 7:37 ` Dave Jones
2005-03-24 4:38 ` [PATCH] " Andrew Morton
2005-03-24 5:17 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 5:32 ` Andrew Morton
2005-03-29 1:33 ` Matt Mackall
2005-03-24 5:43 ` Randy.Dunlap
2005-03-24 12:21 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-24 20:39 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-25 4:25 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-25 4:45 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-25 5:46 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-31 3:52 ` David McCullough
2005-03-31 13:58 ` [PATCH] API for TRNG (2.6.11) [Fortuna] Jean-Luc Cooke
2005-04-13 15:36 ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2005-03-24 12:28 ` [PATCH 2.6.12-rc1] API for true Random Number Generators to add entropy David McCullough
2005-03-24 12:38 ` [PATCH] API for true Random Number Generators to add entropy (2.6.11) David McCullough
2005-03-24 18:51 ` Andi Kleen
2005-03-24 20:37 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-27 17:19 ` Andi Kleen
2005-03-27 18:55 ` folkert
2005-03-28 15:20 ` Andi Kleen
2005-03-28 15:24 ` folkert
2005-03-29 7:17 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-29 15:03 ` Andi Kleen
2005-03-29 7:16 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-29 15:07 ` Andi Kleen
2005-03-29 7:15 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 11:59 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-24 12:48 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 13:08 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-24 20:53 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 13:23 ` David McCullough
2005-03-24 13:46 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-24 20:56 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-25 4:34 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-25 4:48 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-25 5:33 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-25 5:58 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-25 6:16 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-25 6:13 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-25 6:34 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-25 6:33 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-25 6:59 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-25 6:56 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-25 7:19 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-25 7:19 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-25 7:38 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-25 7:25 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-25 7:58 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
[not found] ` <424495A8.40804@freescale.com>
2005-03-25 23:43 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-25 23:47 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-26 0:47 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-26 0:36 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-26 8:52 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-28 13:45 ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2005-03-28 21:30 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-29 10:23 ` Pavel Machek
2005-03-29 10:21 ` Pavel Machek
2005-03-29 10:30 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-29 10:38 ` Pavel Machek
2005-03-29 10:45 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-29 10:50 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-29 10:46 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-29 11:42 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-29 11:39 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-29 12:15 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-29 12:13 ` Pavel Machek
2005-03-29 12:43 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-29 13:11 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-29 14:38 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-29 13:48 ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2005-03-29 23:36 ` Andrew James Wade
2005-03-29 22:02 ` Bill Davidsen
2005-03-29 22:24 ` Kyle Moffett
2005-03-29 22:46 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-30 21:22 ` Bill Davidsen
2005-03-30 21:49 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-30 22:27 ` Paul Jackson
2005-03-29 10:18 ` Pavel Machek
2005-03-29 10:25 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-29 10:53 ` Martin Mares
2005-03-24 20:54 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 14:25 ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2005-03-24 20:57 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 21:20 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-25 5:52 ` Evgeniy Polyakov [this message]
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