From: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>,
Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>, Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>,
Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2011 11:24:40 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1316024680.4478.61.camel@nimitz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110914154229.GA9776@albatros>
On Wed, 2011-09-14 at 19:42 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> > In other words, I dunno. If we do this in the kernel, can we at least
> > do something like CONFIG_INSECURE to both track these kinds of things
> > and make it easy to get them out of a developer's way?
>
> What do you think about adding your user to the slabinfo's group or
> chmod it - quite the opposite Ubuntu currently does? I think it is more
> generic (e.g. you may chmod 0444 to allow all users to get debug
> information or just 0440 and chgrp admin to allow only trusted users to
> do it) and your local policy doesn't touch the kernel.
That obviously _works_. I'd be happy to ack your patch. As I said,
it's pretty minimally painful, even to folks who care about slabinfo
like me.
-- Dave
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>,
Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>, Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>,
Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2011 11:24:40 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1316024680.4478.61.camel@nimitz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110914154229.GA9776@albatros>
On Wed, 2011-09-14 at 19:42 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> > In other words, I dunno. If we do this in the kernel, can we at least
> > do something like CONFIG_INSECURE to both track these kinds of things
> > and make it easy to get them out of a developer's way?
>
> What do you think about adding your user to the slabinfo's group or
> chmod it - quite the opposite Ubuntu currently does? I think it is more
> generic (e.g. you may chmod 0444 to allow all users to get debug
> information or just 0440 and chgrp admin to allow only trusted users to
> do it) and your local policy doesn't touch the kernel.
That obviously _works_. I'd be happy to ack your patch. As I said,
it's pretty minimally painful, even to folks who care about slabinfo
like me.
-- Dave
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-09-14 18:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 90+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-09-10 16:40 [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/2] proc: force dcache drop on unauthorized access Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-10 16:40 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-10 16:41 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-10 16:41 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-10 16:41 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-12 15:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Cyrill Gorcunov
2011-09-12 15:06 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2011-09-12 15:06 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2011-09-13 6:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-13 6:28 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-13 6:28 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 13:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 13:16 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 13:16 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 15:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2011-09-14 15:18 ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-14 15:18 ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-14 15:42 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 15:42 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 15:48 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 15:48 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 18:24 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2011-09-14 18:24 ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-14 18:41 ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-14 18:41 ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-14 18:41 ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-14 19:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 19:14 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 19:14 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 19:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2011-09-14 19:27 ` Kees Cook
2011-09-14 19:27 ` Kees Cook
2011-09-18 17:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-18 17:05 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 13:42 ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-19 13:42 ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-19 14:30 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 14:30 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 14:46 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 14:46 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 15:13 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 15:13 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 15:57 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 15:57 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 16:11 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 16:11 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 16:18 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 16:18 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 17:31 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 17:31 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 17:35 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 17:35 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 17:51 ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-19 17:51 ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-19 19:59 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-09-19 20:02 ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-19 20:02 ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-19 20:36 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-09-19 17:51 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 17:51 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 17:58 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 17:58 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 18:46 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 18:46 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 18:55 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 18:55 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 19:20 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 19:20 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 19:33 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 19:33 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 18:55 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-09-19 18:55 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-09-19 19:18 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 19:18 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 19:45 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 19:45 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 20:59 ` David Rientjes
2011-09-19 20:59 ` David Rientjes
2011-09-19 18:03 ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-19 18:03 ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-19 18:21 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 18:21 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 19:45 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-09-19 19:55 ` Alan Cox
2011-09-19 19:55 ` Alan Cox
2011-09-21 17:05 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-21 17:05 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-22 2:20 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-09-22 17:57 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] proc: force dcache drop on unauthorized access Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-22 17:57 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
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