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From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>,
	Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>, Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo
Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2011 21:05:12 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110918170512.GA2351@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110914192744.GC4529@outflux.net>

Hi Andrew,

On Wed, Sep 14, 2011 at 12:27 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Sat, Sep 10, 2011 at 08:41:34PM +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> > Historically /proc/slabinfo has 0444 permissions and is accessible to
> > the world.  slabinfo contains rather private information related both to
> > the kernel and userspace tasks.  Depending on the situation, it might
> > reveal either private information per se or information useful to make
> > another targeted attack.  Some examples of what can be learned by
> > reading/watching for /proc/slabinfo entries:
> > ...
> > World readable slabinfo simplifies kernel developers' job of debugging
> > kernel bugs (e.g. memleaks), but I believe it does more harm than
> > benefits.  For most users 0444 slabinfo is an unreasonable attack vector.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
> 
> Haven't had any mass complaints about the 0400 in Ubuntu (sorry Dave!), so
> I'm obviously for it.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>

Looks like the members of the previous slabinfo discussion don't object
against the patch now and it got two other Reviewed-by responses.  Can
you merge it as-is or should I probably convince someone else?

Thanks,

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>,
	Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>, Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo
Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2011 21:05:12 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110918170512.GA2351@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110914192744.GC4529@outflux.net>

Hi Andrew,

On Wed, Sep 14, 2011 at 12:27 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Sat, Sep 10, 2011 at 08:41:34PM +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> > Historically /proc/slabinfo has 0444 permissions and is accessible to
> > the world.  slabinfo contains rather private information related both to
> > the kernel and userspace tasks.  Depending on the situation, it might
> > reveal either private information per se or information useful to make
> > another targeted attack.  Some examples of what can be learned by
> > reading/watching for /proc/slabinfo entries:
> > ...
> > World readable slabinfo simplifies kernel developers' job of debugging
> > kernel bugs (e.g. memleaks), but I believe it does more harm than
> > benefits.  For most users 0444 slabinfo is an unreasonable attack vector.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
> 
> Haven't had any mass complaints about the 0400 in Ubuntu (sorry Dave!), so
> I'm obviously for it.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>

Looks like the members of the previous slabinfo discussion don't object
against the patch now and it got two other Reviewed-by responses.  Can
you merge it as-is or should I probably convince someone else?

Thanks,

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

--
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  reply	other threads:[~2011-09-18 17:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 90+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-09-10 16:40 [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/2] proc: force dcache drop on unauthorized access Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-10 16:40 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-10 16:41 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-10 16:41   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-10 16:41   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-12 15:06   ` [kernel-hardening] " Cyrill Gorcunov
2011-09-12 15:06     ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2011-09-12 15:06     ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2011-09-13  6:28     ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-13  6:28       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-13  6:28       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 13:16   ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 13:16     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 13:16     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 15:18     ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2011-09-14 15:18       ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-14 15:18       ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-14 15:42       ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 15:42         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 15:48         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 15:48           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 18:24         ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-14 18:24           ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-14 18:41   ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-14 18:41     ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-14 18:41     ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-14 19:14     ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 19:14       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 19:14       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-14 19:27   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2011-09-14 19:27     ` Kees Cook
2011-09-14 19:27     ` Kees Cook
2011-09-18 17:05     ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2011-09-18 17:05       ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 13:42       ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-19 13:42         ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-19 14:30       ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 14:30         ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 14:46         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 14:46           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 15:13           ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 15:13             ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 15:57             ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 15:57               ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 16:11               ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 16:11                 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 16:18                 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 16:18                   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 17:31                   ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 17:31                     ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 17:35                     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 17:35                       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 17:51                       ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-19 17:51                         ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-19 19:59                         ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-09-19 20:02                           ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-19 20:02                             ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-19 20:36                             ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-09-19 17:51                       ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 17:51                         ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 17:58                         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 17:58                           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 18:46                           ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 18:46                             ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 18:55                             ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 18:55                               ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 19:20                               ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 19:20                                 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 19:33                               ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 19:33                                 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 18:55                             ` Linus Torvalds
2011-09-19 18:55                               ` Linus Torvalds
2011-09-19 19:18                               ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 19:18                                 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 19:45                                 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 19:45                                   ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 20:59                                 ` David Rientjes
2011-09-19 20:59                                   ` David Rientjes
2011-09-19 18:03                         ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-19 18:03                           ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-19 18:21                           ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 18:21                             ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-19 19:45           ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-09-19 19:55             ` Alan Cox
2011-09-19 19:55               ` Alan Cox
2011-09-21 17:05               ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-21 17:05                 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-22  2:20                 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-09-22 17:57 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] proc: force dcache drop on unauthorized access Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-22 17:57   ` Vasiliy Kulikov

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