Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX

[Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>]

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> I am not sure what the point of this patchset is. We have a similar
> effect
> to sanitization already in the allocators through two mechanisms:

The rationale was covered earlier. Are you responding to that or did you
not see it?

> 1. Slab poisoning
> 2. Allocation with GFP_ZERO
> 
> I do not think we need a third one. You could accomplish your goals
> much
> easier without this code churn by either
> 
> 1. Improve the existing poisoning mechanism. Ensure that there are no
>    gaps. Security sensitive kernel slab caches can then be created
> with
>    the  POISONING flag set. Maybe add a Kconfig flag that enables
>    POISONING for each cache? What was the issue when you tried using
>    posining for sanitization?
> 
> 2. Add a mechanism that ensures that GFP_ZERO is set for each
> allocation.
>    That way every object you retrieve is zeroed and thus you have
> implied
>    sanitization. This also can be done in a rather simple way by
> changing
>    the  GFP_KERNEL etc constants to include __GFP_ZERO depending on a
>    Kconfig option. Or add some runtime setting of the gfp flags
> somewhere.
> 
> Generally I would favor option #2 if you must have sanitization
> because
> that is the only option to really give you a deterministic content of
> object on each allocation. Any half way measures would not work I
> think.
> 
> Note also that most allocations are already either allocations that
> zero
> the content or they are immediately initializing the content of the
> allocated object. After all the object is not really usable if the
> content is random. You may be able to avoid this whole endeavor by
> auditing the kernel for locations where the object is not initialized
> after allocation.
> 
> Once one recognizes the above it seems that sanitization is pretty
> useless. Its just another pass of writing zeroes before the allocator
> or
> uer of the allocated object sets up deterministic content of the
> object or
> -- in most cases -- zeroes it again.

Sanitization isn't just to prevent leaks from usage of uninitialized
data in later allocations. It's a mitigation for use-after-free (esp. if
it's combined with some form of delayed freeing) and it reduces the
lifetime of data.

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