From: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 2015 11:13:15 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5679A0CB.3060707@labbott.name> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5679943C.1050604@intel.com>
On 12/22/15 10:19 AM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 12/22/2015 10:08 AM, Christoph Lameter wrote:
>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2015, Dave Hansen wrote:
>>>> Why would you use zeros? The point is just to clear the information right?
>>>> The regular poisoning does that.
>>>
>>> It then allows you to avoid the zeroing at allocation time.
>>
>> Well much of the code is expecting a zeroed object from the allocator and
>> its zeroed at that time. Zeroing makes the object cache hot which is an
>> important performance aspect.
>
> Yes, modifying this behavior has a performance impact. It absolutely
> needs to be evaluated, and I wouldn't want to speculate too much on how
> good or bad any of the choices are.
>
> Just to reiterate, I think we have 3 real choices here:
>
> 1. Zero at alloc, only when __GFP_ZERO
> (behavior today)
> 2. Poison at free, also Zero at alloc (when __GFP_ZERO)
> (this patch's proposed behavior, also what current poisoning does,
> doubles writes)
> 3. Zero at free, *don't* Zero at alloc (when __GFP_ZERO)
> (what I'm suggesting, possibly less perf impact vs. #2)
>
>
poisoning with non-zero memory makes it easier to determine that the error
came from accessing the sanitized memory vs. some other case. I don't think
the feature would be as strong if the memory was only zeroed vs. some other
data value.
Thanks,
Laura
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 2015 11:13:15 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5679A0CB.3060707@labbott.name> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5679943C.1050604@intel.com>
On 12/22/15 10:19 AM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 12/22/2015 10:08 AM, Christoph Lameter wrote:
>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2015, Dave Hansen wrote:
>>>> Why would you use zeros? The point is just to clear the information right?
>>>> The regular poisoning does that.
>>>
>>> It then allows you to avoid the zeroing at allocation time.
>>
>> Well much of the code is expecting a zeroed object from the allocator and
>> its zeroed at that time. Zeroing makes the object cache hot which is an
>> important performance aspect.
>
> Yes, modifying this behavior has a performance impact. It absolutely
> needs to be evaluated, and I wouldn't want to speculate too much on how
> good or bad any of the choices are.
>
> Just to reiterate, I think we have 3 real choices here:
>
> 1. Zero at alloc, only when __GFP_ZERO
> (behavior today)
> 2. Poison at free, also Zero at alloc (when __GFP_ZERO)
> (this patch's proposed behavior, also what current poisoning does,
> doubles writes)
> 3. Zero at free, *don't* Zero at alloc (when __GFP_ZERO)
> (what I'm suggesting, possibly less perf impact vs. #2)
>
>
poisoning with non-zero memory makes it easier to determine that the error
came from accessing the sanitized memory vs. some other case. I don't think
the feature would be as strong if the memory was only zeroed vs. some other
data value.
Thanks,
Laura
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-12-22 19:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 113+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-12-22 3:40 [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 1/7] mm/slab_common.c: Add common support for slab saniziation Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vlastimil Babka
2015-12-22 20:48 ` Vlastimil Babka
2015-12-22 20:48 ` Vlastimil Babka
2016-01-06 0:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-06 0:17 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 0:17 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 2:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 2:06 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 2:06 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 0:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-06 0:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 0:19 ` Kees Cook
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 2/7] slub: Add support for sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 3/7] slab: " Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 4/7] slob: " Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 5/7] mm: Mark several cases as SLAB_NO_SANITIZE Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 0:21 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-06 0:21 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 0:21 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 2:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 2:11 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 2:11 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 9:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 9:33 ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 17:51 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 17:51 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 18:37 ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 18:37 ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 19:18 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 19:18 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:01 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 20:01 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 20:06 ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 20:06 ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 14:57 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 14:57 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:25 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:25 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:22 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 17:24 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:28 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 17:28 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 18:08 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 18:08 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 18:19 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 18:19 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 19:13 ` Laura Abbott [this message]
2015-12-22 19:13 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 19:32 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 19:32 ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-06 0:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 0:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 2:46 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 2:46 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 7/7] lkdtm: Add READ_AFTER_FREE test Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 0:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-06 0:15 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 0:15 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 2:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 2:49 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 2:49 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 16:08 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:08 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:08 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:15 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:38 ` Daniel Micay
2015-12-22 20:04 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:04 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:04 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 0:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-06 0:09 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 0:09 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 3:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 3:17 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 3:17 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-07 16:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Lameter
2016-01-07 16:26 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-07 16:26 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-08 1:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-08 1:23 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-08 1:23 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-08 14:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Lameter
2016-01-08 14:07 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-08 14:07 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-14 3:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-14 3:49 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-14 3:49 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21 3:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-21 3:35 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21 3:35 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21 15:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Lameter
2016-01-21 15:39 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-21 15:39 ` Christoph Lameter
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=5679A0CB.3060707@labbott.name \
--to=laura@labbott.name \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=cl@linux.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
--cc=iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=penberg@kernel.org \
--cc=rientjes@google.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.