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From: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>
To: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 2015 11:18:34 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5679A20A.6060407@labbott.name> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+rthh_agt=YmHGUvBo_+-psOg06DYySqyvkvNNuPmrCKiBC2w@mail.gmail.com>

On 12/22/15 10:37 AM, Mathias Krause wrote:
> On 22 December 2015 at 18:51, Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> wrote:
>>> [snip]
>>>
>>> Related to this, have you checked that the sanitization doesn't
>>> interfere with the various slab handling schemes, namely RCU related
>>> specialties? Not all caches are marked SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU, some use
>>> call_rcu() instead, implicitly relying on the semantics RCU'ed slabs
>>> permit, namely allowing a "use-after-free" access to be legitimate
>>> within the RCU grace period. Scrubbing the object during that period
>>> would break that assumption.
>>
>>
>> I haven't looked into that. I was working off the assumption that
>> if the regular SLAB debug poisoning worked so would the sanitization.
>> The regular debug poisoning only checks for SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU so
>> how does that work then?
>
> Maybe it doesn't? ;)
>
> How many systems, do you think, are running with enabled DEBUG_SLAB /
> SLUB_DEBUG in production? Not so many, I'd guess. And the ones running
> into issues probably just disable DEBUG_SLAB / SLUB_DEBUG.
>
> Btw, SLUB not only looks for SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU but also excludes
> "call_rcu slabs" via other mechanisms. As SLUB is the default SLAB
> allocator for quite some time now, even with enabled SLUB_DEBUG one
> wouldn't be able to trigger RCU related sanitization issues.
>

I've seen SLUB_DEBUG used in stress testing situations but you're
right about production and giving up if there are issues. I'll take
a closer look at this.
  
>>> Speaking of RCU, do you have a plan to support RCU'ed slabs as well?
>>>
>>
>> My only plan was to get the base support in. I didn't have a plan to
>> support RCU slabs but that's certainly something to be done in the
>> future.
>
> "Base support", in my opinion, includes covering the buddy allocator
> as well. Otherwise this feature is incomplete.

Point taken. I'll look at the buddy allocator post-holidays.

It was also pointed out I should be giving you full credit for this
feature originally. I apologize for not doing that. Thanks for
doing the original work and taking the time to review this series.

Thanks,
Laura

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>
To: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 2015 11:18:34 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5679A20A.6060407@labbott.name> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+rthh_agt=YmHGUvBo_+-psOg06DYySqyvkvNNuPmrCKiBC2w@mail.gmail.com>

On 12/22/15 10:37 AM, Mathias Krause wrote:
> On 22 December 2015 at 18:51, Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> wrote:
>>> [snip]
>>>
>>> Related to this, have you checked that the sanitization doesn't
>>> interfere with the various slab handling schemes, namely RCU related
>>> specialties? Not all caches are marked SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU, some use
>>> call_rcu() instead, implicitly relying on the semantics RCU'ed slabs
>>> permit, namely allowing a "use-after-free" access to be legitimate
>>> within the RCU grace period. Scrubbing the object during that period
>>> would break that assumption.
>>
>>
>> I haven't looked into that. I was working off the assumption that
>> if the regular SLAB debug poisoning worked so would the sanitization.
>> The regular debug poisoning only checks for SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU so
>> how does that work then?
>
> Maybe it doesn't? ;)
>
> How many systems, do you think, are running with enabled DEBUG_SLAB /
> SLUB_DEBUG in production? Not so many, I'd guess. And the ones running
> into issues probably just disable DEBUG_SLAB / SLUB_DEBUG.
>
> Btw, SLUB not only looks for SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU but also excludes
> "call_rcu slabs" via other mechanisms. As SLUB is the default SLAB
> allocator for quite some time now, even with enabled SLUB_DEBUG one
> wouldn't be able to trigger RCU related sanitization issues.
>

I've seen SLUB_DEBUG used in stress testing situations but you're
right about production and giving up if there are issues. I'll take
a closer look at this.
  
>>> Speaking of RCU, do you have a plan to support RCU'ed slabs as well?
>>>
>>
>> My only plan was to get the base support in. I didn't have a plan to
>> support RCU slabs but that's certainly something to be done in the
>> future.
>
> "Base support", in my opinion, includes covering the buddy allocator
> as well. Otherwise this feature is incomplete.

Point taken. I'll look at the buddy allocator post-holidays.

It was also pointed out I should be giving you full credit for this
feature originally. I apologize for not doing that. Thanks for
doing the original work and taking the time to review this series.

Thanks,
Laura

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  reply	other threads:[~2015-12-22 19:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 113+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-12-22  3:40 [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 1/7] mm/slab_common.c: Add common support for slab saniziation Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Vlastimil Babka
2015-12-22 20:48     ` Vlastimil Babka
2015-12-22 20:48     ` Vlastimil Babka
2016-01-06  0:17     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:17       ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:17       ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:06       ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  2:06         ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  2:06         ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:19   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:19     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:19     ` Kees Cook
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 2/7] slub: Add support for sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 3/7] slab: " Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 4/7] slob: " Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 5/7] mm: Mark several cases as SLAB_NO_SANITIZE Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:21   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:21     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:21     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:11     ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  2:11       ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  2:11       ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  9:33   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2015-12-22  9:33     ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 17:51     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 17:51       ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 18:37       ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 18:37         ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 19:18         ` Laura Abbott [this message]
2015-12-22 19:18           ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:01         ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 20:01           ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 20:06           ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 20:06             ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 14:57   ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 14:57     ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:25     ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:25       ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:22       ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 17:24         ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:28           ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 17:28             ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 18:08             ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 18:08               ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 18:19               ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 18:19                 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 19:13                 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 19:13                   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 19:32                   ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 19:32                     ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-06  0:29                   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:29                     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:46                     ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  2:46                       ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 7/7] lkdtm: Add READ_AFTER_FREE test Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:15   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:15     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:15     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:49     ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  2:49       ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  2:49       ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 16:08 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:08   ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:08   ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:15   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:15     ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:38   ` Daniel Micay
2015-12-22 20:04   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:04     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:04     ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:09     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:09       ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:09       ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  3:17       ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  3:17         ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  3:17         ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-07 16:26         ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Lameter
2016-01-07 16:26           ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-07 16:26           ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-08  1:23           ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-08  1:23             ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-08  1:23             ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-08 14:07             ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Lameter
2016-01-08 14:07               ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-08 14:07               ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-14  3:49               ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-14  3:49                 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-14  3:49                 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21  3:35                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-21  3:35                   ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21  3:35                   ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21 15:39                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Lameter
2016-01-21 15:39                     ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-21 15:39                     ` Christoph Lameter

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