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From: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>
To: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2016 17:23:01 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <568F0F75.4090101@labbott.name> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1601071020570.28979@east.gentwo.org>

On 1/7/16 8:26 AM, Christoph Lameter wrote:
> On Tue, 5 Jan 2016, Laura Abbott wrote:
>
>> It's not the poisoning per se that's incompatible, it's how the poisoning is
>> set up. At least for slub, the current poisoning is part of SLUB_DEBUG which
>> enables other consistency checks on the allocator. Trying to pull out just
>> the poisoning for use when SLUB_DEBUG isn't on would result in roughly what
>> would be here anyway. I looked at trying to reuse some of the existing
>> poisoning
>> and came to the conclusion it was less intrusive to the allocator to keep it
>> separate.
>
> SLUB_DEBUG does *not* enable any debugging features. It builds the logic
> for debugging into the kernel but does not activate it. CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
> is set for production kernels. The poisoning is build in by default into
> any recent linux kernel out there. You can enable poisoning selectively
> (and no other debug feature) by specifying slub_debug=P on the Linux
> kernel command line right now.
>
> There is a SLAB_POISON flag for each kmem_cache that can be set to
> *only* enable poisoning and nothing else from code.
>
>

The slub_debug=P not only poisons it enables other consistency checks on the
slab as well, assuming my understanding of what check_object does is correct.
My hope was to have the poison part only and none of the consistency checks in
an attempt to mitigate performance issues. I misunderstood when the checks
actually run and how SLUB_DEBUG was used.

Another option would be to have a flag like SLAB_NO_SANITY_CHECK.
sanitization enablement would just be that and SLAB_POISON
in the debug options. The disadvantage to this approach would be losing
the sanitization for ->ctor caches (the grsecurity version works around this
by re-initializing with ->ctor, I haven't heard any feedback if this actually
acceptable) and not having some of the fast paths enabled
(assuming I'm understanding the code path correctly.) which would also
be a performance penalty

Thanks,
Laura

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>
To: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2016 17:23:01 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <568F0F75.4090101@labbott.name> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1601071020570.28979@east.gentwo.org>

On 1/7/16 8:26 AM, Christoph Lameter wrote:
> On Tue, 5 Jan 2016, Laura Abbott wrote:
>
>> It's not the poisoning per se that's incompatible, it's how the poisoning is
>> set up. At least for slub, the current poisoning is part of SLUB_DEBUG which
>> enables other consistency checks on the allocator. Trying to pull out just
>> the poisoning for use when SLUB_DEBUG isn't on would result in roughly what
>> would be here anyway. I looked at trying to reuse some of the existing
>> poisoning
>> and came to the conclusion it was less intrusive to the allocator to keep it
>> separate.
>
> SLUB_DEBUG does *not* enable any debugging features. It builds the logic
> for debugging into the kernel but does not activate it. CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
> is set for production kernels. The poisoning is build in by default into
> any recent linux kernel out there. You can enable poisoning selectively
> (and no other debug feature) by specifying slub_debug=P on the Linux
> kernel command line right now.
>
> There is a SLAB_POISON flag for each kmem_cache that can be set to
> *only* enable poisoning and nothing else from code.
>
>

The slub_debug=P not only poisons it enables other consistency checks on the
slab as well, assuming my understanding of what check_object does is correct.
My hope was to have the poison part only and none of the consistency checks in
an attempt to mitigate performance issues. I misunderstood when the checks
actually run and how SLUB_DEBUG was used.

Another option would be to have a flag like SLAB_NO_SANITY_CHECK.
sanitization enablement would just be that and SLAB_POISON
in the debug options. The disadvantage to this approach would be losing
the sanitization for ->ctor caches (the grsecurity version works around this
by re-initializing with ->ctor, I haven't heard any feedback if this actually
acceptable) and not having some of the fast paths enabled
(assuming I'm understanding the code path correctly.) which would also
be a performance penalty

Thanks,
Laura

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>
To: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2016 17:23:01 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <568F0F75.4090101@labbott.name> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1601071020570.28979@east.gentwo.org>

On 1/7/16 8:26 AM, Christoph Lameter wrote:
> On Tue, 5 Jan 2016, Laura Abbott wrote:
>
>> It's not the poisoning per se that's incompatible, it's how the poisoning is
>> set up. At least for slub, the current poisoning is part of SLUB_DEBUG which
>> enables other consistency checks on the allocator. Trying to pull out just
>> the poisoning for use when SLUB_DEBUG isn't on would result in roughly what
>> would be here anyway. I looked at trying to reuse some of the existing
>> poisoning
>> and came to the conclusion it was less intrusive to the allocator to keep it
>> separate.
>
> SLUB_DEBUG does *not* enable any debugging features. It builds the logic
> for debugging into the kernel but does not activate it. CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
> is set for production kernels. The poisoning is build in by default into
> any recent linux kernel out there. You can enable poisoning selectively
> (and no other debug feature) by specifying slub_debug=P on the Linux
> kernel command line right now.
>
> There is a SLAB_POISON flag for each kmem_cache that can be set to
> *only* enable poisoning and nothing else from code.
>
>

The slub_debug=P not only poisons it enables other consistency checks on the
slab as well, assuming my understanding of what check_object does is correct.
My hope was to have the poison part only and none of the consistency checks in
an attempt to mitigate performance issues. I misunderstood when the checks
actually run and how SLUB_DEBUG was used.

Another option would be to have a flag like SLAB_NO_SANITY_CHECK.
sanitization enablement would just be that and SLAB_POISON
in the debug options. The disadvantage to this approach would be losing
the sanitization for ->ctor caches (the grsecurity version works around this
by re-initializing with ->ctor, I haven't heard any feedback if this actually
acceptable) and not having some of the fast paths enabled
(assuming I'm understanding the code path correctly.) which would also
be a performance penalty

Thanks,
Laura

  reply	other threads:[~2016-01-08  1:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 113+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-12-22  3:40 [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 1/7] mm/slab_common.c: Add common support for slab saniziation Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Vlastimil Babka
2015-12-22 20:48     ` Vlastimil Babka
2015-12-22 20:48     ` Vlastimil Babka
2016-01-06  0:17     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:17       ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:17       ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:06       ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  2:06         ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  2:06         ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:19   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:19     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:19     ` Kees Cook
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 2/7] slub: Add support for sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 3/7] slab: " Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 4/7] slob: " Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 5/7] mm: Mark several cases as SLAB_NO_SANITIZE Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:21   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:21     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:21     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:11     ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  2:11       ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  2:11       ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  9:33   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2015-12-22  9:33     ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 17:51     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 17:51       ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 18:37       ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 18:37         ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 19:18         ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 19:18           ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:01         ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 20:01           ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 20:06           ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 20:06             ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 14:57   ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 14:57     ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:25     ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:25       ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:22       ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 17:24         ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:28           ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 17:28             ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 18:08             ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 18:08               ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 18:19               ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 18:19                 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 19:13                 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 19:13                   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 19:32                   ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 19:32                     ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-06  0:29                   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:29                     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:46                     ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  2:46                       ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 7/7] lkdtm: Add READ_AFTER_FREE test Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40   ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:15   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:15     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:15     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:49     ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  2:49       ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  2:49       ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 16:08 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:08   ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:08   ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:15   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:15     ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:38   ` Daniel Micay
2015-12-22 20:04   ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:04     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:04     ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:09     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:09       ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  0:09       ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  3:17       ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  3:17         ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  3:17         ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-07 16:26         ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Lameter
2016-01-07 16:26           ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-07 16:26           ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-08  1:23           ` Laura Abbott [this message]
2016-01-08  1:23             ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-08  1:23             ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-08 14:07             ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Lameter
2016-01-08 14:07               ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-08 14:07               ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-14  3:49               ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-14  3:49                 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-14  3:49                 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21  3:35                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-21  3:35                   ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21  3:35                   ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21 15:39                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Lameter
2016-01-21 15:39                     ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-21 15:39                     ` Christoph Lameter

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