Re: NULL pointer dereference in selinux_ip_postroute_compat

[Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>]

On Wednesday, August 08, 2012 04:51:56 PM Eric Paris wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 8, 2012 at 4:35 PM, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > On Wednesday, August 08, 2012 10:09:38 PM Eric Dumazet wrote:
> > 
> > Actually, the issue is that the shared socket doesn't have an init/alloc
> > function to do the LSM allocation like we do with other sockets so Eric's
> > patch does it as part of ip_send_unicast_reply().
> > 
> > If we look at the relevant part of Eric's patch:
> >  +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> >  +       if (!sk->sk_security && security_sk_alloc(sk, PF_INET,
> >  GFP_ATOMIC))
> >  +                       goto out;
> >  +#endif
> > 
> > ... if we were to remove the CONFIG_SECURITY conditional we would end up
> > calling security_sk_alloc() each time through in the CONFIG_SECURITY=n
> > case as sk->sk_security would never be initialized to a non-NULL value. 
> > In the CONFIG_SECURITY=y case it should only be called once as
> > security_sk_alloc() should set sk->sk_security to a LSM blob.
> 
> Ifndef SECURITY this turns into (because security_sk_alloc is a static
> inline in that case)
> 
> if (!sk->sk_security && 0)
>         goto out;
> 
> Which I'd hope the compiler would optimize.  So that only leaves us
> caring about the case there CONFIG_SECURITY is true.  In that case if
> we need code which does if !alloc'd then alloc it seems we broke the
> model of everything else in the code and added a branch needlessly.
> 
> Could we add a __init function which does the security_sk_alloc() in
> the same file where we declared them?

Is it safe to call security_sk_alloc() from inside another __init function?  I 
think in both the case of SELinux and Smack it shouldn't be a problem, but I'm 
concerned about the more general case of calling a LSM hook potentially before 
the LSM has been initialized.

If that isn't an issue we could probably do something in ip_init().

> > The issue I'm struggling with at present is how should we handle this
> > traffic from a LSM perspective.  The label based LSMs, e.g. SELinux and
> > Smack, use the LSM blob assigned to locally generated outbound traffic to
> > identify the traffic and apply the security policy, so not only do we
> > have to resolve the issue of ensuring the traffic is labeled correctly,
> > we have to do it with a shared socket (although the patch didn't change
> > the shared nature of the socket).
> > 
> > For those who are interested, I think the reasonable labeling solution
> > here is to go with SECINITSID_KERNEL/kernel_t for SELinux and likely the
> > ambient label for Smack as in both the TCP reset and timewait ACK there
> > shouldn't be any actual user data present.
> 
> I'm willing to accept that argument from an SELinux perspective.  I'd
> also accept the argument that it is private and do something similar
> to what we do with IS_PRIVATE on inodes.  Although sockets probably
> don't have a good field to use...

I'm not aware of one.  See my comments on Eric's last patch posting (the other 
Eric, not you).

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com


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