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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	john.johansen@canonical.com
Subject: Re: NULL pointer dereference in selinux_ip_postroute_compat
Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 16:46:59 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1610114.P5WAdux1ri@sifl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1344457972.28967.251.camel@edumazet-glaptop>

On Wednesday, August 08, 2012 10:32:52 PM Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Wed, 2012-08-08 at 22:09 +0200, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> > On Wed, 2012-08-08 at 15:59 -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> > > Seems wrong.  We shouldn't ever need ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY in core
> > > code.
> > 
> > Sure but it seems include file misses an accessor for this.
> > 
> > We could add it on a future cleanup patch, as Paul mentioned.
> 
> I cooked following patch.
> But smack/smack_lsm.c makes a reference to
> smk_of_current()... so it seems we are in a hole...
> 
> It makes little sense to me to have any kind of security on this
> internal sockets.
> 
> Maybe selinux should not crash if sk->sk_security is NULL ?

I realize our last emails probably passed each other mid-flight, but hopefully 
it explains why we can't just pass packets when sk->sk_security is NULL.

Regardless, some quick comments below ...

> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 6c77f63..459eca6 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -4289,10 +4289,13 @@ out:
>  	return 0;
>  }
> 
> -static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, ...
> +static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, ...
>  {
>  	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
> 
> +	if (check && sk->sk_security)
> +		return 0;
> +
>  	sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
>  	if (!sksec)
>  		return -ENOMEM;

I think I might replace the "check" boolean with a "kern/kernel" boolean so 
that in addition to the allocation we can also initialize the socket to 
SECINITSID_KERNEL/kernel_t here in the case when the boolean is set.  The only 
place that would set the boolean to true would be ip_send_unicast_reply(), all 
other callers would set it to false.

> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 8221514..8965cf1 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -1754,11 +1754,14 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct
> *p, struct inode *inode) *
>   * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
>   */
> -static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t
> gfp_flags) +static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family,
> gfp_t gfp_flags, bool check) {
>  	char *csp = smk_of_current();
>  	struct socket_smack *ssp;
> 
> +	if (check && sk->sk_security)
> +		return 0;
> +
>  	ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
>  	if (ssp == NULL)
>  		return -ENOMEM;

In the case of Smack, when the kernel boolean is true I think the right 
solution is to use smack_net_ambient.

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com


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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	john.johansen@canonical.com
Subject: Re: NULL pointer dereference in selinux_ip_postroute_compat
Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2012 16:46:59 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1610114.P5WAdux1ri@sifl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1344457972.28967.251.camel@edumazet-glaptop>

On Wednesday, August 08, 2012 10:32:52 PM Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Wed, 2012-08-08 at 22:09 +0200, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> > On Wed, 2012-08-08 at 15:59 -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> > > Seems wrong.  We shouldn't ever need ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY in core
> > > code.
> > 
> > Sure but it seems include file misses an accessor for this.
> > 
> > We could add it on a future cleanup patch, as Paul mentioned.
> 
> I cooked following patch.
> But smack/smack_lsm.c makes a reference to
> smk_of_current()... so it seems we are in a hole...
> 
> It makes little sense to me to have any kind of security on this
> internal sockets.
> 
> Maybe selinux should not crash if sk->sk_security is NULL ?

I realize our last emails probably passed each other mid-flight, but hopefully 
it explains why we can't just pass packets when sk->sk_security is NULL.

Regardless, some quick comments below ...

> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 6c77f63..459eca6 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -4289,10 +4289,13 @@ out:
>  	return 0;
>  }
> 
> -static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, ...
> +static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, ...
>  {
>  	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
> 
> +	if (check && sk->sk_security)
> +		return 0;
> +
>  	sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
>  	if (!sksec)
>  		return -ENOMEM;

I think I might replace the "check" boolean with a "kern/kernel" boolean so 
that in addition to the allocation we can also initialize the socket to 
SECINITSID_KERNEL/kernel_t here in the case when the boolean is set.  The only 
place that would set the boolean to true would be ip_send_unicast_reply(), all 
other callers would set it to false.

> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 8221514..8965cf1 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -1754,11 +1754,14 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct
> *p, struct inode *inode) *
>   * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
>   */
> -static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t
> gfp_flags) +static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family,
> gfp_t gfp_flags, bool check) {
>  	char *csp = smk_of_current();
>  	struct socket_smack *ssp;
> 
> +	if (check && sk->sk_security)
> +		return 0;
> +
>  	ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
>  	if (ssp == NULL)
>  		return -ENOMEM;

In the case of Smack, when the kernel boolean is true I think the right 
solution is to use smack_net_ambient.

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com


  reply	other threads:[~2012-08-08 20:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-08-07 18:12 NULL pointer dereference in selinux_ip_postroute_compat John Stultz
2012-08-07 21:50 ` Paul Moore
2012-08-07 21:50   ` Paul Moore
2012-08-07 21:58   ` John Stultz
2012-08-07 22:01     ` Paul Moore
2012-08-07 22:01       ` Paul Moore
2012-08-07 22:17       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-08-07 22:17         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-08-07 22:23         ` Paul Moore
2012-08-07 22:23           ` Paul Moore
2012-08-07 22:37         ` John Stultz
2012-08-08 19:14           ` John Stultz
2012-08-08 19:26             ` Paul Moore
2012-08-08 19:26               ` Paul Moore
2012-08-08 19:38               ` Eric Dumazet
2012-08-08 19:49                 ` John Stultz
2012-08-08 20:04                   ` Eric Dumazet
2012-08-08 19:50                 ` Paul Moore
2012-08-08 19:50                   ` Paul Moore
2012-08-08 20:04                   ` Eric Dumazet
2012-08-08 19:59                 ` Eric Paris
2012-08-08 19:59                   ` Eric Paris
2012-08-08 20:09                   ` Eric Dumazet
2012-08-08 20:32                     ` Eric Dumazet
2012-08-08 20:46                       ` Paul Moore [this message]
2012-08-08 20:46                         ` Paul Moore
2012-08-08 21:54                         ` Eric Dumazet
2012-08-09  0:00                           ` Casey Schaufler
2012-08-09  0:00                             ` Casey Schaufler
2012-08-09 13:30                             ` Paul Moore
2012-08-09 13:30                               ` Paul Moore
2012-08-09 14:27                               ` Eric Dumazet
2012-08-09 15:04                                 ` Paul Moore
2012-08-09 15:04                                   ` Paul Moore
2012-08-09 14:50                               ` [PATCH] ipv4: tcp: security_sk_alloc() needed for unicast_sock Eric Dumazet
2012-08-09 15:07                                 ` Paul Moore
2012-08-09 15:07                                   ` Paul Moore
2012-08-09 15:36                                   ` Eric Dumazet
2012-08-09 15:59                                     ` Paul Moore
2012-08-09 15:59                                       ` Paul Moore
2012-08-09 16:05                                     ` Eric Paris
2012-08-09 16:05                                       ` Eric Paris
2012-08-09 16:09                                       ` Paul Moore
2012-08-09 16:09                                         ` Paul Moore
2012-08-09 17:46                                       ` Eric Dumazet
2012-08-09 20:06                                 ` Eric Paris
2012-08-09 20:19                                   ` Paul Moore
2012-08-09 20:19                                     ` Paul Moore
2012-08-09 20:19                                     ` Paul Moore
2012-08-09 21:29                                   ` Eric Dumazet
2012-08-09 21:53                                     ` Casey Schaufler
2012-08-09 21:53                                       ` Casey Schaufler
2012-08-09 22:05                                       ` Eric Dumazet
2012-08-09 22:26                                         ` Casey Schaufler
2012-08-09 22:26                                           ` Casey Schaufler
2012-08-09 22:26                                           ` Casey Schaufler
2012-08-09 23:38                                     ` David Miller
2012-08-09 23:56                                       ` [PATCH] ipv4: tcp: unicast_sock should not land outside of TCP stack Eric Dumazet
2012-08-10  4:05                                         ` David Miller
2012-08-08 20:35                     ` NULL pointer dereference in selinux_ip_postroute_compat Paul Moore
2012-08-08 20:35                       ` Paul Moore
2012-08-08 20:51                       ` Eric Paris
2012-08-08 20:51                         ` Eric Paris
2012-08-08 21:03                         ` Paul Moore
2012-08-08 21:03                           ` Paul Moore
2012-08-08 21:09                           ` Eric Paris
2012-08-08 21:09                             ` Eric Paris
2012-08-08 19:29             ` Eric Dumazet
2012-08-08 16:58         ` John Johansen
2012-08-07 22:26       ` John Stultz
2012-08-07 22:31         ` John Stultz

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