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From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 3/6] tpm2: add hmac checks to tpm2_pcr_extend()
Date: Sat, 10 Mar 2018 14:16:57 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1520720217.4495.15.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1520720026.4495.11.camel@HansenPartnership.com>

We use tpm2_pcr_extend() in trusted keys to extend a PCR to prevent a
key from being re-loaded until the next reboot.  To use this
functionality securely, that extend must be protected by a session
hmac.

Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>

---

v3: add error handling to sessions
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 33 +++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index c0ebfc4efd4d..6ed07ca4a5e8 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -247,13 +247,6 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
 	return rc;
 }
 
-struct tpm2_null_auth_area {
-	__be32  handle;
-	__be16  nonce_size;
-	u8  attributes;
-	__be16  auth_size;
-} __packed;
-
 /**
  * tpm2_pcr_extend() - extend a PCR value
  *
@@ -268,7 +261,7 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count,
 		    struct tpm2_digest *digests)
 {
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
-	struct tpm2_null_auth_area auth_area;
+	struct tpm2_auth *auth;
 	int rc;
 	int i;
 	int j;
@@ -276,20 +269,19 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count,
 	if (count > ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND);
+	rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip, &auth);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, pcr_idx);
+	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND);
+	if (rc) {
+		tpm2_end_auth_session(auth);
+		return rc;
+	}
 
-	auth_area.handle = cpu_to_be32(TPM2_RS_PW);
-	auth_area.nonce_size = 0;
-	auth_area.attributes = 0;
-	auth_area.auth_size = 0;
+	tpm_buf_append_name(&buf, auth, pcr_idx, NULL);
+	tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(&buf, auth, 0, NULL, 0);
 
-	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, sizeof(struct tpm2_null_auth_area));
-	tpm_buf_append(&buf, (const unsigned char *)&auth_area,
-		       sizeof(auth_area));
 	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, count);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
@@ -302,9 +294,10 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count,
 			       hash_digest_size[tpm2_hash_map[j].crypto_id]);
 		}
 	}
-
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0,
-			      "attempting extend a PCR value");
+	tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(&buf, auth);
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &chip->kernel_space, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE,
+			      0, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value");
+	rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(&buf, auth, rc);
 
 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
 
-- 
2.12.3

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com (James Bottomley)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 3/6] tpm2: add hmac checks to tpm2_pcr_extend()
Date: Sat, 10 Mar 2018 14:16:57 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1520720217.4495.15.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1520720026.4495.11.camel@HansenPartnership.com>

We use tpm2_pcr_extend() in trusted keys to extend a PCR to prevent a
key from being re-loaded until the next reboot.  To use this
functionality securely, that extend must be protected by a session
hmac.

Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>

---

v3: add error handling to sessions
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 33 +++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index c0ebfc4efd4d..6ed07ca4a5e8 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -247,13 +247,6 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
 	return rc;
 }
 
-struct tpm2_null_auth_area {
-	__be32  handle;
-	__be16  nonce_size;
-	u8  attributes;
-	__be16  auth_size;
-} __packed;
-
 /**
  * tpm2_pcr_extend() - extend a PCR value
  *
@@ -268,7 +261,7 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count,
 		    struct tpm2_digest *digests)
 {
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
-	struct tpm2_null_auth_area auth_area;
+	struct tpm2_auth *auth;
 	int rc;
 	int i;
 	int j;
@@ -276,20 +269,19 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count,
 	if (count > ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND);
+	rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip, &auth);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, pcr_idx);
+	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND);
+	if (rc) {
+		tpm2_end_auth_session(auth);
+		return rc;
+	}
 
-	auth_area.handle = cpu_to_be32(TPM2_RS_PW);
-	auth_area.nonce_size = 0;
-	auth_area.attributes = 0;
-	auth_area.auth_size = 0;
+	tpm_buf_append_name(&buf, auth, pcr_idx, NULL);
+	tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(&buf, auth, 0, NULL, 0);
 
-	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, sizeof(struct tpm2_null_auth_area));
-	tpm_buf_append(&buf, (const unsigned char *)&auth_area,
-		       sizeof(auth_area));
 	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, count);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
@@ -302,9 +294,10 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count,
 			       hash_digest_size[tpm2_hash_map[j].crypto_id]);
 		}
 	}
-
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0,
-			      "attempting extend a PCR value");
+	tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(&buf, auth);
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &chip->kernel_space, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE,
+			      0, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value");
+	rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(&buf, auth, rc);
 
 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
 
-- 
2.12.3
--
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-03-10 22:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-03-10 22:13 [PATCH v3 0/6] add integrity and security to TPM2 transactions James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:13 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v3 1/6] tpm-buf: create new functions for handling TPM buffers James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:14   ` James Bottomley
2018-03-12 16:00   ` J Freyensee
2018-03-12 16:00     ` J Freyensee
2018-03-12 17:59     ` James Bottomley
2018-03-12 17:59       ` James Bottomley
2018-03-13 16:00       ` J Freyensee
2018-03-13 16:00         ` J Freyensee
2018-03-16 11:58   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-03-16 11:58     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-03-16 12:02     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-03-16 12:02       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-03-10 22:16 ` [PATCH v3 2/6] tpm2-sessions: Add full HMAC and encrypt/decrypt session handling James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:16   ` James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:16 ` James Bottomley [this message]
2018-03-10 22:16   ` [PATCH v3 3/6] tpm2: add hmac checks to tpm2_pcr_extend() James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:17 ` [PATCH v3 4/6] tpm2: add session encryption protection to tpm2_get_random() James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:17   ` James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:19 ` [PATCH v3 5/6] trusted keys: Add session encryption protection to the seal/unseal path James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:19   ` James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:20 ` [PATCH v3 6/6] tpm2-sessions: NOT FOR COMMITTING add sessions testing James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:20   ` James Bottomley
2018-03-12 10:58 ` [PATCH v3 0/6] add integrity and security to TPM2 transactions Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-03-12 10:58   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-03-12 15:57   ` James Bottomley
2018-03-12 15:57     ` James Bottomley
2018-03-16 13:34     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-03-16 13:34       ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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