From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: J Freyensee <why2jjj.linux@gmail.com>, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/6] tpm-buf: create new functions for handling TPM buffers
Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 10:59:13 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1520877553.4522.25.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <277bd8a1-9e7f-f6e8-bede-5208f0456adf@gmail.com>
On Mon, 2018-03-12 at 09:00 -0700, J Freyensee wrote:
> >
> > +int tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal)
> > +{
> > + int rc;
> > +
> > + rc = __tpm_buf_init(buf);
>
>
> Assuming that functions like tpm_buf_init() are the top-level API
> being defined in this patch, shouldn't it check if buf is valid
> before passing into the internal functions like __tpm_buf_init(buf)
> (maybe WARN()/BUG_ON()?). Or does __tpm_buf_init(buf) do this check?
These are kernel internal APIs designed for on stack struct tpm_buf
usage, so I can't think of a viable threat model that would require
this type of checking ... do you have one?
James
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com (James Bottomley)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 1/6] tpm-buf: create new functions for handling TPM buffers
Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 10:59:13 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1520877553.4522.25.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <277bd8a1-9e7f-f6e8-bede-5208f0456adf@gmail.com>
On Mon, 2018-03-12 at 09:00 -0700, J Freyensee wrote:
> >
> > +int tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal)
> > +{
> > + int rc;
> > +
> > + rc = __tpm_buf_init(buf);
>
>
> Assuming that functions like tpm_buf_init() are the top-level API
> being defined in this patch, shouldn't it check if buf is valid
> before passing into the internal functions like __tpm_buf_init(buf)
> (maybe WARN()/BUG_ON()?).? Or does __tpm_buf_init(buf) do this check?
These are kernel internal APIs designed for on stack struct tpm_buf
usage, so I can't think of a viable threat model that would require
this type of checking ... do you have one?
James
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-12 17:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-10 22:13 [PATCH v3 0/6] add integrity and security to TPM2 transactions James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:13 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v3 1/6] tpm-buf: create new functions for handling TPM buffers James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:14 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-12 16:00 ` J Freyensee
2018-03-12 16:00 ` J Freyensee
2018-03-12 17:59 ` James Bottomley [this message]
2018-03-12 17:59 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-13 16:00 ` J Freyensee
2018-03-13 16:00 ` J Freyensee
2018-03-16 11:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-03-16 11:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-03-16 12:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-03-16 12:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-03-10 22:16 ` [PATCH v3 2/6] tpm2-sessions: Add full HMAC and encrypt/decrypt session handling James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:16 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:16 ` [PATCH v3 3/6] tpm2: add hmac checks to tpm2_pcr_extend() James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:16 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:17 ` [PATCH v3 4/6] tpm2: add session encryption protection to tpm2_get_random() James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:17 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:19 ` [PATCH v3 5/6] trusted keys: Add session encryption protection to the seal/unseal path James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:19 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:20 ` [PATCH v3 6/6] tpm2-sessions: NOT FOR COMMITTING add sessions testing James Bottomley
2018-03-10 22:20 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-12 10:58 ` [PATCH v3 0/6] add integrity and security to TPM2 transactions Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-03-12 10:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-03-12 15:57 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-12 15:57 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-16 13:34 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-03-16 13:34 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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