From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net,
hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
corbet@lwn.net, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
jmorris@namei.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs
Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2012 12:55:17 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120406125517.77133b4e.akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1333051320-30872-2-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>
On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:46 -0500
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote:
> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
>
> With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc)
> become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of
> subverting privileged binaries.
The changelog doesn't explain the semantics of the new syscall.
There's a comment way-down-there which I guess suffices, if you hunt
for it.
And the changelog doesn't explain why this is being added. Presumably
seccomp_filter wants/needs this feature but whowhatwherewhenwhy? Spell
it all out, please.
The new syscall mode will be documented in the prctl manpage. Please
cc linux-man@vger.kernel.org and work with Michael on getting this
done?
>
> ...
>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andrew Morton <akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
linux-doc-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
kernel-hardening-ZwoEplunGu1jrUoiu81ncdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org,
netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org,
davem-fT/PcQaiUtIeIZ0/mPfg9Q@public.gmane.org,
hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org,
mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org,
oleg-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org,
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rdunlap-/UHa2rfvQTnk1uMJSBkQmQ@public.gmane.org,
mcgrathr-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org,
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luto-3s7WtUTddSA@public.gmane.org,
eparis-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org,
serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org,
djm-ilwOsaqNJrtAfugRpC6u6w@public.gmane.org,
scarybeasts-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org,
indan-1J6HnF7K7zE@public.gmane.org,
pmoore-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org,
corbet-T1hC0tSOHrs@public.gmane.org,
eric.dumazet-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org,
markus-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org,
coreyb-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org,
keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org,
jmorris-gx6/JNMH7DfYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org,
Andy Lutomirski <luto-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org>,
linux-man-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs
Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2012 12:55:17 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120406125517.77133b4e.akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1333051320-30872-2-git-send-email-wad-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:46 -0500
Will Drewry <wad-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org>
>
> With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc)
> become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of
> subverting privileged binaries.
The changelog doesn't explain the semantics of the new syscall.
There's a comment way-down-there which I guess suffices, if you hunt
for it.
And the changelog doesn't explain why this is being added. Presumably
seccomp_filter wants/needs this feature but whowhatwherewhenwhy? Spell
it all out, please.
The new syscall mode will be documented in the prctl manpage. Please
cc linux-man-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org and work with Michael on getting this
done?
>
> ...
>
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net,
hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
corbet@lwn.net, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
jmorris@namei.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs
Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2012 12:55:17 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120406125517.77133b4e.akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
Message-ID: <20120406195517.wU5BJT9hUi_fe4_rlnHSLIJbiNBN769rbhidgyW2rnY@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1333051320-30872-2-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>
On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:46 -0500
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote:
> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
>
> With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc)
> become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of
> subverting privileged binaries.
The changelog doesn't explain the semantics of the new syscall.
There's a comment way-down-there which I guess suffices, if you hunt
for it.
And the changelog doesn't explain why this is being added. Presumably
seccomp_filter wants/needs this feature but whowhatwherewhenwhy? Spell
it all out, please.
The new syscall mode will be documented in the prctl manpage. Please
cc linux-man@vger.kernel.org and work with Michael on getting this
done?
>
> ...
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-04-06 19:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 146+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-03-29 20:01 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 00/15] seccomp_filter: BPF-based syscall filtering Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 19:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 19:49 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 19:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2012-04-06 19:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-04-06 19:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 20:47 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 20:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:54 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 21:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 21:04 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 21:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 21:15 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 21:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 21:32 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-10 19:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-10 19:12 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 19:55 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2012-04-06 19:55 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 19:55 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:01 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jonathan Corbet
2012-04-06 20:28 ` Jonathan Corbet
2012-04-06 20:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:37 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-11 19:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-11 19:31 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-12 0:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-12 0:15 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-12 0:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-12 0:50 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-16 19:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rob Landley
2012-04-16 19:11 ` Rob Landley
2012-04-10 20:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rob Landley
2012-04-10 20:37 ` Rob Landley
2012-04-10 19:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-10 19:03 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 02/15] Fix apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 03/15] sk_run_filter: add BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 04/15] net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 05/15] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 06/15] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 07/15] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 20:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:05 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:24 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 08/15] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-31 4:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vladimir Murzin
2012-03-31 4:40 ` Vladimir Murzin
2012-03-31 18:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-03-31 18:14 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 20:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:23 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-06 20:44 ` Kees Cook
2012-04-06 21:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:05 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-04-06 21:06 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-04-06 21:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:09 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-08 18:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Indan Zupancic
2012-04-08 18:22 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-04-09 19:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:59 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 9:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2012-04-10 9:48 ` James Morris
2012-04-10 20:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-10 20:00 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-10 20:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-10 20:16 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 20:16 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 10:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Dumazet
2012-04-10 10:34 ` Eric Dumazet
2012-04-10 19:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-10 19:54 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-10 20:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-10 20:15 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 09/15] seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:14 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:26 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:26 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-09 19:32 ` Kees Cook
2012-04-09 19:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Paris
2012-04-09 19:33 ` Eric Paris
2012-04-09 19:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-09 19:39 ` Kees Cook
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 10/15] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:19 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:19 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 11/15] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 12/15] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 13/15] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:24 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:38 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 14/15] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:02 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 15/15] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:02 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:26 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:46 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-09 20:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Markus Gutschke
2012-04-09 20:47 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-09 20:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ryan Ware
2012-04-09 20:58 ` Ryan Ware
2012-04-09 20:58 ` Ryan Ware
2012-04-09 22:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 22:47 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 17:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ryan Ware
2012-04-10 17:49 ` Ryan Ware
2012-04-10 17:49 ` Ryan Ware
2012-03-29 23:11 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v17 00/15] seccomp_filter: BPF-based syscall filtering James Morris
2012-03-29 23:11 ` James Morris
2012-04-06 21:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:28 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:28 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 3:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2012-04-09 3:48 ` James Morris
2012-04-09 3:48 ` James Morris
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